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COLLECTIVE ACTION FOR DEVELOPMENT FINANCE
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ABSTRACT
Recent development challenges highlight a pressing need to reevaluate whether the post-World War II behemoths of
international development finance are up to the tasks being
demanded of them today. These challenges include both the
problems to be addressed (climate change, HIV/AIDS, and abject
poverty among them) and a change in attitude about the desired
modalities for addressing them (financing via inclusive,
participatory, partnerships rather than intergovernmental
organizational fiat).
The institutions that dominate the current order, the United
Nations (―U.N.‖) and the World Bank, have undergone a crisis of
legitimacy. The U.N., though originally charged with protecting
the global welfare, has not played a central role in the design and
financial administration of the more recent innovations in
development finance, such as carbon finance, microfinance, and
public-private financing initiatives. Instead, it has ceded primary
responsibility for innovative international development financing
to the World Bank. However the World Bank, tasked with the
responsibility of being the developing world‘s primary source of
multilateral development finance, struggles with the inherently
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schizophrenic nature of its role as a development institution on the
one hand, and a bank on the other. Repeatedly, its banking id
prevails, too often to the detriment of the development agenda.
Recognizing these inadequacies, the world‘s development aid
donors are engaged in an ongoing quest to find alternatives to
these institutions. This quest takes the form of setting up
numerous funds narrowly tailored to finance specific, narrowlydefined needs. Examples of these funds include the Global
Environment Trust Fund (―GEF‖) and the Global Fund to Fight
HIV Aids, Malaria and Tuberculosis. The Climate Change Fund,
proposed in the December 2009 Copenhagen Accord (and recently
renamed the Green Climate Fund), is poised to follow this
approach.
This ad hoc special-purpose fund approach is reactive and
lacks a coherent, unifying vision of how to meet today‘s
development challenges. The funds that have been created fill a
need but are a fragmented, sub-optimal response to that need.
They suffer from several deficits, ranging from governance gaps
and lacunae in accountability, to uncertain status in the
international political and legal order. These deficits generate new
risks and costs for the international aid architecture.
In this Article, I argue that the time has come to redesign the
interrelationship between these special-purpose funds and the
U.N. and the World Bank so that these funds operate in sync with,
rather than as bypasses to, those institutions. I propose that this redesign occur in two stages. In the immediate term, I argue that the
contributions that the special-fund phenomenon makes to the
design of international development finance should be
strengthened by addressing the governance and other deficits
apparent in these funds‘ structures. Efforts to strengthen these
funds should be informed by an understanding of the task at hand,
drawn from principles of principal-agent and accountability
theory, as applied to third party financing arrangements. In the
longer term, I argue, the popularity of these special purpose funds
as a form of collective finance points to a need to re-design key
aspects of the way the U.N. and the World Bank do business so
that those institutions can serve as effective facilitators and vehicles
of such finance, rather than as pillars of an out-dated model that
has to be circumvented. In furtherance of these arguments, I make
some preliminary suggestions for the kind of short-term and longterm changes I advocate.
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INTRODUCTION

Recent development challenges highlight a pressing need to reevaluate whether the post-World War II behemoths of
international development finance are up to the tasks being
demanded of them today. These challenges include both the
problems to be addressed (climate change, HIV/AIDS and poverty
among them) and a change in attitude about the desired modalities
for addressing them (financing via inclusive, participatory
partnerships rather than intergovernmental organization fiat).
The institutions that dominate the current order, the U.N.1 and
the World Bank,2 as they presently operate, have undergone a
1 The U.N. is a source of economic and technical assistance for
underdeveloped countries. See Pierre de Senarclens, The United Nations as a Social
and Economic Regulator, in REGULATING GLOBALIZATION: CRITICAL APPROACHES TO
GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 8, 9 (Pierre de Senarclens & Ali Kazancigil eds., 2007)
(detailing the role of the U.N. system as ―the symbol of international community,‖
―an essential forum for multilateral diplomacy,‖ and ―a source of economic and
technical assistance for numerous‖ developing countries). Although ―[t]he
maintenance of peace was the main objective for the foundation of the United
Nations organization,‖ its founders believed that governments could not achieve
international security without ―strong international cooperation aimed at
promoting economic progress and social welfare,‖ goals reflected in Article 55 of
the United Nations Charter. Id. at 10. Various UN-related organizations, such as
the United Nations Development Programme (―UNDP‖), the Food and
Agriculture Organization (―FAO‖), the World Food Programme (―WFP‖), and the
World Health Organization (―WHO‖) provide development assistance. See J.
SAMUEL BARKIN, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION: THEORIES AND INSTITUTIONS 107
(2006) (detailing the role of international organizations in development). Of these,
the U.N. entity that is most directly focused on development is UNDP. Id. (stating
that the UNDP‘s ―remit is to provide technical assistance to developing countries‖
and that it ―is most directly focused on development assistance per se‖).
2 The term ―World Bank‖ is commonly used to refer to the institution set up
in 1944, on the heels of World War II, as the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (―IBRD‖) for the purpose of making loans to member countries
at below market rates. See John W. Head, Law and Policy in International Financial
Institutions: The Changing Role of Law in the IMF and the Multilateral Development
Banks, 17 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL‘Y 194, 196–97 (2007) (describing the early
development of the World Bank). Its loans were initially directed at the
reconstruction of post-war Europe but are now exclusively directed at
development for developing county members. Id. (detailing the funds used by
multilateral development banks (―MDBs‖), like the IBRD and the International
Development Association (―IDA‖), to aid economic development in certain
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crisis of legitimacy.3 The U.N., though originally charged with
protecting the global welfare, has not played a central role in the
design and financial administration of the more recent innovations
in development finance, such as carbon finance, microfinance, and
public-private financing initiatives. Instead, it has ceded primary
responsibility for those aspects of innovative international
development financing to the World Bank. The World Bank, on
countries). IBRD has since been joined by four additional institutions: (1) the
International Finance Corporation (―IFC‖), which lends to the private sector; (2)
the International Development Association (―IDA‖), which make interest-free
loans to the poorest countries of the world; (3) the Multilateral Investment
Guaranty Agency (―MIGA‖), which issues guarantees to the private sector against
certain development country risks; and (4) the International Center for the
Settlement of Investment Disputes (―ICSID‖), an arbitrating body. See INT‘L BANK
FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEV., INFORMATION STATEMENT 47 (2010), available at
http://treasury.worldbank.org/cmd/pdf/InformationStatement.PDF (describing
the IFC, IDA, and MIGA as ―affiliated‖ with the IRBD). In this Article, the term
―World Bank‖ will be used to apply interchangeably to IBRD or IDA whether
acting separately or together. See id. at 78–82 (noting that the IDA has no separate
staff but is run wholly by IBRD).
3 See Michael N. Barnett & Martha Finnemore, The Politics, Power, and
Pathologies of International Organizations, 53 INT‘L ORG. 699, 723 (1999) (noting that
the World Bank‘s worldview has translated into a record of development
failures); Ruth W. Grant & Robert O. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of Power
in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 29 (2005) (noting NGOs‘ views that the
World Bank lacks accountability by not having to answer to those whom its
policies affect). The World Bank has been vilified by both aid skeptics, and proaid, anti-globalization protestors. See Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters,
Preface to REINVENTING THE WORLD BANK, at viii (Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A.
Winters eds., 2002) [hereinafter Pincus and Winters, Preface] (posing common
questions concerning the Bank‘s operational capacity and whether it is the
appropriate vehicle for its aid endeavors). Aid skeptics, opposed to government
generally, denounce the Bank as usurping reliance on private markets. Jonathan
R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, in REINVENTING THE
WORLD BANK 1, 2 (Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters eds., 2002) [hereinafter
Pincus & Winters, Reinventing the World Bank] (discussing how the perception that
the integration of global capital markets undermined the rationale of public sector
development lending contributed to the general disappointment in the
institution). Pro-aid, anti-globalization protesters, on the other hand, denounce
the Bank as being captive to the corporate interests of its more powerful members.
Id. Additionally, the ―Fifty Years is Enough‖ campaign surfaced around the
fiftieth year of the Bank‘s founding. See 50 YEARS IS ENOUGH: THE CASE AGAINST
THE WORLD BANK AND THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND (Kevin Danaher ed.,
1994) (compiling various viewpoints of multiple groups opposing the World Bank
for both political and economic reasons). For additional discussion, see de
Senarclens, supra note 1, at 26–35 (citing the ―crisis in the legitimacy and
accountability‖ of the U.N. system); Daniel C. Esty, Good Governance at the
Supranational Scale: Globalizing Administrative Law, 115 YALE L.J. 1490, 1506 (2006)
(noting the trepidation of many national officials and citizens over assigning
responsibility for important domains to an ―ineffectual‖ U.N.).
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the other hand, though tasked with the responsibility of being the
developing world‘s primary source of multilateral development
finance, struggles with the inherently schizophrenic nature of its
role as a development institution on the one hand, and a bank on
the other. Repeatedly, its banking id prevails, too often to the
detriment of the development agenda. For these reasons, there has
been little public support for imposing new or expanded mandates
on these institutions.4 Recognizing this reality, the world‘s
development aid donors are engaged in an ongoing quest to find
alternatives to these institutions.
This quest takes the form of setting up numerous funds
narrowly tailored to finance specific, narrowly-defined needs.
Examples of these funds include the GEF and the Global Fund to
Fight AIDS, Malaria and Tuberculosis. The Climate Change Fund,
proposed by the participants in the 15th Conference of the Parties
of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(―UNFCCC‖) (also known as the Copenhagen Summit),5 and
recently renamed the Green Climate Fund,6 is poised to follow this
approach. The developed countries that participated in the
Copenhagen Summit promised to collectively provide $30 billion
in annual support over the near term (2010-2012) to finance this
fund and financial resources of $100 billion a year by 2020.7 The
4 See Helen V. Milner, Why Multilateralism? Foreign Aid and Domestic PrincipalAgent Problems, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS,
107, 110 (Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006) (noting the strong influence public
sentiment has on member countries‘ support for international organizations).
5 For more information on the Copenhagen Accord, see generally David
Hunter, Implications of the Copenhagen Accord for Global Climate Governance, 10
SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL‘Y 4 (2010) (concluding that while better than nothing,
the Copenhagen Accord will not motivate the world‘s leaders to prioritize longterm climate goals over short-term political needs).
6 See PEW CTR. ON GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE, SIXTEENTH SESSION OF THE
CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON
CLIMATE CHANGE AND SIXTH SESSION OF THE MEETING OF THE PARTIES TO THE KYOTO
PROTOCOL,
[hereinafter
PEW
CANCUN
SUMMARY]
available
at
http://www.pewclimate.org/international/cancun-climate-conference-cop16summary (recounting the discussions at Cancún including the articulated goals,
and future measures to be taken). The fund was renamed at the Sixteenth Session
of the Conference of the Parties in Cancún in December 2010, at which time
participants strengthened their financial commitments to the new fund and
agreed on implementation mechanisms for financing. Id.
7 See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change [UNFCC] Draft Dec. /CP.16 ¶ 95, [hereinafter Cancún Accord], available at http://unfccc.int/files
/meetings/cop_16/application/pdf/cop16_lca.pdf (detailing the general funding
structure resulting from the Copenhagen Summit).
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financing is expected to come from a wide variety of sources, both
public and private, as well as bilateral and multilateral.8 The
participants agreed, however, that the World Bank will serve as
interim trustee of the fund for the first three years.9
This phenomenon of creating new funds to address special
needs in developing countries, epitomized by the decision of the
Copenhagen and Cancún Summit participants, reflects a seismic
change in international development finance and is a byproduct of
Ushered in by the end of the Cold War,
globalization.10
globalization gives rise to both a need and a desire for countries
and their citizens to collaborate together across sovereign
boundaries in unprecedented ways.11 The global problems it has
spawned are too big for any single country to address alone. They
demand a collective response.12 Moreover, the easing of fears of a
Communist world takeover allows for inter-governmental

8 Id. ¶ 99. See Hunter, supra note 5, at 11 (stating further that while funds are
supposed to come from this variety of sources, the institutional structure for
delivering such finance has ―yet to be determined‖).
9 Cancún Accord, supra note 7, ¶ 107. See also PEW CANCUN SUMMARY, supra
note 6, at 4 (stating that three years after the fund begins operations, the World
Bank as interim trustee will be subject to a review). A Transitional Committee
was also established to design the fund which will report to the Seventeenth
Session of the Conference of the Parties in December 2011. Cancún Accord, supra
note 7, ¶ 109.
10 For the purposes of this Article, I take ―globalization‖ to connote an
increased interdependence and interaction among countries and their citizens—
both as between developed and developing countries, and between developed
countries inter se—that began with the end of the Cold War and the subsequent
rise in opportunities for greater transnational activity. See Robert Howse, The End
of the Globalization Debate: A Review Essay, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1528, 1529 (2008)
(reviewing RAWI ABDELAL, CAPTIAL RULES: THE CONSTRUCTION OF GLOBAL FINANCE
(2007); JAGDISH BHAGWATI, IN DEFENSE OF GLOBALIZATION (2007); SASKIA SASSEN,
TERRITORY, AUTHORITY RIGHTS FROM MEDIEVAL TO GLOBAL ASSEMBLAGES (2006);
JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK (2006)) (noting the end of the
Cold War as a formation point for a pro-market consensus in the discussion of
economic globalization).
11 See JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK 277–78 (2006)
(reiterating that the Cold War necessitated collaboration between nations for
development responsibility); Howse, supra note 10, at 1529 (discussing the
dynamic struggle between right and left governmental policies at the close of the
Cold War).
12 See Esty, supra note 3, at 1493 (recognizing that national governments
cannot singularly address the problems associated with globalization and must
work collaboratively for the most effective response).
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collaboration in addressing longstanding needs in developing
countries.13
This increased need for extensive collective financing, when
coupled with a loss of confidence in the established institutions
charged with the primary responsibilities for collective
development finance, presents a conundrum. How should donors
willing to pool their funds to address global and other problems in
developing countries proceed when they have lost faith in the
institutions that handle such financing? This is the question I
examine in this Article.
I analyze this conundrum from the point of view of: what will
it take to create collective financing efforts that optimize the
likelihood that monies pooled by donors for a collective purpose
will be applied to that purpose? This focus is not intended,
however, to ignore or neglect the fact that the question of
overarching importance is whether these financing efforts provide
meaningful development assistance to their third-party
beneficiaries—the citizens of the developing countries that these
collective financing efforts are created to serve. But I take the view
that the development effectiveness of these efforts and the
efficiency, equity, transparency, and accountability with which
they disperse their resources are inextricably intertwined. Taking
measures to lower the agency costs and raise the accountability by
which these efforts discharge their goals is not an exercise which
takes place independent of the ultimate beneficiaries of these
efforts. It requires their involvement and ownership of the process
and that involvement and ownership is a crucial step in these
efforts achieving their goals.
As it currently operates, I maintain that the ad hoc specialpurpose fund approach is reactive and lacks a coherent, unifying
vision of how to meet today‘s development challenges. The funds
that have been created fill a need, but they are a fragmented, sub-

13 See
How
We
Classify
Countries,
WORLD
BANK,
http://data.worldbank.org/about/country-classifications (last visited Aug. 16,
2010) (noting that the World Bank classifies countries with a Gross National
Income per capita under $12,196 as ―developing‖). See also JEFFREY D. SACHS, THE
END OF POVERTY: ECONOMIC POSSIBILITIES FOR OUR TIME 290 (2005) (discussing
calculations for international development through collaboration among World
Bank member nations); Howse, supra note 10, at 1541 (citing JOSEPH STIGLITZ,
MAKING GLOBALIZATION WORK, supra note 11)) (recognizing that these needs, in
addition to global problems, include the needs borne of conflict and abject
poverty).
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optimal response to that need. They suffer from several deficits
ranging from governance gaps and lacunae in accountability to
uncertain status in the international political and legal order—
deficits that generate new risks and costs for the international aid
architecture. Therefore, I claim that we need a new approach.
I base my claim on an analysis of the agency costs,14
accountability gaps, and other shortcomings that inhere in three
major global special purpose funds that precede the Green Climate
Fund and which will likely serve as precedents for it—the Global
Environment Facility Trust Fund (―the GEF Trust Fund‖), the
Education For All Fast Track Initiative Catalytic Trust Fund (―the
Education Fund‖) and the Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria (―the Global Fund‖). I show how these
three funds take two distinct approaches to limiting donors‘
reliance on the World Bank or U.N. to effectuate these funds‘
mandates and why, for differing reasons, neither approach offers
an optimal mechanism for setting up a collective financing
initiative.
In advocating for a new approach, I aim for a solution that will
enable special-purpose funds to operate in sync with—rather than
as bypasses to—those institutions. I propose that change be
considered in two stages. In the immediate term, I argue that the
contributions that special purpose funds make to international
development should be strengthened by addressing the
14 The term ―agency costs‖ refers to the losses and costs donors incur when
they convey funds to an intermediary for the benefit of a developing country and
the World Bank or U.N. then engages in undesired independent action or does
nothing at all. ―Agency costs‖ also refer to the costs donors incur monitoring the
intermediary. See Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy: States,
International Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory in DELEGATION AND AGENCY
IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS, 3, 9 (Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006)
(noting that ―[p]rincipals incur agency losses or costs when agents engage in
undesired independent action or when they themselves expend resources to
contract with or monitor and control those agents‖). ―Agency costs‖ is also a term
in law and economics scholarship on third-party financing arrangements. See
Robert H. Sitkoff, An Agency Costs Theory of Trust Law, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 621,
636–37 (2004).
[I]n economic rather than legal parlance, agency problems are caused by the
impossibility of complete contracting when one party (the agent) has
discretionary and unobservable decision-making authority that affects the wealth
of another party . . . . [U]nless there is a perfect correlation between the agent‘s
effort and the project‘s observable profits . . . it will be difficult for the principal to
prevent shirking by the agent . . . . The losses to the parties that stem from such a
misalignment of interests are called agency costs.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
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governance and other deficits that arise in these funds‘ structures.
I maintain that efforts to strengthen these funds should be
informed by an understanding of the task at hand, drawn from
principles of principal-agent theory15 and accountability theory,16
as applied to third-party financing arrangements. In the longer
term, I argue that the popularity of these special purpose funds as
a form of collective finance points to a need to redesign key aspects
of the way the U.N. and the World Bank do business. If such
reform occurs, those institutions can serve as effective facilitators
and vehicles of collective finance rather than as pillars of an
outdated model that has to be circumvented. In support of my
argument, I make preliminary suggestions for the kind of shortterm and long-term changes that I believe are warranted.
To date, the theoretical underpinnings of these special purpose
funds and their implications for the international legal order have
been neglected. This neglect occurs even though these funds give
rise to the same issues of legitimacy and accountability as the
World Bank and U.N., about which there is an extensive
literature.17 Thus, this Article fills a gap in the legal scholarship on
international development finance. Furthermore, as billions of
dollars pass annually from the developed world to the developing
world through these initiatives,18 and the Green Climate Fund
15 See Milner, supra note 4, at 10 (exploring ―variations in the pattern of
multilateral aid giving over time and across countries using this principal-agent
theory of multilateral allocation‖); Barnett and Finnemore, supra note 3, at 705
(describing the principal-agent theory and its application to analyzing the
autonomy of international organizations).
16 See Grant & Keohane, supra note 3, at 41 (discussing the role of
accountability mechanisms in relation to various actors in global politics and the
various conditions necessary for accountability).
17 See JOHN W. HEAD, LOSING THE GLOBAL DEVELOPMENT WAR 49–62 (2008)
(detailing the origins and consequences of the global economic organizations‘ role
in the ―Global Development War‖); Pincus & Winters, Preface, supra note 3, at vii–
x (prefacing academic responses to the ―reinvention‖ of the World Bank to better
serve poor nations); NGAIRE WOODS, THE GLOBALIZERS: THE IMF, THE WORLD BANK,
AND THEIR BORROWERS 22–38 (2006) (discussing a brief history of the World Bank
and the IMF); de Senarclens, supra note 1, at 9 (discussing the social and economic
regulatory role of the United Nations); BARKIN, supra note 1, at 105–06 (arguing
that ―[t]he World Bank, as a regime, has been criticized from both efficiency and
legitimacy perspectives‖).
18 WORLD BANK, A MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK FOR WORLD BANK ADMINISTERED
TRUST FUNDS at i, World Bank Doc. 41063 (2007) [hereinafter WB TRUST FUNDS
MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK], available at http://www-wds.worldbank.org/external
/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/11/01/000020439_2007110116494
5/Rendered/PDF/410630R200710198.pdf (stating that over $4.4 billion worth of
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gears up to expand this form of finance to an unprecedented
level,19 discussing the elements of an optimal collective financing
approach brings a theoretical optic to bear on an important policy
goal.
Two starting premises underpin my argument.
First,
regardless of whether one believes that the developed world has a
moral or ethical obligation to provide development assistance to
the developing world,20 all can agree on the importance of having
an infrastructure that maximizes the likelihood that the provided
assistance will reach its intended beneficiaries. Second, I proceed
on the basis that providing the optimal airtight delivery
mechanism falls squarely within the remit of the international legal
order.21 All of development‘s stakeholders rely on the legal order

disbursements under trust funds were managed by the World bank Group in
2002). Ilias Bantekas‘ recent monograph is one isolated, useful and timely
exception to this neglect. ILIAS BANTEKAS, TRUST FUNDS UNDER INTERNATIONAL
LAW: TRUSTEE OBLIGATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS AND INTERNATIONAL
DEVELOPMENT BANKS (2009).
19 Cancún Accord, supra note 7, ¶ 8–10 (establishing the Green Climate Fund,
which called for signing nations to significantly increase their contributions aimed
at reducing worldwide greenhouse gas emissions).
20 For discourse in favor of such a moral or ethical obligation, see AMARTYA
SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 8–10 (1999) (advancing the norms, values and
principles associated with development); PETER SINGER, PRACTICAL ETHICS 218–46
(2d ed. 1979) (arguing that developed countries have an ethical obligation to assist
developing countries). For the contrary view, see ROBERT J. BARRO, GETTING IT
RIGHT: MARKETS AND CHOICE IN A FREE SOCIETY (1996) (emphasizing the role of
markets over governments or assistance as the engine of economic growth and
development). Support for the existence of a moral imperative to provide aid
does not preclude recognizing that many other motivations also drive aid. See
Milner, supra note 4, at 108 (noting that the literature on donor motivation points
to two main motivations for aid: ―the satisfaction of recipient needs or of donor
political goals‖ with donor interests being the dominant motive). Furthermore,
this support does note that aid has a checkered history and can have detrimental
effects. See generally DAMBISA MOYO, DEAD AID: WHY AID IS NOT WORKING AND
HOW THERE IS A BETTER WAY FOR AFRICA (2009) (arguing that aid to African
nations is counter-productive and proposing alternatives such as microfinance
and revised property laws). Others argue forcefully that development aid is
essential to global economic stability, pointing out that developing countries face
challenges they cannot handle on their own. See PAUL COLLIER, THE BOTTOM
BILLION: WHY THE POOREST COUNTRIES ARE FAILING AND WHAT CAN BE DONE ABOUT
IT (2007) (arguing that if failed states are ever to be helped, the G8 will have to
adopt preferential trade policies, new laws against corruption, new international
charters, and carefully calibrated military interventions); SACHS, supra note 13, at
56–66 (―[E]ight major categories of problems can cause an economy to stagnate or
decline.‖).
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to provide the infrastructure within which development finance
occurs.
This Article is organized as follows. Section 2.1 shows the
expanding range of needs that collective finance efforts meet and
the approaches on which donors rely to provide such finance. I
show how two competing models have emerged from donors‘
efforts to find alternatives to the World Bank and the U.N. Section
2.2 details the parameters of these models. The first model is a
trust fund set up under the auspices of the World Bank. This
model‘s donor-friendly governance structure allows the donors to
take charge of allocating the fund‘s assets. I refer to this model as a
―Quasi-Entity Fund‖. The other model consists of a stand-alone
fund set up as a legal entity under a national law regime. I refer to
this model as a ―National Law Entity‖. I show how both models
rely on the World Bank and the U.N. to perform certain functions
but differ from an approach that gives those institutions additional
funds directly with broad discretion to address additional causes
as they see fit.
Section 3 critiques these models. I argue that the theoretical
logic of the Quasi-Entity Fund fails due to the extent of the model‘s
continued dependency on the World Bank. I show how this
dependency causes such funds to be dominated by the World
Bank‘s lending agenda22 rather than by the agenda of the donors
21 I refer here to the coordinating role of the legal order. See e.g., Duncan
Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000, in THE NEW LAW
AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 19–72 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds., 2006)
(arguing that ―[l]egal institutions and ideas have a dynamic, or dialectical, or
constitutive relationship to economic activity‖).
22 Pincus & Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, supra note 3, at 24 (describing
the highly centralized nature of the World Bank and how a voluntary surrender of
control is unlikely); WOODS, supra note 17, at 212 (―Each member government, and
the IMF and World Bank, must balance private initiatives with public purpose,
weighing competing priorities and making decisions which create winners and
losers.‖); BARKIN, supra note 1, at 137 (discussing how developing countries are
receiving greater decisional power in international organizations, though this
change is ―concentrated in a small group of big and influential developing
countries, led by China and India‖); STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS,
111TH CONG., REP. ON THE INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS: A CALL FOR
CHANGE (Comm. Print Mar. 10, 2010) [hereinafter Senate Committee Report]
available
at
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&cd=1&ved
=0CBIQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fforeign.senate.gov%2Freports%2Fdownload
%2F%3Fid%3D92182c41-3b05-45f8-99d9-59d3034485f2&ei=UHxxTOvsGML
_lgfGsdixDw&usg=AFQjCNEqYLyrsnMsBD4z4Ifpm5I1SebOKA; Galit Sarfaty,
Why Culture Matters in International Institutions: The Marginality of Human Rights at
the World Bank, 103 AM. J. INT‘L L. 647, 682 (2009) (discussing how the decision
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who created the fund, or the agenda of the fund‘s beneficiaries—a
result this model was specifically designed to avoid. I further
show that the model‘s governance structure as currently conceived
gives rise to several significant gaps in accountability23 with
potentially negative outcomes for all stakeholders.
I argue that the theoretical logic of the National Law Entity has
promise. It succeeds in avoiding some of the agency costs that
donors would incur if they put these resources under the direct
control of the U.N. or the World Bank. The flexibility of its
structure allows for greater input from beneficiary countries than
occurs under the governance structures of those institutions. I
maintain, however, that this model is not a complete answer to the
need for improved mechanisms for collective finance. To date, this
model has depended on existing institutions agreeing to cooperate
with the National Law Entities in discrete but essential ways. As
these entities increase in size and scope, however, and begin to
look like competitors of existing institutions, donors cannot count
on that cooperation being indefinitely available. Further, I point
out that although donors may be committed to providing financial
assistance for a particular purpose, they may not want to commit
to the degree of responsibility and expense involved in this model.
Lastly, I show that since special interest funds do not have legal
status and capacity under international law, they may face
obstacles that prevent them from operating optimally.
Section 4 sounds a call for change. The new collective finance
models are symptoms of a larger issue that needs a long-term
solution; specifically, that the institutions charged with primary
responsibility for international development finance are not the
kind of institutions the international community needs or wants
anymore. Any redesign of the interrelationship between the
phenomenon of these special-purpose funds, the U.N. and the
World Bank, however, will have to be tackled on a two-track basis:
(1) a long-term solution with a new vision compatible with the new
making process of the World Bank affected its decision not to adopt a human
rights policy).
23 These gaps include, but are not limited to, fiscal accountability, defined by
Grant and Keohane as the ―mechanism through which funding agencies can
demand reports from, and ultimately sanction, agencies that are recipients of
funding.‖ Grant and Keohane, supra note 3, at 36. Grant and Keohane note that
this form of accountability is particularly important for ―organizations such as the
United Nations and the World Bank, which rely on government appropriations to
fund substantial parts of their activities.‖ Id.
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world order, and (2) a more immediate solution comprised of
various changes to make special purpose funds more effective in
the interim. I make some preliminary suggestions for the kind of
short-term and long-term changes advocated.
The long-term approach must inevitably entail an overhaul of
the way in which the U.N. and the World Bank address the needs
that special purpose funds serve. The more immediate approach,
focused on making special purpose funds work better, would
involve several incremental but cumulative changes to the existing
models. I propose that these include creating a new institution—
an international development fund manager—the sole function of
which would be to provide the financial management services
required for collective financing. I also suggest expanding the
range of options upon which donors can draw to create
autonomous collective financing efforts for development in both
domestic and international law.
In conclusion, my aim in filling the gap in legal scholarship on
collective financing initiatives for development is to stimulate
debate about the best way to create a framework for collective
financing that meets the needs of the new world order, better
serves the interests of all of development‘s stakeholders, and
facilitates the delivery of funds to the purposes and people that
depend upon them.
2.

THE COLLECTIVE FINANCE CHALLENGE

2.1. Part I of the Collective Finance Challenge
2.1.1. An Exponential Growth in Demand
Globalization24 generates a significant demand for collective
financing for development. Critical global issues—including
climate change, infectious diseases and financial crises—emerge as
byproducts of globalization25 and are especially acute in
developing countries. Developing countries lack the resources to
address these issues, but a failure to act puts the whole world in
24 See BARKIN, supra note 1, at 7 (discussing globalization in the realm of
international governance); Howse, supra note 10, at 1529 (reviewing various
claims about the origins and theoretical end of globalization).
25 See Esty, supra note 3, at 1500 (noting that globalization gives rise to a
point of interconnectedness as unintended consequences of policy choices, e.g.,
the open borders of free trade and ―free travel create an exposure to the spread of
disease, requiring a commitment to coordinated policy response‖).
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jeopardy.26 Moreover, no single donor country can alleviate these
issues alone.27 Accordingly, global problems create a need for
extensive collective financing and a dynamic pooling of up-to-date
knowledge on treatments, causes, effects, and cures.28
Globalization has also spurred collective financing in other
aspects of development aid. At the start of the new millennium,
globalization‘s contribution to new levels of prosperity in the
developed world generated a more magnanimous and egalitarian
This led to a highly public
approach to development.29
commitment on the part of donor countries to ―eradicate‖ extreme
poverty by 2015 and to work ―in partnership‖ with local
governments and non-government entities to do so.
This
commitment was memorialized in the Millennium Development
Goals (―MDGs‖).30 The end of the Cold War, which sparked the
process of globalization,31 also facilitated a norm of cooperation
among donor countries in the aid effort. For example, this norm is

26 Id. at 1495–96 (discussing the benefits of global governance and adherence
to a set of roles that are embodied in administrative law).
27 See generally, Jeremy Heimans, Multifactor Global Funds: New Tools to
Address Urgent Global Problems 1 (UN Univ. World Inst. For Dev. Econ. Research,
Research Paper No. 2004/47, 2004), available at http://www.wider.unu.edu
/publications/working-papers/research-papers/2004/en_GB/rp2004047/_files/78091745868055742/default/rp2004-047.pdf
(considering
how
desirable multifactor global funds are for resource allocation and arguing that
they promise to mobilize more public and private resources).
28 See Esty, supra note 3, at 1500–01 (noting that supranational policymaking,
of which one can view multilateral aid as a subset, can be advisable for many
reasons, including the fact that ―[m]any policy problems have multiple
dimensions, making response strategies that draw on both decentralized and
centralized information optimal‖).
29 SACHS, supra note 13, at 211–13 (listing the eight goals and eighteen targets
of the Millennium Development Goals).
30 At the United Nations Millennium Summit, representatives of most of the
world‘s governments and its leading development institutions gathered at the
Millennium Assembly of the United Nations to agree upon priorities for
development aid for the new millennium, and agreed upon eight goals, the
―Millennium Development Goals,‖ the eighth of which expressly acknowledged
the importance of achieving development through partnerships. Millennium
Declaration G.A. Res. 55/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/2 (Sept. 18, 2000).
31 See ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER 42 (2004) (opining that
―[a]s the bipolar state system of the Cold War disappeared and nonstate, substate, and supranational actors rode the tide of globalization, pundits and many
scholars began heralding the era of complex, multilevel, global governance, tied
together by networks‖).
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reflected in the Paris Declaration on Aid Harmonization, in which
donor countries agreed to harmonize their approaches to aid.32
In addition to generating and facilitating an increased need for
collective financing, globalization also brings new donors (and
new recipients) into the international development fold. These
new actors consist most notably of non-governmental
organizations (―NGOs‖), whose explosive growth is generally
Numerous NGOs are now
attributed to globalization.33
extensively involved in development as implementers of
programs,34 as consultants to and observers of policy dialogues,
and as watchdogs over countries‘ aid commitments.35 Other new
actors include foundations that are significant development aid
donors, such as the Gates Foundation and the Soros Foundation,36
and for-profit entities, such as pharmaceutical companies engaged
with donor governments in subsidized arrangements to produce

32 See,
e.g., Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness: Ownership,
Harmonization, Alignment, Results and Mutual Accountability (Mar. 2, 2005),
available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf. Later, in 2008,
participating countries and organizations agreed to the Accra Agenda for Action,
which was also non-binding.
Accra Agenda for Action, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/11/41/34428351.pdf.
33 Commentators also point to the role of the internet in facilitating NGOs‘
communication as a contributing factor in NGOs‘ growth, with the internet being
seen as one of the cornerstones of globalization. See Jessica T. Mathews, Power
Shift, 76 FOREIGN AFF. 50, 51–67 (1997) (noting that the end of the Cold War
brought a novel redistribution of power among states, markets and civil society,
spurred on by the computer and telecommunications revolution); Peter J. Spiro,
Accounting for NGOs, 3 Chi. J. Int‘l L. 161 (2002) (observing that the advent of
globalization has empowered NGOs).
34 See LAWRENCE ZIRING ET AL., THE UNITED NATIONS: INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATION AND WORLD POLITICS 82–83 (4th ed. 2005) (discussing the role of
NGOs in development policy decisions and the implementation of social and
economic development programs).
35 See id. at 82 (noting that the advice and support of NGOs can be crucial to
the overall coordination of development programs); Milner, supra note 4, at 120
(describing how NGO endorsement and evaluation of aid programs facilitates the
strength and success of development programs).
36 The Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation gave a combined total of over $2.28
billion to global development and health programs in 2008. See BILL & MELINDA
GATES
FOUND.,
2008
ANNUAL
REPORT
23
(2008),
available
at
http://www.gatesfoundation.org/annualreport/2008/Documents/2008-annualreport.pdf. The same year, the Soros Foundations reported over $77 million in
international initiatives. See SOROS FOUND., 2008 NETWORK REPORT 88 (2008),
available at http://www.soros.org/resources/articles_publications/publications
/ar08_20090720/ar08_20090911.pdf.
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the medications and vaccines that developing countries need.37
The combination of all these factors has led to an exponential
increase over the last fifteen years in the number of collective
financing efforts created to address global problems and other
development needs.38 The Green Climate Fund is poised to
become one more.
The programs and activities that these existing efforts finance
are as diverse as the world they serve. They address global
problems and critical development needs. They also include
efforts to pilot innovative forms of financing to address these
needs, such as microfinance and carbon finance.39 These efforts,
37 See, e.g., Innovative Partnership, GLOBAL ALLIANCE FOR VACCINES AND
IMMUNIZATION (―GAVI‖), http://www.gavialliance.org/about/in_partnership
/index.php (last visited July 27, 2010) (representing a global partnership, whose
members include ―governments, private sector philanthropists . . . the financial
community, developed and developing country vaccine manufacturers [and]
research and technical institutes,‖ dedicated to providing immunizations to
children worldwide); Why IFFIm?, International Financing Facility for
Immunizations (―IFFIm‖), http://www.iff-immunisation.org (last visited July 27,
2010) (raising over $3 billion in funds for GAVI‘s immunization programs). Many
other kinds of corporations are also part of collective development aid initiatives,
such as efforts to combat climate change and child health. See, e.g., Prototype
Carbon Fund, WORLD BANK CARBON FINANCE UNIT, http://wbcarbonfinance.org
/Router.cfm?Page=PCF (last visited July 28, 2010) (partnering several Japanese
utility companies and other private companies with six governments acting
collectively to reduce greenhouse gas emissions).
38 Reports of the rapid increase in the World Bank‘s involvement, as the
preeminent international development entity, evidence the growing importance of
this form of financing. See BARKIN, supra note 1, at 103 (―The World Bank is the
world‘s premier development lending institution.‖). The exponential growth of
this financing is well documented by the World Bank. See, e.g., WORLD BANK
OPERATIONS EVALUATION DEP‘T, THE WORLD BANK‘S APPROACH TO GLOBAL
PROGRAMS: AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION, PHASE 1 REPORT para. 3.13, at 14 (2002)
[hereinafter OED PHASE I REPORT], available at http://lnweb90.worldbank.org
/oed/oeddoclib.nsf/DocUNIDViewForJavaSearch/F97A9075E643981785256C070
0753005/$file/GPPP.pdf (noting that the World Bank‘s portfolio of funds for such
programs increased from $383 million in 1997 to $515 million in 2001); see also WB
TRUST FUNDS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, para. 1.02, at 1 (noting that
the World Bank administers funds for programs financed by over 290 different
donors, including both governments and private sector (nonprofit and for-profit)
entities). See generally BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 132 (noting the World Bank‘s
practice of establishing funds after a natural disasters and other large scale
emergencies to address the emergency); Sophie Smyth, World Bank Grants in a
Changed World Order: How Do We Referee this New Paradigm?, 30 U. PA. J. INT‘L L.
483, 518–26 (2008) (detailing the grants the World Bank issues from trust funds,
IDA resources and the World Bank‘s net income).
39 See
Afghanistan
Reconstruction
Trust
Fund,
WORLD
BANK,
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTAFGHANISTAN/Resources/Afghanista
n-Reconstructional-Trust-Fund/ARTF_information.pdf
(follow
―ARTF
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respectively, make funds available to new recipients and expand
the pool of available financing. In size, they range from a few
hundred thousand dollars to several billion dollars.40 In the
aggregate, these efforts play a vital role in helping narrow the
eternal gap41 between the size of the developing world‘s needs and
the size of developed countries‘ development aid budgets.
2.1.2. Agency Costs and Collective Finance
The rapid growth and current prevalence of collective
financing shows a strong commitment to collective financing but
masks the fact that the international legal framework for this
financing fails to provide an adequate means for curbing agency
costs; the bugaboo of the kind of third party financing
arrangements that these collective efforts involve.42 A closer look
Information‖ hyperlink) (last visited July 27, 2010) (providing post-conflict
reconstruction assistance through joint efforts between the World Bank and the
Afghani
government);
About
Cities
Alliance,
CITIES
ALLIANCE,
http://www.citiesalliance.org/ca/about-cities-alliance (last visited July 27, 2010)
(creating a global coalition of cities working together to reduce poverty and
eradicate slum conditions); About Us, CONSULTATIVE GROUP TO ASSIST THE POOR
(―CGAP‖), http://www.cgap.org/p/site/c/aboutus/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2011)
(increasing access to finance for poor populations); Carbon Finance at the World
Bank, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS
/ENVIRONMENT/EXTCARBONFINANCE/0,,menuPK:4125909~pagePK:64168
427~piPK:64168435~theSitePK:4125853,00.html (last visited Mar. 18, 2011)
(program piloted the purchase of greenhouse gas emission reductions for projects
in developing countries); CARIBBEAN CATASTROPHIC RISK INSURANCE FACILITY,
http://www.ccrif.org (last visited July 27, 2010) (allowing Caribbean
governments to purchase natural disaster insurance at low prices); Community
Development
Carbon
Fund,
WORLD
BANK,
http://go.worldbank.org
/QNLHGWLPS0 (last visited July 27, 2010) (providing carbon financing to poorer
areas in the world). In addition to these global initiatives discussed, see, for
example, smaller initiatives such as the Critical Ecosystem Partnership Fund and
the International Coral Reef Initiative, which are funded by a combination of
NGOs, governments, and intergovernmental organizations. See About CEPF,
CRITICAL
ECOSYSTEM
PARTNERSHIP
FUND,
http://www.cepf.net
/about_cepf/Pages/default.aspx (last visited July 27, 2010) (providing grants to
NGOs and private sector partners to protect critical ecosystems); ICRI at a Glance,
INTERNATIONAL CORAL REEF INITIATIVE, http://www.icriforum.org/about-icri (last
visited July 27, 2010) (preserving coral reefs and related ecosystems).
40 See WB TRUST FUNDS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, para. 2, at i
(outlining the variability in size of trust funds and discussing the steady growth of
overall trust fund disbursements in recent years).
41 See SACHS, supra note 13, at 273, 283 (discussing a five-part poverty
reduction strategy and listing donors supporting the U.N. Millennium Project).
42 See Sitkoff, supra note 14, at 636–38 (arguing that agency costs are a product
of post-contractual asymmetric information).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss4/1

SMYTH.DOC

2011]

4/24/2011 9:51 AM

COLLECTIVE FINANCE CHALLENGE

979

at the tasks involved in creating and running a collective financing
effort illustrates the challenges these efforts present, both at the
practical and theoretical level.
2.1.2.1. The Source of Agency Costs
The creation of a new collective financing effort requires both
financial administration and development-focused activities,43 two
tasks that require different capacities. Financial administration is a
banking task that does not require development expertise. In order
for a group of donors to pool their resources in a central fund to
finance the provision of assistance to developing countries, they
must either appoint one of their group or retain a third party to
serve as the financial administrator of the funding pool.44 Financial
administration expertise is required to administer the donors‘ pool
of funds. For example, someone must be responsible for collecting
donors‘ contributions, investing them pending their disbursement,
disbursing them in accordance with the donors‘ instructions, and
reporting regularly to donors on their use.45 In undertaking these
functions, the financial administrator is generally regarded as
having undertaken certain fiduciary duties to the donors.46
Traditionally, donor countries do not manage each others‘
funds.47 Instead, they generally use a third party to serve as a
43 See Sophie Smyth, A Practical Guide to Creating a Collective Financing Effort to
Save the World: The Global Environment Facility Experience, 22 GEO. INT‘L ENVTL. L.
REV. 29, 35–36 (2009) (discussing the choices parties have to make when creating a
collective financing initiative).
44 See id. at 97 (discussing how the structure of successful collective finance
necessitates the appointment of a financial manager to facilitate the collective
financing efforts of donors).
45 See id. (describing the responsibilities for the financial manager of a
collective fund).
46 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 27 (noting that under international law,
trusts give rise to relationships that are more akin to contractual relationships
than to the relationships based on fiduciary duties drawn from the common law
of trusts, but that the common law principles of trust still provides useful
analogies that can be drawn upon). See generally Joseph Gold, Trust Funds in
International Law: The Contribution of the International Monetary Fund to a Code of
Principles, 72 AM. J. INT‘L L. 856, 860–65 (1978) (noting, for example, that the duty
of loyalty prohibiting the fund manager from investing the donors‘ assets in
securities owned or controlled by the fund manager applies to intergovernmental
trusts).
47 As part of their new commitment to harmonize aid approaches, some
donor governments manage the aid funds of others, pursuant to collective
approaches. See generally Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness, supra note 32;
Accra Agenda for Action, supra note 32 (increasing joint efforts to direct
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financial manager for a new development effort.48 Donor countries
are likely to seek an intergovernmental organization to act as a
third party. While commercial banks could also serve this role,
they are more expensive49 and carry a liquidity risk. Moreover,
they are likely unfamiliar with the idiosyncrasies of the
governmental aid appropriations processes, which augurs in favor
of having an intergovernmental entity perform these functions.50
The development task involved in a collective financing effort
is distinct from the financial housekeeping involved in managing a
fund‘s financial resources. It consists of designing, appraising,
executing, supervising and monitoring programs and projects
intended to produce the results for which donors provide
resources.51 The development task requires extensive development
expertise and, depending on the scale of the activities involved,
will likely engage multiple layers of intermediaries, including
international and regional intergovernmental organizations,
bilateral government aid agencies, developing country government
agencies and NGOs.52
Both the financial administration task and the development
task necessitate reliance on third parties as intermediaries, or
middlemen, and thereby give rise to agency cost concerns. Faced
with tasks that donor countries cannot perform themselves, they

involvement of donor countries in delivering and managing aid); Norwegian
Agency for Development Cooperation, NORDIC PLUS: PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
DELEGATED
COOPERATION,
Annex
2
at
31
(2006),
available
at
http://www.norad.no/en/Tools+and+publications/Publications/Publication+P
age?key=109585 (providing an overview of the financial management
requirements of the Nordic Plus donors to increase aid effectiveness).
48 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 6–7 (describing an international trust fund
in which the trustee, independent and distinct from the donor, manages the funds
for the benefit of the beneficiary country).
49 Although the World Bank charges a trust administration fee, it is set at a
below-market rate. See WB TRUST FUNDS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18,
at 42 (discussing the World Bank‘s standard fees).
50 See Smyth, supra note 43, at 33 (noting that managing a collective financing
effort ―demands an affinity with the idiosyncratic, at times arcane, appropriations
processes of national governments‖ and international institutions).
51 See e.g., Project Cycle, WORLD BANK, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE
/EXTERNAL/PROJECTS/0,,contentMDK:20120731~menuPK:41390~pagePK:413
67~piPK:51533~theSitePK:40941,00.html (last visited Mar. 2, 2011) (detailing the
World Bank‘s process for administering loans ―to low and middle-income
countries to support development‖).
52 See Milner, supra note 4, at 115 (noting that foreign aid, ―[l]ike all public
spending, it involves long chains of delegation‖).
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must choose either to (i) engage an existing entity or entities to
perform those tasks, including, if necessary, amending such
entities to equip them to serve, (ii) create a new entity or entities of
their own design, or (iii) adopt a hybrid approach that uses
selected aspects of existing entities but sets up a new mechanism to
perform the functions that donors do not want the existing entity
to perform.53 Donors‘ key concern is to find a mechanism that
maximizes the likelihood that their resources will be used for the
purposes for which they are making them available. This is the
Holy Grail of any third-party financing arrangement.54
2.1.2.2. Agency Costs and Principal-Agent Theory
Situating the donors‘ quest in the language of principal-agent
theory, as articulated and applied to international development
finance by Darren G. Hawkins, David A. Lake, Daniel L. Nielson,
and Michael J. Tierney,55 the key aspect of agency costs that
53 See id. at 114–22 (analyzing the conditions under which donor countries
will opt to provide multilateral rather than bilateral aid); Esty, supra note 3, at
1510 (―National governments must contract for decision-making authority to be
lodged at the supranational level. Nation-states will tend to engage in such
delegation when they believe that it is in their best interest to do so, based on
potential gains . . . in responding to collective action problems.‖).
54 See Mona M. Lyne et al., Who Delegates? Alternative Models of Principals in
Development Aid, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
41, 43–44 (Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006) (proposing methods to determine
whether and how well international organizations comply with the instructions of
their principals). While I recognize that the donors‘ ultimate goal is, of course, for
a development result to be achieved (such as the containment of HIV/AIDS,
global environmental degradation, or the attainment of universal primary
education), assessing the development effectiveness of these funds, which
requires a development analysis rather than a legal analysis, is beyond the scope
of this Article‘s inquiry. Concerns have been raised about the fragmentation of
aid resulting from creating multiple special purpose funds. See Shampa Biswas,
W(h)ither the Nation-state? National and State Identity in the Face of Fragmentation and
Globalisation, 16 GLOBAL SOC‘Y 175, 177, 194 (2002). But these concerns must be
weighed against the fact that special purpose funds generate a support for aid
efforts that would not otherwise exist. See Heimans, supra note 27, at 11–13
(arguing that multi-actor global funds are magnets for additional funding and are
created under the expectation that they will be able to mobilize additional
resources that could not be raised through existing national or international
financing channels).
55 See Darren G. Hawkins et al., Delegation under Anarchy: States, International
Organizations, and Principal-Agent Theory, in DELEGATION AND AGENCY IN
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 3, 4–8 (Darren G. Hawkins et al. eds., 2006)
[hereinafter Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy] (arguing that principalagent theory views international organizations as the agents of the principal
member states which create them, and finds that the rules governing such
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concerns development aid donors is agency slack. Agency slack
refers to independent action by the agent—the entity or entities to
which donors entrust their pooled resources—that is undesired by
the donors.56 In searching for an effective financing vehicle,
therefore, donors are looking to minimize the likelihood of, and
opportunity for, the occurrence of slack.57
Slack may occur in two primary forms: ―shirking, when an
agent minimizes the effort it exerts on its principal‘s behalf, and
slippage, when an agent shifts policy away from its principal‘s
preferred outcome and towards its own preferences.‖58 Principals
generally use one or more of three standard mechanisms to control
agency slack.59 The first method requires crafting the principalagent relationship as a rule-based delegation by the principal to the
agent, thereby limiting the agent‘s discretion. The second method
involves the establishment of ex post monitoring and reporting
requirements.60 The third requires principals to select agents with
preferences similar to their own, agents who are, therefore,
naturally inclined to act as the principal would if it were
implementing the task itself.61 A principal may also structure the
agency relationship so as to rely on internal checks and balances in
the agent institution.62 Lastly, a principal may use carrots and

organizations are member governments‘ efforts to limit opportunities for
international organizations to stray from their core mandate).
56 Id. at 8.
See also Lyne et al., supra note 54, at 43–44 (providing
recommendations in response to agency slack).
57 See Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 8 (defining
―agency slack‖).
58 Id.
59 Id. at 30 (noting the different ways principals sanction agents and
principals‘ tendency to impose more extensive rules and monitoring
arrangements where an agent‘s preferences are unknown).
60 Ex post monitoring and reporting requirements may take the form of direct
monitoring of the agent by the principal to identify malfeasance (police patrols) or
they may rely upon affected parties outside the agency relationship to bring
evidence of slack to the principal‘s attention (fire alarms). Id. at 28.
61 Id. at 28–29.
62 For example, the principal may ask one department in the agent institution
to assume responsibility for the development task involved in a collective
financing effort but a different department to furnish the principal with financial
reports on the fund, so that some internal check occurs within the agent
institution. A principal may also empower more than one agent in order to
induce competition between them, thereby increasing work productivity to the
benefit of the principal. Id. at 29–30 (discussing the checks and balances
approach).
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sticks—budgetary reductions when the agent disappoints, and
expansions when the agent completes a desired action.63 Where a
principal doubts that any of these mechanisms or a combination
thereof will adequately address agency slack, the principal may
appoint a new agent rather than relying on one of the pre-existing
options.64
When applied to collective development finance, principalagent theory frames donor countries‘ options in stark relief. As
Hawkins, Lake, Nielson, and Tierney note, ―[i]n ‗hiring‘ an agent, a
principal can create one of its own, thereby constructing from
‗scratch‘ an organization of her own design, or choose from among
a pool of existing entities willing to serve as the agent.‖65 Creating
a new agent is costly, but likely to produce an agent closer to the
preferences and purposes of the principal (here donor principals).66
Choosing an existing agent, on the other hand, avoids the start-up
costs, but the principals may be unable to find an ideal agent that
perfectly mirrors their preferences and is optimally designed to
perform the appointed task. Realization of this problem becomes
particularly likely when delegating to an intergovernmental
organization, as there are a limited number of such organizations
to choose from.67
2.1.3. Curbing the Agency Costs
In applying the principal-agent theory to donors‘ quest for a
collective financing vehicle, one might think that the most obvious
choices among existing entities to serve as donors‘ agents would be
the World Bank and the United Nations, the intergovernmental
behemoths of collective financing for development.68 In fact,
however, the story of collective finance for development is a story
63 See id. at 30 (discussing the carrot-and-stick approach to mitigating the
effects of agency slack).
64 See id. at 31 (noting that
since control mechanisms are costly and
imperfect, it‘s impossible to fully control all agents and therefore to completely
avoid slack).
65 Id. at 25.
66 See id. (weighing the advantages and disadvantages of creating an agent
from scratch as opposed to hiring an existing agent).
67 See id. at 19, 26 (―Given a finite pool of possible agents and positive costs of
creating new agents, however, the ‗exogenous‘ traits of agents are likely to matter
. . . .‖).
68 See supra notes 2–3 (describing functions, policies, and reactions to the
World Bank and the U.N.).
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of an ongoing quest to find alternatives to these behemoths as
agents.
2.1.3.1. Disillusion with Traditional Approaches
Skepticism about the efficacy of the U.N. and the World Bank
precludes either from being regarded as an ―ideal agent‖ to
address post-globalization challenges.
The causes of this
skepticism are multi-faceted, and have resulted in donor
governments—or more accurately the citizens of those
governments69—opposing increased funding for those institutions
to assume new mandates.70 Moreover, recipient governments,
eager for greater input in development efforts, increasingly express
a similar opposition.71
Skepticism about the World Bank stems largely from a concern
that, at an operational level, the Bank‘s driving force is to make
loans, and that this lending imperative permeates and dominates
the Bank‘s relationship with its borrowing member countries.72
69 See Milner, supra note 4, at 110 (discussing domestic politics and the
problems that arise when the donor government and its public differ in interests,
as well as how this affects multilateral aid).
70 See Heimans, supra note 27, at 1 (discussing the desirability of multi-actor
global funds as ―instruments for international financial mobilization, resource
allocation and as a form of experimentation in global governance‖).
71 See UN Climate Change Talks in Cancun Agree a Deal, BBC NEWS, Dec. 11,
2010, 7:44 ET), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-11975470
(discussing developed countries‘ insistence that the World Bank be a trustee,
while other countries were negotiating for a different approach); John M. Broder,
Climate Talks End with Modest Deal on Emissions, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2010,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/12/science/earth/12climate.html
(noting
countries‘ reluctance to combine many climate change finance efforts under the
U.N.).
72 See Bruce Rich, The World Bank under James Wolfensohn, in REINVENTING THE
WORLD BANK 26 (Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A. Winters eds., 2002) (giving an
overview of former World Bank president James Wolfensohn‘s failed efforts to
―change the institution‘s embedded internal culture from one of loan approval—
in which staff were rewarded above all for pushing money‖); see also Pincus &
Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, supra note 3, at 22 (noting that the Bank‘s
incentive structure, which emphasizes new lending and volume over project
quality and supervision, has played a role in the lack of development effectiveness
of Bank projects); see Sarfaty, supra note 22, at 668 (noting that the Bank‘s incentive
system emphasizes lending targets rather than results on the ground); Senate
Committee Report, supra note 22, at 4 (noting that the World Bank, like all of the
international financial institutions (―IFIs‖), ―suffer[s] from a ‗pressure-to-lend‘
culture that places more emphasis on signing project agreements and getting
loans out the door than on actually improving the development level of the
borrowing country‖).
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The force of this lending imperative gives rise to a loss of
confidence in the Bank. Although the Bank was originally created
to fund post-World War II reconstruction, in the ensuing sixty plus
years, its supporters have come to expect it to serve as much more
than a well-oiled banking machine.73 That hope, that the World
Bank will be something more—a knowledge bank, a social
reformer, an economic advisor, or a voice for the poor—is
frequently dashed in the face of findings that the Bank‘s internal
culture emphasizes getting loans out the door over assuming any
of these roles.74 Repeatedly, these additional development goals
end up in irreconcilable tension with the Bank‘s desire to make
loans.75 Notwithstanding a wealth of Bank rhetoric to the contrary,
when the Bank assumes any of these additional mandates they
appear to become subsumed by and subservient to the Bank‘s loan
approval culture.76
73 See generally, Devesh Kapur, The Changing Anatomy of Governance of the
World Bank, in REINVENTING THE WORLD BANK (Jonathan R. Pincus & Jeffrey A.
Winters eds. 2002) (discussing the disempowerment of poorer countries in the
international arena and the failure of governance structures to effect change); see
Pincus & Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, supra note 3, at 20 (noting that ―[a]n
institution that is at heart a development bank makes for a rather unlikely ‗voice
for the poor‘: we would not expect the former to mount a political challenge to the
status quo nor the latter to raise money cheaply on the international capital
markets‖ as the World Bank does).
74 See Pincus & Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, supra note 3, at 13–15, 20
(noting that the Bank‘s rhetoric of acting in partnership actually results in the
World Bank calling the shots because it is not a representative organization
comprised of people or local communities, but countries).
75 For example, in a meeting of senior Bank managers with then-President
James Wolfensohn in 1996, one manager noted that the Bank has to choose
between being a merchant bank whose clients are the governments of the
developing countries to which it lends—a relationship in which there is no place
for the environment, women in development, poverty alleviation and similar
priorities—or being a development bank whose clients are the citizens of the
borrowing countries, and who deals with borrowing country governments as
agencies with whom the Bank works in order to meet its clients‘ needs. See Rich,
supra note 72, at 52.
76 See Pincus & Winters, Preface, supra note 3, at viii (describing the World
Bank as a ‖political organization, keenly aware of the image it projects‖ and
noting that the ―World Bank staff . . . account[s] for a surprisingly large share of
the published materials on the topic of the World Bank and World Bank reform‖);
Pincus & Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, supra note 3, at 14–15 (noting that
the Bank‘s efforts to transform itself from a development bank into a development
agency began in the 1970s when its public pronouncements reflected a significant
change in its conception of how the development process should be promoted).
Those pronouncements indicated that the Bank no longer saw it as sufficient to
transfer capital to viable projects. Instead, development was also seen as
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The Bank‘s pressure-to-lend culture is reinforced by skewed
incentives for the staff responsible for the Bank‘s lending
operations who are on the front lines of the Bank‘s interactions
with its borrowing member countries. Evidence suggests that
inadequate account is taken of the development effectiveness and
sustainability of the projects and programs for which Bank loans
are made.77
The U.N. is also ill-suited to take on the task of managing new
collective financing efforts.
As documented by Pierre de
Senarclens,78 structural problems have hampered the U.N.‘s
effectiveness in social and economic matters since its creation, due
in part to its founders‘ lack of a common vision on the mechanisms
and strategies necessary to accomplish its economic progress and
social welfare ideals.79 Its highly fragmented system of agencies,
programs, and funds has diluted the effectiveness of any one of
encompassing a sustained increase in a country‘s capacity to satisfy social
preferences. According to Pincus and Winters, the Bank‘s embrace of this broader
concept of development widened the gap between its rhetoric concerning its
mission and its actual performance. Id. at 15.
77 See Rich, supra note 72, at 26 (detailing Wolfensohn‘s changes which
actually strengthened made the Bank‘s accommodation of its corporate and
governmental clients and weakened the existing internal mechanisms for
control—all of which decreased development effectiveness). In support of this
claim, Rich points to the conclusions of an internal Bank review entity called the
Quality Assurance Group, which, in 1997, conducted a year-long study of 150
projects and concluded that systemic weakness in the Bank‘s assessment of
borrowing governments‘ commitment to a project, local capacity, and the more
general risks in project implementation had their roots in a Bank culture which
generates pressure to lend. Id. at 43 (citing World Bank Quality Assurance Group
Portfolio Improvement Program, Reviews of Sector Portfolios and Lending
Instruments: A Synthesis Draft Internal Report (April 22, 1997)). Further, Rich
notes that a sub-report to that 1997 synthesis report—which indicated that only
19% of the Bank‘s technical assistance projects were performing satisfactorily—
concluded that this poor performance resulted from the fact that staff view
technical assistance loans as a second-class activity because they do not compare
in size and importance to other resource flows and because doing technical
assistance work does not gain a staff member recognition from Bank
management. See also WOODS, supra note 17, at 207, 211 (noting that there are few
if any incentives for Bank staff to ensure that the Bank‘s projects and policies are
sustained beyond the short-term lending period, and that the incentives for Bank
staff need rewriting); see HEAD, supra note 17, at 57 (describing a strong criticism
of the World Bank‘s staffing policies for not appropriately rewarding
performance, while utilizing inappropriate promotion criteria).
78 See de Senarclens, supra note 1 (detailing a plethora of problems that have
constrained the U.N.).
79 See id. at 26–35 (discussing how structural problems and lack of a unified
vision have led to U.N. failure in solving certain social and economic problems).
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them and has led to many of them being very poorly funded.80
Repeated efforts to achieve greater coherence have failed and lack
of support for the institution is widespread, not only on the part of
the United States (which has denounced the U.N. as an ossified
structure) but also on the part of other major powers.81 This
negative image makes the U.N. a poor contender for spearheading
new collective financing initiatives despite the fact that its original
mandate, Article 55 of the U.N. Charter, contemplated the U.N.
taking a leadership role in global development.82
2.1.3.2. A Search for Alternatives
Consistent with principal-agent theory, the logical response for
a group of donors acting as a collective principal83 who are
dissatisfied with an existing agent‘s capacity or suitability for
carrying out their agenda would be to create a new agent, if
necessary, constructing from ―scratch‖ an organization of the
donors‘ own design.84 But the difficulties of garnering support for
new initiatives, coupled with the limitations of the international
legal order, constrain what donors can do. Often, at the formative
stage of a new initiative, broad support may be tentative and
uncertain, making donors reluctant to invest in a whole new
structure and apparatus. Further, the international legal order has
traditionally discouraged the proliferation, and therefore the
80 See id. at 25, 28 (discussing how the involvement of many nations has
added further confusion to many of the problems the U.N. has been charged with
solving).
81 See id. at 25–28 (asserting that "Western governments have regularly
complained" about U.N. repeat agendas and inefficiency).
82 See
generally U.N. Charter ch. IX, art. 55, available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/chapter9.shtml
(describing
the
international economic and social goals, as well as the purposes, of the U.N.).
83 Principals, like a group of donor countries, which have more than one
actor individually or collectively delegating to the same agent are referred to in
principal-agent theory as complex principals. See Lyne et al., supra note 54, at 42. In
complex principal situations where a group of actors designs and has authority
over a common contract and, having decided amongst themselves, negotiates a
contract with an agent, the complex principal is referred to as a collective principal.
Id. at 44. A group of donors setting up a collective financing effort to be
administered and implemented by one or more third parties would constitute a
collective principal.
84 See Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 25 (arguing
that a principal can choose to create its own agent, and while costly, this can lead
to an agent whose existence and goals more clearly align with that of the
principal).
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creation, of new international organizations,85 although this norm
is shifting.86 For these reasons, collective financing efforts for
development have generally not been created as new entities under
international law. Instead, the overwhelming norm over the last
several years has been for donors to use a new tool—a hybrid
approach, whereby they use those aspects of the World Bank and
the U.N. that seem useful but set up a different entity to perform
the functions that they do not want those institutions to perform
(or to have the exclusive right to perform).
This hybrid approach may take one of two distinct legal forms,
which co-exist as competing models. The most common form of
the hybrid approach, the Quasi-Entity Fund, involves setting up
the collective financing effort under the auspices of the World
Bank.87 The other form of the hybrid, the National Law Entity,
involves setting up the new collective financing effort as a legal
85 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 133 (discussing contributing nations and
their potential use of trust accounts); Niels M. Blokker, Proliferation of International
Organizations: An Exploratory Introduction in PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: LEGAL ISSUES 14–15 (Niels M. Blokker & Henry G. Schermers eds.,
2001) (noting that the majority of analysts emphasize the disadvantages of
proliferation); Jose Alvarez, International Organizations: Then and Now, 100 AM. J.
INT‘L L. 324, 324–47 (2006) (discussing the progression of international
organizations). Critics of proliferation cite problems of coordination, different
interests and inefficiency. See Blokker, supra, at 14 (discussing legal issues
pertaining to the United Nations); C.W. Jenks, Co-Ordination a New Problem in
International Organization, 77 Recuell des Cours (1950) p. 135-271; C. Wilfred
Jenks, Some Structural Dilemmas of World Organization, 3 GA J. INT‘L & COMP. L. 1, 1–
13 (1973) (describing structural problems of international organizations). Some
criticism of proliferation is based on a lack of support for international
organizations generally. See Alvarez, supra, at 343–45 (describing the growing
awareness among developing countries that international organizations have not
leveled the playing field between developed and undeveloped countries, making
the value of international organizations as ―neutral‖ venues questionable).
86 The trend is shifting towards supporting proliferation. Alvarez, supra note
85, at 343 (discussing the troubling future of the international organization). See
generally Joel Trachtman, The Theory of the Firm and the Theory of the International
Economic Organization: Toward Comparative Institutional Analysis, 17 NW. J. INT‘L L.
& BUS. 470 (1997) (noting the potential for organizations to increase transactional
gains, decrease losses and costs, notwithstanding problems of overlapping,
competition and conflicting interests).
87 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 26 (noting that the World Bank is the
leading trustee of humanitarian projects funded by states). The World Bank‘s
dominant role in this area tracks a broader trend towards the increased
dominance of the World Bank and the correlated fading relevance of UN entities
in setting the international development agenda. See de Senarclens, supra note 1,
at 27 (noting that the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, as the
most resource-rich multilateral aid institutions, increasingly ―call the tune‖).
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entity under national law and then having that entity contract out
specific financial management and development tasks to the World
Bank and the U.N., among others. Both forms of the hybrid reflect
standard mechanisms for controlling agency slack but also include
their own unique twist. The Quasi-Entity Fund involves the
donors heavily in fund governance as a way for donors to exercise
control over their agent (the World Bank). The National Law
Entity approximates the creation of a customized agent for the
principal‘s purposes but retains ties with pre-existing agents (the
World Bank and the UN) in certain respects.
2.2. Part II of the Collective Finance Challenge
2.2.1. The Emergence of a New Approach: Two New Models
The potential of both forms of the hybrid approach to constrain
agency slack88 depends on whether they enable donors to retain
greater control over their contributions than they retained under
the traditional approach.
2.2.1.1. The Quasi-Entity Fund
Within the hybrid model, donors create a new collective
financing effort under the auspices of the World Bank as a separate
fund dedicated to a specific development purpose. The financing
effort will often be a discrete part of a broader collaborative effort
to tackle an identified need in a coordinated way. For example, the
GEF Trust Fund is the financing arm of the GEF—a collaboration
that involves 182 countries that have undertaken a joint approach
to addressing global environmental issues.89
Similarly, the
Education Fund is the financing arm of the Education for All Fast

88 This article‘s focus is on the potential for both forms of the hybrid
approach to minimize agency costs. Evaluating the extent to which these models
quantifiably minimize agency costs would require an empirical analysis of data
that is beyond this article‘s scope. Nonetheless, meaningful deductions can be
made as to the potential of these models to promote the likelihood that donors‘
fund goals will be honored to the fullest extent feasible, by analyzing how these
models address perverse incentives and other challenges posed by the operating
environment.
89 See
What is the GEF?, GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY (―GEF‖),
http://www.thegef.org/gef/whatisgef (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (providing a
description and a brief history of the GEF).
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Track Initiative, a broad-based partnership of donor and recipient
countries that aims to achieve universal primary education.90
This separate fund has a specific governance structure that
gives donors an ongoing role in allocating the fund‘s assets.91 The
donors and the World Bank characterize these Quasi-Entity Funds
as World Bank trust funds and the World Bank as their trustee.92
In its trustee capacity, the Bank manages the Quasi-Entity Fund‘s
financial resources and keeps them separate from the Bank‘s
regular resources, disbursing them in accordance with donors‘
allocation choices.93 The Bank is also involved in developing the
funds, including proposing, supervising and monitoring fundfinanced projects, although it usually shares these tasks with other
entities rather than exercising exclusive control.94
2.2.1.1.1. The Origin of the Quasi-Entity Fund
The GEF Trust Fund pioneered the Quasi-Entity Fund model.
It is a multi-billion dollar Fund created in 1994 to provide financial
support to developing countries for projects designed to protect
the environment.95 Its structure grew out of donors‘ (internally
conflicting) desires to avail themselves of the World Bank‘s
capacity to manage the Fund while simultaneously preventing the
World Bank from exercising complete control over it.
90 See
About
FTI,
EDUCATION
FOR
ALL,
http://www.educationfasttrack.org/about-fti (last visited Mar. 18, 2011)
(describing the Fast Track Initiative).
91 These World Bank Quasi Entity Funds are to be distinguished from the
programs and funds set up under the U.N., which together constitute the
mainstay of the U.N.‘s development arm (some, such as UNDP, began as U.N.
Trust Funds and subsequently reorganized into more formal entities). See de
Senarclens, supra note 1, at 11 (describing the organization of the various U.N.
commissions and programs). The U.N.‘s mix of funds and programs reflect how
the UN has always done business in the international development arena. In
contrast, these World Bank Quasi Entity Funds are an add-on to the World Bank‘s
core business of issuing loans. See WOODS, supra note 17, at 164–65 (describing the
loan operations of the World Bank).
92 Ibrahim F. I. Shihata, Techniques to Avoid Proliferation of International
Organizations–The Experience of the World Bank, in PROLIFERATION OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS: LEGAL ISSUES 111, 125 (Niels M. Blokker & Henry G. Schermers
eds., 2001) (explaining how the Bank oversees various trust funds).
93 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 33 (outlining the various ways to structure
international trust funds).
94 See infra notes 131–32, 156, 163, 174.
95 See Smyth, supra note 43, at 40 (describing the intentions of the GEF‘s
creators).
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In asking the World Bank to manage the Fund, the GEF Trust
Fund donors drew upon the Bank‘s long tradition of serving as an
administrator of externally financed funds, which are referred to
by the Bank and all interested parties as World Bank Trust Funds.96
Prior to the GEF Trust Fund‘s creation, however, the standard
practice for such funds was for donors to impose little control on
the Bank‘s discretionary use of the funds‘ resources within the
broad parameters of the funds‘ objectives.97 The pre-GEF Trust
Fund model, the World Bank Trust Fund, is essentially an
accounting mechanism. It consists of a designated account held by
the World Bank, for use by the World Bank, for the purposes
designated by the donors.98 Donors depend on several ex post facto
controls to manage agency slack in these traditional World Bank
Trust Fund arrangements. For example, donors require the Bank
to make regular financial and progress reports on the use of the
trust fund‘s assets.99 In principal-agency terms, this is a police

96 The World Bank began administering funds created by other donors to
finance specific activities that served the Bank‘s purposes early on in its existence.
See Shihata, supra note 92, at 125 (discussing early projects undertaken by the
World Bank when administering donated funds). The World Bank began to use
the term ―trust fund‖ for these funds in the late 1970s, shortly after the IMF
established the IMF Trust Fund and undertook to manage that fund‘s assets in
accordance with six principles which then-IMF General Counsel, Sir Joseph Gold,
described as ―fundamental principles of the law of trusts.‖ Gold, supra note 46, at
865. The Bank assumes the role of trustee of World Bank trust funds pursuant to
its inherent powers, consistent with the inherent power of all international
organizations, to establish funds to the extent needed to promote their purposes.
Shihata, supra note 92, at 125.
97 Steven A. Silard, The Global Environment Facility: A New Development in
International Law and Organization, 28 GEO. WASH. J. INT‘L L. & ECON. 607, 624–25
(1994–95)
98 BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 133–34 (discussing distinct funds created by the
World Bank that serve the Bank‘s purpose or a closely related purpose).
99 See id., at 220–21 (explaining the reporting responsibilities of groups
responsible for or connected to the use of trust funds); WORLD BANK, WORLD BANK
OPERATIONAL MANUAL, OPERATIONAL POLICIES, OP 14.40/BP14.40, para. 8 (July 1,
2008), available at http://go.worldbank.org/MSNAYLJX60 [hereinafter World
Bank OP/BP 14.40] (outlining the Bank‘s responsibilities as a trustee, which
include providing financial reports to donors and others involved with the fund).
By contrast, under a national law regime that incorporates Anglo-Saxon trust
principles, the trustee of a charitable trust reports to the state office charged with
the oversight of charitable trusts, not to the donors. Jonathan Klick & Robert H.
Sitkoff, Agency Costs, Charitable Trusts, and Corporate Control: Evidence from
Hershey’s Kiss-Off, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 749, 770–81 (2008).
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patrol form of reporting and monitoring,100 whereby donors
control agency slack by themselves playing the role of the police.101
The disadvantage of the traditional World Bank Trust Fund,
and the reason the donors to the GEF Trust Fund did not want to
follow this model, is that under the World Bank Trust Fund model
the World Bank has extensive control and discretion over the
funds. In light of the World Bank‘s lending agenda, giving broad
discretion over the use of a fund‘s resources could be perceived as
tantamount to asking Henry Ford to figure out how to improve the
lives of Detroit‘s poor. Henry Ford could be counted on to
conclude that what every poor family in Detroit really needed in
order to improve its standard of living was a car. Likewise, there is
a perception that the World Bank would conclude that what every
developing country really needs in order to develop is a loan.
Following this logic, the World Bank could be seen as likely to use
the resources of any externally financed fund for which it is
responsible to grease the wheels for making a loan.102 In the
language of principal-agent theory, the preferences and incentives
of the donors/principals of these funds and their agent, the World
Bank, are misaligned.103
A simple hypothetical illustrates why a fund‘s donors might
not want the Bank‘s lending agenda to dominate a fund. Assume,
for example, that a group of donors sets up a World Bank Trust
Fund to support small scale farming in Africa. Further, assume the
Bank as trustee has a choice of whether to issue a grant to perform
a feasibility study for building new irrigation systems or a grant to
See Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 28.
Id. See BanModel Form of Multi-Donor Administration Agreement,
WORLD BANK (Sept. 16, 2004) [hereinafter Standard Conditions] (on file with
Author); Klick & Sitkoff, supra note 99, at 770–81 (providing an example of donors
forcing trustees to account for use of trust funds and noting that states
increasingly give donors standing, concurrent with the state attorney general, to
enforce a charitable trust). The World Bank Trust Fund created by the application
of these principles has been described by one commentator as a sui generis
financing vehicle, peculiar to international law. See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 24
(―The sui generis nature of these funds does not give rise to a single model by
which the intergovernmental trust concept can be explained.‖).
102 See WOODS, supra note 17, at 212 (pointing out that entities such as the
World Bank make decisions by balancing competing interests, as well as taking
into account their own interests); Senate Committee Report, supra note 22
(discussing the way in which the World Bank decides between competing
interests and the need to influence those decisions in order to get more adequate
results).
103 Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 26–28.
100
101

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss4/1

SMYTH.DOC

2011]

4/24/2011 9:51 AM

COLLECTIVE FINANCE CHALLENGE

993

set up a farmer training program. Finally, assume that the grant
for the feasibility study is quite likely to result in a finding that the
recipient needs several new irrigation systems (and, therefore, a
World Bank loan to pay for them), but that the grant for farmer
training is unlikely to generate any need for a World Bank loan.
Faced with the choice between these two grant proposals, the
concern would be that the Bank‘s lending agenda would lead the
Bank staff to issue the grant for the feasibility study, regardless of
which proposal best fits the recipient‘s needs or the donors‘
objectives.104
When the creators of the GEF Trust Fund opted to form the
Fund as a World Bank Trust Fund,105 there was an immediate
outcry from the global environmental NGO community.106 At the
time, the World Bank‘s record of addressing environmental
concerns was dismal;107 opponents worried that the Bank would
either use the Fund to advance its own lending projects regardless
of whether they were likely to affect optimal environmental results
(agency slippage) or do nothing (agency shirking). To frame this
outcry in principal-agent terms, the complex collective principal,
comprised of donor governments, was under pressure from
constituents within individual governments to take bold measures
to address what those constituents viewed as a high risk of agency
slack entailed by the donors‘ selection of the Bank as agent.108

104 Empirical data would be useful to confirm this hypothesis. Absent the
availability of such data, however, there are other materials that lend ample
support to the validity of this hypothesis. See Pincus & Winters, Reinventing the
World Bank, supra note 3, at 20–23 (pointing to the misalignment between the
Bank‘s lending agenda and the expectation that its loan officers make decisions on
how to use a fund‘s resources, independent of that agenda, coupled with evidence
of how the Bank‘s lending agenda has, from time to time, usurped other roles
assumed by the Bank).
105 A number of reasons, including expense-saving concerns, prompted this
choice. See Silard, supra note 97, at 622–23 (outlining the considerations that
prompted the donors of the GEF Trust Fund to choose a trust fund form).
106 See id. at 633 (discussing the contentious debates over the structuring of
the GEF Trust Fund).
107 See generally Bruce M. Rich, The Multilateral Development Banks,
Environmental Policy, and the United States, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q. 681 (1985) [hereinafter
Rich, MDBs] (considering how multilateral development banks could effectively
promote sound environmental policies).
108 Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 27.
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2.2.1.1.2. A Governance Structure Designed to Reduce Agency
Slack
In response to this outcry, a governance structure was designed
to control the World Bank‘s role in the new Fund and, thereby,
reduce the risk inherent in the Bank‘s role as trustee. Components
of the resulting structure effected major innovations in the
standard World Bank Trust Fund structure. For one thing, the
Fund, in addition to financing projects proposed by the World
Bank, is designed and intended to also finance projects proposed
by other entities.109 Indeed, from the start, donors identified the
United Nations Environment Programme (―UNEP‖) and the
United Nations Development Program (―UNDP‖) as entities that,
along with the World Bank, would propose projects for Fund
financing (with each of UNEP, UNDP, and the World Bank being
an ―Implementing Agency‖).110 Previous World Bank Trust Funds,
under the traditional structure, financed World Bank projects
only.111
The Implementing Agencies, which comprise one
component of the GEF‘s governance structure, serve as
intermediaries between the donors and the beneficiaries of the
Fund by proposing projects to be financed, and by monitoring and
supervising recipients‘ execution of these projects.
In addition, the Fund‘s structure includes two governing
bodies, the GEF Assembly and the GEF Council.112 The center of
power is the GEF Council, which includes representatives from
each donor country and representatives from recipient countries.
These representatives, inter alia, approve the Implementing

109 WORLD BANK, INSTRUMENT FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE RESTRUCTURED
GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT FACILITY, 33 I.L.M. 1273, 1294–95 (March 16, 1994)
[hereinafter GEF Instrument] (outlining the fiduciary duties and responsibilities of
the GEF Fund‘s trustee, including the way funds are allocated).
110 See id. para. 9(b) (describing eligibility requirements for funding).
111 Silard, supra note 97, at 624 (discussing how the GEF Trust Fund broke
new ground in intra-organizational cooperation); David Freestone, The
Establishment, Role and Evolution of the Global Environment Facility: Operationalising
Common but Differentiated Responsibility?, in LAW OF THE SEA, ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
AND SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES: LIBER AMICORUM JUDGE THOMAS A. MENSAH 1077,
1079–82 (Tafsir Malick Ndiaye & Rudiger Wolfrum eds., 2007) (discussing how
calls for restructuring included calls for ensuring transparent and democratic
governance, and a balanced and equitable representation of the interests of
developed and developing countries).
112 See GEF Instrument, supra note 109, paras. 11–20 (establishing the
structure and responsibilities of the GEF Assembly and the GEF Council).
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Agencies‘ work program.113 The GEF Assembly is an overseeing
body that meets every three years.114 The World Bank is not a
member in either the GEF Council or the GEF Assembly.115
The other key components of the GEF‘s structure are the
Secretariat and the Trustee.116 The Secretariat, designed to be
―functionally independent,‖117 is made up of several staff headed
by a Chief Executing Officer (―CEO‖)118 who is selected by, and
answerable to, the GEF Council.119 The Secretariat is responsible
for convening meetings of the GEF Council and Assembly and for
preparing the agenda and the proposed GEF work program for the
GEF Council‘s review. The Bank serves as Trustee of the GEF
Trust Fund but, given the functions of the other component parts,
the trustee role consists solely of financial management.120 In sum,
although the Bank has three separate and distinct roles in the
GEF—Implementing Agency, Trustee, and host to the Secretariat—
these three roles, taken together, amount to less Bank control than
exists under a traditional World Bank Trust Fund.
2.2.1.1.3. The Proliferation of Quasi-Entity Funds
Following the GEF Trust Fund‘s creation, the Quasi-Entity
Fund model quickly became a norm when creating collective
financing efforts for development.121
The Bank‘s apparent
113 See id. (stating that the GEF Council is responsible for monitoring and
evaluating the progress of the Implementing Agencies). The governance structure
also includes a Scientific and Technical Advisory Committee (―STAP‖) to provide
technical advice to the GEF Council. Id.
114 See id. para. 13 (―The Assembly shall consist of Representatives of all
Participants. The Assembly shall meet once every three years.‖).
115 See id. paras. 13, 16 (outlining the membership of the two bodies, neither
of which include the World Bank).
116 See id. para. 2, Annex B (describing the roles and duties of the Trustee and
the focus areas of the GEF).
117 Id. para. 21.
118 See id. paras. 20(j), 21(―The CEO shall be appointed to serve for three years
on a full time basis by the Council on the joint recommendation of the
Implementing Agencies.‖).
119 See id. para. 21 (providing for the appointment of the Chief Executing
Officer (―CEO‖) of the Secretariat). The CEO is appointed by the GEF Council for
a three-year term on the joint recommendation of the Implementing Agencies and
is accountable to the GEF Council for running the Secretariat. Id.
120 See id. at Annex B (providing for the role and fiduciary responsibilities of
the Trustee).
121 See WB TRUST FUNDS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at 1–2
(discussing the growth and development of trust funds and stating that ―[t]rust
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willingness to accommodate and participate in an arrangement
with a donor-friendly governance structure, as evidenced by its
role in the GEF, unleashed a pent-up demand for customized
collective financing arrangements.122 Now, donors have a way to
control a fund more tightly than they did under a traditional
World Bank Trust Fund, making this model more attractive than
the alternative strategy of making general contributions to an
institution‘s budget.
First, Quasi-Entity Funds are magnets for fundraising from
public and private sources because they create a sense of urgent
and focused attention on a particular issue.123 Setting up special
funds to address specific development issues has more political
appeal than general pleas for increases in aid.124 The fact that
donors receive reports on the use of a fund‘s resources makes fund
resources easier to track, and therefore this structure is more
transparent than contributions to the general budget of an
institution.125
Further, the donor participation and control
advanced by the Quasi-Entity Fund model reassures a reluctant

funds have emerged as a key instrument of development finance in recent years‖);
Smyth, supra note 38, at 499 (discussing how changes in overseas development aid
norms since the 1990s have resulted in a shift toward the use of trust funds).
122 See OED Phase I Report, supra note 38, para. 1, at ix (stating that, in
responding to changes in the global environment, ―the Bank has become the
largest manager of trust funds for global programs‖). In fact, the majority of
global programs supported by the World Bank are less than 13 years old. Id. para.
5, at x. The Bank has recently evaluated its performance and needs in light of this
shift in demands. Id. para. 1.1. Changes have been suggested to ―help bring
about greater coherence and clarity among the Bank‘s diverse global roles, reduce
transactions costs, and communicate roles and responsibilities to partners . . . .‖
Id. para. 15, at xii. Changes include effective standards for involvement in global
programs, internal oversight mechanisms, diversifying the instruments available
for proper functioning, and improving linkages between global and country
programs. Id. para. 14, at xii. See also WORLD BANK, 2007 TRUST FUNDS ANNUAL
REPORT, at 14 (2007), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/CFPEXT
/TrustFunds/21892003/TFAnnualReport_2007.pdf [hereinafter WB TRUST FUNDS
2007 REPORT] (noting that Recipient-Executed Trust Funds ―continued to serve as
a versatile instrument of Bank support‖ in the 2007 fiscal year) (emphasis
omitted).
123 See Heimans, supra note 27, at 2 (noting that these funds ―promise an
aggressive focus on results, to the point of withholding funding to nonperforming recipients‖).
124 See id. at 3 (arguing that the popularity of global funds ―reflects the
political implausibility of raising much-needed new funds through the U.N.‖).
125 See id. at 2 (highlighting how multi-actor global funds are result-driven).
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legislature that the donor country‘s goals in providing support will
be advanced.126
Second, Quasi-Entity Funds offer a flexible mechanism that
works for a world that embraces development as a process,
engaging developed-country donors working in partnership with
developing countries and non-government entities. The QuasiEntity Fund‘s governance structure—providing for donor
governing bodies composed of donor and recipient countries as
well as a range of non-World Bank implementing agents—suggests
the possibility of including many kinds of entities in a discreet,
self-contained fund, small enough in size for such diverse
participants to have an impact.
A third, and more prosaic, factor contributing to donors‘
preference for the Quasi-Entity Fund over the traditional World
Bank Trust Fund model stems from the discovery in 2001 of
widespread corruption in certain World Bank trust funds.127
Following this discovery, the Bank instituted reforms aimed at
improving trust fund controls.128 Audits of World Bank Trust
Funds conducted in 2004 and 2005, however, showed continued
significant lapses.129 These findings reinforced donors‘ preference
for the Quasi-Entity Fund, which they believe affords them more
control over such agency slippage.130

126 In deference to this political reality, World Bank President Robert Zoellick
recently suggested that the developing world create a vulnerability fund with a
governance structure that will provide support to failing financial institutions in
developing countries. See Robert B. Zoellick, A Stimulus Package for the World, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 23, 2009, at A27. Absent this political reality, one would expect the
President of the World Bank to call for an increase in the Bank‘s budget, rather
than for the creation of a new fund.
127 See Stephen Fidler, Corruption Leads to Freeze on Trust Funds, FIN. TIMES,
Feb. 7, 2001, at 14 (describing a kickback scheme in the awarding of contracts that
led to the suspension of five trust funds).
128 See id. (noting that 54 companies and individuals involved in the
corruption were disbarred and prohibiting all consultant trust funds from hiring
any Danish, Swedish, or Norwegian consultants).
129 Out of ten audits of World Bank Trust Funds conducted by the Bank‘s
internal auditing department, ―all were rated less than satisfactory, and of those,
five were rated ‗unsatisfactory.‘‖ WB TRUST FUNDS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK,
supra note 18, para. 4.01, at 31. It should be added that the audits also revealed
corruption within the donors‘ aid agencies themselves and, therefore, a need for
donors to tighten internal controls in addition to controlling external agency
slippage.
130 Id. at 31 (noting poor documentation practices and fiduciary review
compliance issues).
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Donors‘ repeated use of this model shows a strong need for
collective financing vehicles. An important caveat to bear in mind,
however, is that the repeated use of this model does not necessarily
show that the Quasi-Entity Fund model is a success. To draw that
conclusion from these funds‘ proliferation alone would be to
ignore the pressures under which many of them are created,131 the
institutional tendency of donors (and the World Bank) to replicate
out of inertia,132 and the limitations of existing alternatives. As
shown in Part III, infra, donors have embraced this model without
paying adequate attention to the agency costs it perpetuates, the
accountability gaps that it generates, and the negative outcomes
that flow from these deficiencies.133
2.2.1.2. The National Law Entity
Under this form of the hybrid approach, donors create a new
collective financing effort as an independent legal entity under the
national law of a country whose location and legal provisions for
nonprofit entities meet donors‘ needs. The independent legal
status of these efforts diminishes the agency costs that accrue from
being a dependent entity under the auspices of the World Bank or
other existing intergovernmental organization. This is not to
suggest that there are no agency costs associated with this model.
To the contrary, as shown by Helen Milner in Why Multilateralism?
Foreign Aid and Domestic Principal-Agent Problems, all multilateral
aid efforts involve multiple forms of agency costs.134 The National

131 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 132 (explaining that, although trust funds
set up to address urgent needs lack certain legal personality, they are nonetheless
―governed by a complex structure that resembles that of large international
organizations‖); Heimans, supra note 27, at 2–3 (describing the heated political
context under which these funds are created and the conflicts regarding how they
are managed).
132 See WOODS, supra note 17, at 2 (noting that the World Bank tends to fall
back on existing habits and solutions to deal with unforeseen and unexpected
problems).
133 See OED PHASE I REPORT, supra note 38
(explaining how the rapid
expansion of these funds, without attention to governance details, was raised as a
concern by the World Bank‘s internal Independent Evaluation Group).
134 See Milner, supra note 4, at 115 (observing that ―[f]oreign aid in general
poses a principal-agent problem‖ because, ―[l]ike all public spending, it involves
long chains of delegation‖). Milner points out, however, that foreign aid adds at
least two elements to the delegation chain that are distinct from domestic
spending programs: ―[l]onger chains of delegation and the fact that, unlike with
domestic spending programs where voters can see for themselves the benefits of
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Law Entity model as it has evolved, however, does succeed in
preventing the donors‘ agenda from being hijacked by the
competing agenda of the World Bank or other organizations. As
the history of this model‘s use shows, this result has been achieved
in increments rather than in one fell swoop—and at a cost.
Creating this model involves a substantial investment of financial
and other resources. Moreover, the operations of the vertical funds
that result from the model can be difficult to integrate with a
beneficiary‘s macro policy in the sector that is the target of the
fund‘s assistance.
2.2.1.2.1. The Origin of the National Law Entity
The National Law Entity model emerged as a widely accepted
option when the G8 countries135 set up the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria (the Global Fund) in 2001.136 The
Global Fund is a $1.3 billion fund137 that finances efforts to combat
HIV/AIDS, malaria, and tuberculosis in developing countries.138
the spending, voters in donor countries cannot measure aid performance reliably
mean additional principal-agent problems.‖ Id. at 116.
135 The Group of Eight (―G8‖) is a forum, created by France in 1975, that
originally included France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States and has since added Canada and Russia. Every year representatives
of the countries convene to discuss global issues. See UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO, G8
Information Center, http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/what_is_g8.html (last visited
Aug. 18, 2010).
136 See G.A. Res. S-26/2, U.N. Doc. A/RES/S-26/2, para. 90, at 14 (Aug. 2,
2001) available at http://www.un.org/ga/aids/docs/aress262.pdf (expressing the
General Assembly‘s resolution to take global measures aimed at combating HIV,
including providing additional funding for the prevention and treatment of
AIDS). Note that the Global Fund is not the only example of a group of sovereign
donors joining private sector donors to create a collective financing effort under a
national law regime. However, it is unparalleled in its potential to serve as a
precedent because it is a comprehensive and deliberate effort to operationalize an
alternative to the post-World War II intergovernmental organizations‘ way of
delivering development finance.
137 See WORLD BANK, TRUSTEE FOR THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS,
TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA, TRUSTEE REPORT, GF/B7/6, 2 tbl.3 (Feb. 2004), available
at http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/07/gfb76.pdf (detailing the
finances of the Global Fund).
138 See GLOBAL FUND, THE FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT OF THE GLOBAL FUND TO
FIGHT
AIDS,
TUBERCULOSIS
AND
MALARIA
(2002),
available
at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/TGF_Framework.pdf
[hereinafter
GLOBAL FUND FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT] (establishing the title, purpose, principles
and scope of the Fund). See generally Anna Triponel, Global Fund to Fight AIDS,
Tuberculosis and Malaria: A New Legal and Conceptual Framework for Providing
International Development Aid, 35 N.C. J. INT‘L L. & COM. REG. 175 (2010) (discussing
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Set up by many of the same core countries that set up the GEF
Trust Fund, the degree to which its legal status, structure, and
modus operandi differ from the GEF Trust Fund is striking. These
differences result, in part, from the lessons and experience gleaned
from the GEF, and in part from adjustments needed to reflect a
divergent recipient base, and an expanded range of potential
donors.
From the outset, the Global Fund‘s donors wanted to create an
effort that could channel resources to the grassroots level.139
Research showed that the prevention and treatment of the target
diseases was most likely to be effective if assistance was available
at the local clinic level and not confined to the coffers of
government health ministries.140 In addition, the donors wanted to
structure their funding with sufficient flexibility to incorporate the
contributions and participation of the private sector, as they judged
input from the pharmaceutical sector, in particular, to be of vital
importance to the Fund‘s success.141 Both of these goals pointed
donors away from, rather than towards, creating the Fund as an
add-on to the World Bank, the Joint United Nations Programme on
HIV/AIDS (―UNAIDS‖), or the World Health Organization
(―WHO‖), and set the stage for exploring alternatives. The
alternative the Global Fund‘s donors selected was to set the Fund
up as a nonprofit foundation under Swiss law.142
the recent increase of multilateral funding mechanisms, and the creation of the
Global Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria as an example).
139 See STEVEN RADELET, CTR. FOR GLOBAL DEV., THE GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT
AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS AND MALARIA: PROGRESS, POTENTIAL, AND CHALLENGES FOR THE
FUTURE 4 (2004), available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents
/library/studies/position_papers/PP_GEN1_full.pdf (asserting that the Global
Fund to Fight AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria has taken a hands-off approach to
its financing, preferring to leave much of the responsibility with country
representatives and local groups); How the Global Fund Works, GLOBAL FUND,
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/how (last visited, Aug. 18, 2010) (describing
how the Global Fund operates).
140 See Triponel, supra note 138, at 197–99 (stressing the importance placed on
local management of resources distributed from the Fund and how such local
control leads to more efficient management).
141 See FIRST MEETING OF THE TRANSITIONAL WORKING GROUP TO ESTABLISH A
GLOBAL FUND TO FIGHT AIDS, TUBERCULOSIS, AND MALARIA 5 (2001), available at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/twg/Meeting_report_F_011030.pdf
(questioning ―whether there is some legally separate organization or entity that
can perform services for the Fund without sacrificing the independence of the
Fund and its ability to seek contributions from both public and private sources‖).
142 See THE GLOBAL FUND, FIFTH BOARD MEETING, REPORT OF THE GOVERNANCE
AND PARTNERSHIP COMMITTEE, Annex 6, at
2–3 (2003), available at
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2.2.1.2.2. A Governance Structure Designed to Eliminate
Agency Slack
The basic design of the Global Fund, in contrast to the GEF
Trust Fund, is a fund that is largely the donors‘ own show. It is a
paradigmatic example of a group of donors acting as a collective
principal to create an agent of its own design.143 The Fund has
both a global-level and a country-level governance structure.144 At
the global level, it consists of a Board of Directors, Secretariat,
Technical Review Panel, and the World Bank as Trustee.145 At the
regional and country level, it consists of an innovative apparatus
that includes Country Coordinating Mechanisms (―CCM‖),
Regional Coordinating Mechanisms, Principal Recipients, and
Local Funding Agents.146 These innovations aim to give effect to
the founders‘ belief that the Fund should be a non-bureaucratic
and lean financing agency that differs from, and operates more
effectively than, existing bilateral and multilateral aid mechanisms.
The Fund works through local stakeholders rather than U.N.
agencies or other multilateral or bilateral development partners.147
The Fund‘s Board of Directors is drawn from developed and
developing countries, civil society, and the private sector. The

http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/05/gfb57annex6.pdf
[hereinafter GLOBAL FUND REPORT ANNEX 6] (providing a historical analysis of why
the Global Fund chose to incorporate itself as a nonprofit under Swiss law). As a
nonprofit foundation, it operates under the supervision of the Swiss Federal
Supervisory Board for Foundations.
143 See Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 14, at 25
(explaining that while a principal may want to construct its own agent in order to
ensure the agent is more in-line with the principal‘s own preferences, this process
is more costly than other options).
144 See Triponel, supra note 138, at 195 (stating that ―[t]he Global Fund has
both a country and a global level governance structure,‖ and briefly describing
the mechanisms of each).
145 See generally GLOBAL FUND FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, supra note 138,
(describing the Fund‘s oversight mechanisms).
146 Id. at 5–6 (describing the roles of the Fund‘s Board of Directors, CCM,
Regional Coordinating Mechanisms, Principal Recipients, and Local Funding
Agents).
147 See Alexander Shakow, GLOBAL FUND & WORLD BANK, GLOBAL FUND–
WORLD BANK HIV/AIDS PROGRAMS COMPARATIVE: ADVANTAGE STUDY 18–19 (2006)
(outlining the strengths of the Global Fund); see also GLOBAL FUND, GUIDELINES FOR
PROPOSALS ROUND SEVEN 35 (2007), available at http://www.theglobalfund.org
/documents/rounds/7/Guidelines_for_Proposals_R7_en.pdf
[hereinafter
GLOBAL FUND ROUND SEVEN GUIDELINES] (detailing the administrative components
of the Global Fund).
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World Bank, WHO, and UNAIDS are non-voting members of the
Board.148 The ―supreme governing body of the [f]oundation‖ is the
Foundation Board,149 and it plays a role similar to the role played
by the GEF Council, including making final funding decisions.150
The Secretariat handles the Fund‘s day-to-day management and
reports to the Board of Directors.151 Its responsibilities include
receiving proposals for Fund financing, commissioning the
Technical Review Panel (a body of experts that advises on scientific
matters such as new treatment protocols),152 and forwarding
proposals that receive positive recommendations from the
Technical Review Panel to the Board of Directors for final
decision.153 It also negotiates and executes the Fund‘s grant
agreements.154
As Trustee, the World Bank‘s role is extremely limited.155 It
collects, administers, and invests the fund‘s resources, disburses
them to grant recipients in accordance with the instructions of the

148 See
GLOBAL FUND, BY-LAWS art. 7.1 (2010), available
at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/core/Core_GlobalFund_Bylaws_en.
pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL FUND BYLAWS]. See also Triponel, supra note 138, at 205,
fig.2 (depicting the voting groups of the Global Fund‘s Board of Directors). For a
complete list of the members of the Global Fund‘s Board of Directors, see GLOBAL
FUND, Board Members, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/board/members/ (last
visited Aug. 18, 2010).
149 GLOBAL FUND BYLAWS, supra note 148, art. 7.4.
150 Id. at 4–6 (explaining how the Fund‘s Board of Directors appoints Board
members, sets policies and strategies for the Fund, sets operational guidelines,
work plans, and budgets for the Secretariat and the Technical Review Panel, and
generally exercises all powers required to carry out the purposes of the Fund).
151 Id. at 8 (detailing the responsibilities of the Secretariat).
152 The Technical Review Panel reviews all funding proposals submitted to
the Global Fund for technical merit. See Technical Review Panel, GLOBAL FUND,
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/trp/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2010) (describing
the role and composition of the Technical Review Panel); see also GLOBAL FUND
ROUND SEVEN GUIDELINES, supra note 147, at v (stating how the Technical Review
Panel reviews proposals based on the following criteria: soundness of approach,
feasibility, and potential for sustainability).
153 See GLOBAL FUND FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, supra note 138, § VIII(A)(5)
(―The Secretariat will forward the recommendations from the Technical Review
Panel to the Board for final decision.‖).
154 See GLOBAL FUND BYLAWS, supra note 148, art. 8.2; GLOBAL FUND
FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, supra note 138, § VIII(A)(3) (―The Secretariat will ensure
that all the required information is included, before forwarding proposals to the
independent Technical Review Panel.‖).
155 See GLOBAL FUND FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, supra note 138, § 10(C)
(outlining the role of the World Bank as Trustee).
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Board of Directors,156 and periodically reports to the Board of
Directors on the status of the Fund‘s resources.157 It does not enter
into grant agreements with the Fund‘s recipients; such agreements
are made directly between the Fund and the Principal Recipients.
Nor does the Bank play any role in supervising or monitoring the
recipients‘ use of the Fund‘s resources.
At the country level, the Global Fund‘s point entity is the
Country Coordinating Mechanism (―CCM‖) which coordinates the
submission of each country‘s proposal for funding to the Global
Fund‘s Secretariat and selects the Principal Recipients of the Global
Fund‘s grants.158 The Regional Coordinating Mechanism (―RCM‖)
performs similar functions as the CCM regarding regional
proposals.159
The Principal Recipient is the entity selected by the CCM to
enter into a grant agreement with the Fund and to receive the
proceeds of a Fund grant directly from the World Bank as Trustee,
either for the Principal Recipient‘s own direct use or for ongranting as appropriate.160 The Principal Recipient is financially
156 See id. § 10(C)(1)(a)–(b) (describing the Trustee‘s responsibility for
―collection, investment, and management of funds‖ and for ―disbursement of
funds to national-level entities‖).
157 See id. § 10(C)(1)(c) (―Through the Board, the Trustee would report to the
GFATM stakeholders as a group on the financial management of the Fund, and
the allocation of Fund resources.‖).
158 See id. § 7(A)(3) (―Country proposals will be accepted from a Country
Coordination Mechanism (―CCM‖) that includes broad representation from
government agencies, NGOs, community-based organizations, commercial sector
organizations (where these exist) and bilatereal [sic] and multilateral agencies.‖).
See generally GLOBAL FUND, GUIDELINES AND REQUIREMENTS FOR COUNTRY
COORDINATING
MECHANISMS
(2007),
available
at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/16/GF-BM1607_PC_Attachment1.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL FUND CCM GUIDELINES] (outlining
the purpose, structure, responsibilities, and composition of the Country
Coordinating Mechanisms and the principles they must advance).
The
composition of each Country Coordinating Mechanism usually includes
representation from governments, NGOs, civil society, multilateral and bilateral
agencies, key affected populations, and the private sector. See id. pt. 5(12) (listing
actors that, whenever possible, should be included in a country‘s CCM).
159 See GLOBAL FUND, ROUND NINE FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS 7 (2008),
available at http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/rounds/9/CP_Pol_R9
_FAQ_en.pdf (explaining that CCM and RCM both fall under the heading of
―Coordinating Mechanism‖).
160 See
Principal
and
Sub-Recipients,
GLOBAL
FUND,
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/recipients (last visited Aug. 18, 2010)
(outlining the role of the Principal Recipients and their interaction with the SubRecipients). The Principal Recipient is often a government ministry but may also
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accountable to the Global Fund for the grant proceeds and
implementation of the program being financed by the Global
Fund‘s grant.161 Accordingly, the Principal Recipient is responsible
for overseeing the program implementation of any sub-recipients
to which it makes sub-grants and for regularly auditing subrecipients‘ financial arrangements.162 The CCM monitors the
Principal Recipients.163 Finally, the Local Fund Agents are incountry entities (such as local accounting firms) that the Fund hires
to assess (in accordance with criteria approved by the Board of
Directors)164 the financial capacity of a proposed Principal
Recipient to assume responsibility for a grant.165
2.2.1.2.3. The Evolution of the National Law Entity
Since the Global Fund was created, the Swiss Government has
accorded it enhanced legal stature and its autonomy has also
expanded. Its legal stature improved in 2003 when, responding to
pressure from the Fund‘s donors for enhanced privileges and
immunities, the Swiss Government agreed to accord the Fund
privileges and immunities similar to those it accords international
organizations.166 The Government conferred this status on the
Fund by entering into a Headquarters Agreement with it.167
be a nongovernmental or faith-based organization or a private sector firm or
foundation. ROUND NINE FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 159, at 33.
161 See GLOBAL FUND, FIDUCIARY ARRANGEMENTS FOR GRANT RECIPIENTS 3
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents
(2003),
available
at
/6_pp_fiduciary_arrangements_4_en.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL FUND FIDUCIARY
ARRANGEMENTS] (stating that, after receiving disbursements of funds from the
World Bank as Trustee, the Principal Recipients must ―periodically report on
progress made with the grant proceeds to the Global Fund and to the CCM‖).
162 See GLOBAL FUND, ROUND SEVEN GUIDELINES, supra note 147, § 4.8.2
(describing the responsibilities of the Principal Recipient, including ―overseeing
the financial arrangements of [sub-recipients], and preparing a plan for the annual
audit of [sub-recipient] activities under the grant‖).
163 See GLOBAL FUND CCM GUIDELINES, supra note 158, pt. 3(7) (specifying that
it is the responsibility of the CCM to select and evaluate the Principal Recipients).
164 See GLOBAL FUND FIDUCIARY ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 161, at 3 (―The
Global Fund . . . contracts for independent advice from . . . Local Fund Agents
(―LFAs‖). . . . The Global Fund normally contracts with one LFA per grantreceiving country . . . .‖).
165 See
generally,
Local
Fund
Agents,
GLOBAL
FUND,
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/lfa (last visited Aug. 3, 2010) (providing
additional information on the Local Fund Agents).
166 See Press Release, Global Fund, Global Fund Gains Privileges and
Immunities Similar to Int‘l Orgs. (Dec. 13, 2004), available at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/pressreleases/?pr=pr_041213
[hereinafter
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Under the Headquarters Agreement the Global Fund‘s assets,
income, and property are exempt from tax and the Fund is
immune from legal process and enforcement in the conduct of its
business.168 In addition, the archives of the Fund are inviolable.169
Further, the Fund‘s staff, including the members of its Board of
Directors, enjoy certain privileges and immunities in Switzerland,
including immunity from liability for acts performed in their
official capacity and tax exemptions.170
As for the Fund‘s expanded autonomy, when the Fund‘s
donors initially set it up, they provided for its Secretariat staff to
serve on contracts of employment with the WHO, pursuant to the
terms of an Administrative Services Agreement between the Fund
and the WHO.171 The Global Fund‘s Executive Director, though
Global Fund Gains Privileges and Immunities] (citing the ―nature and scale of the
[Global Fund‘s] activities‖ as the primary reasons why the organization was
granted the types of privileges and immunities typically reserved for international
organizations). The Swiss Government expressly based its willingness to accord
the Fund this status on the importance Switzerland attaches to the fight against
AIDS. See GLOBAL FUND, SIXTH BOARD MEETING, REPORT OF THE GOVERNANCE AND
PARTNERSHIP COMMITTEE, GF/B6/7,
9 (Oct. 15–17, 2003) available at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/06/gfb67.pdf
[hereinafter
GLOBAL FUND SIXTH BOARD MEETING] (referring to the intervention of the Swiss
President, Pascal Couchepin, at the U.N. Special Session on AIDS on September
22, 2003).
167 See GLOBAL FUND SIXTH BOARD MEETING, supra note 166, at 10 (―[T]he Swiss
government confirms the principle to conclude a headquarters agreement with
the Global Fund which will grant to the Global Fund the privileges and
immunities normally accorded to an intergovernmental organization.‖). The
Headquarters Agreement between the Global Fund and the Swiss Federal
Council, determining the final legal status of the Global Fund in Switzerland, was
signed on December 13, 2004. Global Fund Gains Privileges and Immunities,
supra note 166. See generally GLOBAL FUND, EIGHTH BOARD MEETING, REPORT OF THE
GOVERNANCE AND PARTNERSHIP COMMITTEE, GF/B8/7, Annex 4a (2004) available at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/08/gfb87_annex4a.pdf
[hereinafter HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT] (including the text of the Headquarters
Agreement between the Swiss Federal Council and the Global Fund to Fight
AIDS, Tuberculosis and Malaria).
168 See HEADQUARTERS AGREEMENT, supra note 167, arts. 5, 7 (stating that the
Global Fund is generally immune from any legal process or enforcement with
several listed exceptions and summarizing the Fund‘s tax exemptions).
169 See id. art. 13 (confirming the ―inviolability of all official papers, data
storage media and documents‖ associated with the Members of the Board in the
official discharge of their responsibilities).
170 See id. arts. 13, 15 (listing the privileges and immunities enjoyed by
Members of the Board and all officials of the Global Fund).
171 See GLOBAL FUND, FOURTH BOARD MEETING, REPORT ON LEGAL STATUS
OPTIONS FOR THE GLOBAL FUND, , GF/B4/12, 6 (Jan. 29–31, 2003), available at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/04/GF%20B4%2012%20Legal
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selected by the Fund‘s Board of Directors, also served on a contract
of employment with the WHO.172 In December 2008, however, the
Fund terminated the Administrative Services Agreement with the
WHO173 so as to give its Secretariat staff independence, freeing
them from the conflict of serving two entities with distinct
agendas—the Fund and the WHO.174 The Executive Director of the
Fund‘s Secretariat and the Secretariat staff now serve on
employment contracts with the Fund.175 As of January 1, 2009, the
Global Fund is a wholly ―autonomous, international financing
institution.‖176
Following its experience in negotiating the legal status of the
Global Fund with the Fund‘s founders, in January 2008, the Swiss
Government enacted a new statute, the Host State Act, under
which groups of donor governments working collectively inter se
or with nongovernmental entities and private sector entities may
apply to the Swiss Government for the equivalent of international
organization status under Swiss law.177

%20Status%20Report.pdf [hereinafter GLOBAL FUND REPORT ON LEGAL STATUS
OPTIONS] (acknowledging the benefits of the Global Fund‘s arrangements with the
WHO but stating that the arrangements are ―neither effective nor cost-effective‖
and lamenting the persisting structural issues and institutional liability).
172 See id. (discussing the administrative relationship between the Global
Fund and the World Health Organization).
173 See
GLOBAL FUND, SIXTEENTH BOARD MEETING, Decision Point
GF/B16/DP21
(NOV.
12–13,
2007),
available
at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/16/GF-BM16Decisions_en.pdf (deciding that ―the Global Fund shall discontinue the
Administrative Services Agreement with the World Health Organization‖ by
December 31, 2008); see also GLOBAL FUND, EIGHTEENTH BOARD MEETING, REPORT OF
THE SEVENTEENTH BOARD MEETING, GF/B18/2, 10–11 (Nov. 7–8, 2008) available at
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/18/GF-B1802_ReportSeventeenthBoardMeeting.pdf (discussing delays in implementing the
new administrative arrangements and recommending an interim solution).
174 See GLOBAL FUND REPORT ON LEGAL STATUS OPTIONS, supra note 171, at 4
(―[E]mployees of the Secretariat have a duty to serve their employer, WHO, while
also having a duty to serve the Global Fund as a private entity. The differing and
distinct mandates of WHO and the Global Fund create chronic conflicts of interest
for Global Fund staff.‖).
175 See supra note 173 and accompanying text.
176 GLOBAL FUND, NINETEENTH BOARD MEETING, REPORT OF THE EXECUTIVE
(May
5–6,
2009),
available
at
DIRECTOR,
GF/B19/3,
27
http://www.theglobalfund.org/documents/board/19/GF-B1903_EDReport.pdf.
177 See Loi sur l‘Etat hôte [LEH] [Swiss Host Act], June 22, 2007, Recueil
systematique du droit federal [RO] 6637, art. 25, available at
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The developments in the Global Fund that prompted this
statute are already serving as a precedent for other initiatives. In
2008, the participants in another global health initiative, the Global
Alliance Vaccine Initiative Foundation (―GAVI Foundation‖)
(which began life as an informal collaboration between donor
governments, the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation, WHO,
UNAIDs, the World Bank, and several vaccine manufacturers)
restructured the initiative and filed an application with the Swiss
Government for international organization status under this
statute.178
3. CURRENT FINANCING MODELS FAIL TO MEET THE
CHALLENGE
As discussed supra, donors to collective financing efforts for
development face the challenge of designing a framework that
maximizes the likelihood that their resources will be used for the
purposes they intended.179 Neither the Quasi-Entity Fund nor the
National Law Entity meets this challenge.
3.1. The Deficits in the Quasi-Entity Fund
The GEF Trust Fund, giving rise to the Quasi-Entity Fund
model, materially altered the principal-agent dynamic of the World
Bank Trust Fund. By inserting themselves into the fund‘s
governance and reserving for themselves the right to allocate the
fund‘s assets (including the right to allocate funding to entities
other than the World Bank), the donors to the GEF Trust Fund
changed the nature of the traditional delegation between the
donors to a World Bank Trust Fund and the Bank. Restricting the

http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/1/192.12.en.pdf (defining international nongovernmental organizations (―INGOs‖) for purposes of the Host State Act).
178 See GAVI ALLIANCE, SECRETARIAT TRANSITION, Doc # AF.12, 2 (June 25-26,
2008),
available
at
http://www.gavialliance.org/resources
/12__GAVI_Secretariat_transition.pdf (providing an update on GAVI‘s
application for international status and confirming that the Foreign Affairs
Department intended to support the organization). See generally GAVI ALLIANCE,
GAVI ALLIANCE PROGRESS REPORT (2008), available at http://www.gavialliance.org
/resources/2008_GAVI _Alliance_Progress_Report.pdf (providing an overview of
the GAVI Alliance‘s efforts and accomplishments in 2008).
179 See Hawking et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 119 (noting
that a key challenge of third-party financing arrangements involves implementing
a system that succeeds in matching donors‘ contributions with the projects that
the donors wish to support).
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trustee function to perfunctory financial management tasks
emasculates the trustee role. The innovations of the Quasi-Entity
Fund introduced the possibility that the donors to a new fund
could disaggregate the functions they wanted the World Bank to
perform in connection with a fund.180 At the same time, they
opened up new issues about the locus and scope of accountability
for these funds between the donors and the Bank when such
disaggregation occurs.
These issues limit the potential of the Quasi-Entity Fund to
serve as a new and improved model over the traditional World
Bank Trust Fund for two distinct but related reasons.
First, the potential of this model to give rise to a lower risk of
agency slack can only be realized if: (1) the World Bank agrees to
perform the different disaggregated functions donors call upon it
to perform; and (2) the international legal order facilitates that
disaggregation. Second, a related limitation arises from the fact
that creating a Quasi-Entity Fund involves disaggregating a variety
of other controls that traditionally apply under a World Bank Trust
Fund. The donors to a Quasi-Entity Fund must recognize the need
to create an alternative framework of controls in order for QuasiEntity Funds to constitute accountable financing mechanisms both
in theory and in practice. The record shows that neither of these
limitations has been adequately addressed.
3.1.1. Unabated Agency Slack
The GEF Trust Fund‘s donors were reluctant to give the World
Bank control over the fund because of the Bank‘s poor record, at
that time, of caring for the environment.181 Even when the Bank‘s
position on the environment is not an issue, donors‘ pervasive
concern is that giving the World Bank‘s broad discretion over their
funds will result in the Bank using the funds to advance its lending
agenda at the expense of the donors‘ priorities. This concern

180 For example, in unbundling the tasks involved in managing the GEF Trust
Fund, and splitting up the responsibilities of trustee, secretariat, and
implementing agent, the GEF introduced the idea of the World Bank as an
institution whose different trust fund-related functions could be decentralized,
with donors potentially free to pick and choose which of those functions they
want to engage.
181 See Rich, MDBs, supra note 107, at 688–702 (exploring the adverse
environmental impacts of bank-funded agriculture and energy projects in
developing countries).
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derives from the force of the Bank‘s lending agenda.182 The Bank‘s
drive to lend, and the internal institutional ethos that comes with
this drive, is especially problematic for the Quasi-Entity Fund as a
model, because it affects the ability of the Bank to serve as a
disinterested trustee or administrator. It also limits the degree to
which any Secretariat of a Quasi-Entity Fund can make the goals of
a fund‘s governing body the fund‘s top priority.
3.1.1.1. An Operational Stake as a Quid Pro Quo for Financial
Management Services
When the Quasi-Entity Fund first emerged, the Bank
conditioned its willingness to serve as trustee on donors agreeing
that a sizeable proportion of the projects funded by the new effort
would be World Bank projects.183 When the GEF Trust Fund was
created, for example, the Bank insisted that two-thirds of the
fund‘s resources would be allocated to World Bank projects.184
Over time, the strictures of this quid pro quo have loosened but the
Bank‘s willingness to serve as trustee of a fund is usually still
conditioned on its having an operational stake in the fund. This
generally translates into an understanding (explicit or implicit) that
some part of the fund‘s resources will finance Bank operations.
Again, hypothetically, assume that instead of setting up a
traditional World Bank Trust Fund to support small-scale farming
in Africa, the group of donors set up the fund as a Quasi-Entity
Fund. Under the Quasi-Entity Fund model the donor governing
body, not the World Bank, chooses how to allocate the fund‘s
resources among the categories of recipients that the donors have
decided, at the time of the fund‘s creation, will be eligible to apply
for funding.

182 See supra note 75 and accompanying text (discussing the tension between
the aspirations of supporters of the World Bank and the Bank‘s lending agenda).
183 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 132–35 (discussing the legal personality of
trust funds under the administrative direction of the World Bank); Smyth, supra
note 43, at 34, 57 (stating that, although the World Bank had limited powers as a
trustee of the GEF, these limitations were offset by its substantial involvement
with GEF projects and, at least initially, the World Bank and the other two
Implementing Agencies (UNEP and UNDP) successfully pushed their own
agendas).
184 See Smyth, supra note 43, at 37–38 (explaining that, at its inception, the
GEF‘s governance structure formally included the World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP
as Implementing Agencies but that, practically, ―the World Bank . . . controlled
the Fund‖).
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Faced with the choice of funding a feasibility study for building
new irrigation systems or a farmer training grant, for example, the
purpose of the Quasi-Entity Fund is to enable the donors to choose
which proposal best fits with their goals. However, if one of these
proposals is for a World Bank project and the other is not, and
there is an understanding that part of the fund‘s resources will
fund World Bank projects, then the need to fulfill that
understanding constrains the donors‘ choice. This may force
donors to select the World Bank‘s project even though it is not their
first choice. Thus, this understanding curtails the extent to which
the Quasi-Entity Fund model can serve as an added brake on
agency slack when donors rely on the World Bank to serve as a
trustee.
This Bank practice of conditioning its availability to perform
the financial management task required for a collective financing
effort on its having an operational stake undercuts the potential of
the Quasi-Entity Fund as an optimal collective financing
mechanism. How much impact this practice has on a fund‘s
independence depends on the bargain the Bank makes with the
donors. The Bank does not simply hire itself out as a financial
manager without the quid pro quo for two reasons: one involves
self-interested turf protection, and the other prudential financial
management.
On the turf protection side, the quid pro quo is driven by the
Bank‘s lending agenda. Bank Task Managers want to be able to
dangle the promise of free trust fund resources as a carrot to
encourage a borrower to take on a loan. They can only do so if the
fund will co-finance World Bank projects. Not all the reasons for
the quid pro quo are so ignoble, however. On the prudential
financial management side, the quid pro quo approach reassures the
Bank that it will not end up serving as trustee of an initiative that
finances poorly designed, non-World Bank projects. Projects that
do not comply with Bank standards or their equivalent could
potentially expose the Bank‘s reputation and credibility to
significant risks. Also, serving as trustee has traditionally been
linked with issuing grants of fund resources and undertaking to
supervise and monitor the recipients‘ activities, while the quid pro
quo approach avoids having the Bank take on a task on which it
cannot deliver. The risk of taking on monitoring tasks becomes
even greater if the Bank has no active operations in a particular
sector of a country—a situation that would require new staff to be
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trained and stationed in order to effectively supervise and monitor
the grant.
Given the difficulty of sorting out whether legitimate or
illegitimate concerns are at play, having the Bank insist on an
operational stake as the quid pro quo of its providing financial
management services suggests a need for change. In many
instances, the agenda of a collective financing effort will overlap
with the Bank‘s agenda, but the cause of development is not wellserved by perpetuating a situation in which the Bank dominates.
An alternative approach could allow for the donor community to
create a separate independent entity—an international
development fund administrator—to perform the financial
administration services for these efforts.
Creating a new independent entity to provide financial
administrative services would enable donors to have their
collective financing effort administered by an entity
uncompromised by a competing lending agenda. The mandate of
such an entity would be strictly limited to financial administration.
The development-specific tasks (including supervision and
monitoring) requiring specific development expertise would be the
responsibility of such entities as the donors might choose to have
serve as financial intermediaries between the financial
administrator and the ultimate recipients. Such intermediaries
could include the World Bank in its operational (as distinct from a
financial administrator) capacity. As indicated above,185 several
factors point to the wisdom of structuring any such new entity as
an intergovernmental entity.
In sum, in order for donors to gain the autonomy for their
collective financing efforts that the Quasi-Entity Fund aims to
achieve, they should create a separate and distinct entity to serve
as financial administrator of such efforts. This step would remove
the conflict of interest between donors and the Bank that is
inherent in the Quasi-Entity Fund as it is currently conceived. This
step, however, would not alone be sufficient to make the QuasiEntity Fund an optimal funding mechanism. Additional changes

185 See Hunter, supra note 5, at 11 (noting the tension between the United
States, which supports using the World Bank as the institutional structure that
will distribute financial resources for addressing climate change, and developing
countries, which prefer to use an entity with more ―representative decision
making structures‖).
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in the design of this model would also be necessary, as illustrated
below.
3.1.1.2. Illusory Independence
The World Bank‘s lending agenda also drives it to actively limit
and interfere with the independence of a Quasi-Entity Fund‘s
secretariat. Such interference defeats the purpose of the QuasiEntity Fund model, but is facilitated by the nature of the legal
arrangements on which the Quasi-Entity Fund model is based.
Briefly, the legal status of a Quasi-Entity Fund is based on the
arrangements into which the donors enter with the World Bank as
Trustee,186 which are generally regarded as governed by
international law.187 These arrangements incorporate certain
fundamental principles of the law of trusts,188 including the
principle that a trust is not a legal entity in the sense that it does
186 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 133–34 (pointing out that the World Bank
does not differentiate between trust funds and the actual accounts that contain the
funds, but rather commingles the trust fund assets it maintains).
187 See id. at 25–26 (explaining that trusts under international law are formed
by the agreement of both the trustee and the donor, and that the legal form of the
contract is left up to the parties); ANDRES RIGO SUREDA, THE LAW APPLICABLE TO
THE ACTIVITIES OF INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT BANKS, 308 Recueil des Cours of The
Hague Academy of International Law, 192 (2004) (discussing the chain of
accountability created through World Bank trust funds). In the case of private
sector donors, however, such arrangements would be governed by private
international law. See JOSÉ E. ALVAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AS LAWMAKERS 1–4 (2005) (recognizing that transnational corporations and nongovernmental organizations ―help [] to make and enforce modern international
law‖ but distinguishing them from international organizations in that they are not
―constituted by one of the recognized sources of international law, an
international agreement‖); C.F. AMERASINGHE, PRINCIPLES OF THE INSTITUTIONAL
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS 10 (2d rev. ed. 2005) (listing the differences
between private and public international organizations including the fact that
public international organizations, unlike private ones, are created by
international agreement or established under international law). A full discussion
of the law governing these arrangements and their enforceability at international
law is beyond the scope of this Article. See generally BANTEKAS, supra note 18,
passim (comparing and contrasting the generally similar, but sometimes different,
treatment of trusts under domestic versus international law); Head, supra note 2
(detailing the history, legality, and policy surrounding important international
financial institutions); Smyth, supra note 38, at 527–29 (discussing the uncertainty
surrounding what form of law should govern the legal status of World Bank grant
agreements, and maintaining that all such agreements should specify that they are
governed by public international law). The arrangements do not contain a
governing law clause. See Standard Conditions, supra note 101.
188 See Shihata, supra note 92, at 125–26 (describing the structure of the World
Bank‘s trust funds).
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not bear rights or hold duties.189 Instead, all rights and duties
owed by and to a trust fund are held by and owed to the trustee.190
A trust fund itself does not have any independent legal personality
or capacity.191
The application of this principle to a Quasi-Entity Fund means
that all rights and duties owed by or to the fund are owed by or to
the World Bank as the fund‘s trustee.192 The donors as a group
have no collective legal capacity to engage with third parties, for
example, as an employer.193 The fund they create from their
pooled resources does not have this capacity, either.194 Instead, the
World Bank as the trustee of a Quasi-Entity Fund hires the CEO of
a fund‘s secretariat. Further, the World Bank as Trustee hires any
staff that a CEO recruits to serve on the secretariat, and these staff
members thereby become World Bank employees.
This arrangement, by which a Quasi-Entity Fund‘s CEO serves
on a contract of employment with the World Bank, is fraught with
conflicts of interest. On the one hand, the donors specifically select
the CEO to advance the fund‘s priorities. On the other hand, the
CEO, by entering into a contract of employment with the World
Bank, undertakes, pursuant to the Bank‘s Articles of Agreement, to
owe his or her duty entirely to the Bank and not to any other

189 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 22–23 (discussing the formal and
customary principles of trust law, including the customary requirement that ―the
trust relationship . . . does not generate obligations for third States or entities‖);
Gold, supra note 46, at 863 (discussing the restrictions on the use of Trust Fund
resources, including the requirement that they be used solely for the benefit of
potential beneficiaries and the condition that they be ―kept separate from the
property and assets of the IMF and . . . all other accounts . . . that it administers in
a fiduciary capacity‖).
190 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 22 (clarifying that while there is a body of
international law regarding intergovernmental trust funds, the basic principle that
rights and duties are owed only to the trustee is not generally altered).
191 See id. (discussing the importance of administration agreements and
treaties, the mechanisms that actually bind donors and trustees).
192 See id. (noting that when the World Bank acts as trustee, its agreements
with donors are based on standard model treaties that reference the Bank‘s
Articles of Agreement and internal Bank documents and policies in accordance
with which the agreements must be construed).
193 See id. (asserting that, by accepting the donor-trustee agreement and the
terms and conditions of the trust, the donor States lose their status as independent
entities and become bound to the trust).
194 See id. (―[T]he assets of the trust are in the trust ownership of the trustee
and . . . [the trust] does not generate obligations for third States or entities . . . .‖).
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authority.195 The CEO also agrees to be bound by the World Bank‘s
Staff Rules and Principles of Employment. Under those rules, the
CEO is answerable to his or her World Bank supervisor.196
Simply revealing that this conflict of interest exists does not
demonstrate that it prevents the Quasi-Entity Fund model from
being an effective means of limiting the agency slack inherent in a
World Bank trust fund. With the CEO placed in this position of
serving two masters, however, one of two possible scenarios seem
likely to emerge, neither of which serves the stakeholders of these
funds well. Under the first scenario, the CEO finds that her World
Bank supervisor is a more immediate presence to please than a
non-standing body of donor representatives. In this case, the CEO
will be under the thumb of the Bank, and the fund‘s agenda is
likely to be co-opted by that of the Bank. Such subservience results
in a scenario similar to the one that exists under a traditional
World Bank Trust Fund model, which the Quasi-Entity Fund
model is intended to change. Under the second scenario, the
Quasi-Entity Fund is large and high-profile and, as a result, the
CEO has leverage to speak with an independent voice. A
secretariat with that kind of independence, however, will be
threatening to the World Bank, an institution accustomed to calling
the shots. As a result, such a secretariat and the Bank seem poised
to become locked in a continuing struggle that will result in backbiting, unnecessary delays, stalemates, and a waste of both entities‘
resources.
Developments in the GEF Trust Fund show how the second
scenario can play out in a large Quasi-Entity Fund.197 The

195 See INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION AND DEVELOPMENT,
ARTICLES OF AGREEMENT, art. V, § 5(c), (Feb. 16, 1989), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/ibrdarticlesofagreement.pdf (explaining that, in addition to owing his or her entire
loyalty to the World Bank, the Bank‘s President, officers, and staff shall ―respect
the international character of this duty‖ and refrain from being influenced in
discharging their responsibilities).
196 These are standard undertakings for all World Bank employees.
See
generally WORLD BANK, STAFF MANUAL, sec. 00 Principles of Staff Employment,
available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSTAFFMANUAL/Resources
/StaffManual_WB_web.pdf (setting out the guiding principles that govern the
World Bank‘s internal staff rules and policies).
197 The evidence regarding smaller Quasi-Entity Funds is harder to quantify,
absent empirical research. The positions the World Bank has taken with respect to
the larger Quasi-Entity Funds, however, reinforce the impression that any World
Bank employee serving as the CEO of a smaller Quasi-Entity Fund will feel
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protracted tension between the Bank and the GEF Secretariat
illustrate the unresolved issues that arise. For example, in 2001,
emboldened by swelling contributions to the GEF Trust Fund, the
CEO of the GEF Secretariat sought greater autonomy for the
Secretariat.198 He proposed that the GEF be restructured to give
the Secretariat the authority to formulate GEF-specific policies, to
conduct GEF country assistance strategies with recipient countries
independent of the World Bank and the other Implementing
Agencies, and to sign agreements with external parties such as
country governments on the GEF‘s behalf.199 He also sought the
right to determine the terms and conditions of Secretariat staff
independent of the World Bank‘s Staff Rules and Policies.200
Not surprisingly, the World Bank opposed all aspects of the
Secretariat‘s bid for expanded powers.201 In effect, the CEO was
seeking powers for the Secretariat equivalent to those of the World
Bank, such that the GEF would operate like a mini-World Bank for
the environment. As a compromise, the Bank and the Secretariat
devised and agreed on a matrix of responsibilities clarifying who

pressure from the Bank to discharge his or her responsibilities in a manner that
advances the Bank‘s agenda.
198 See GEF COUNCIL, OVERALL STRUCTURE, PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES OF THE
GEF,
GEF/C.18/8,
para.
63(a)
(Dec.
5–7,
2001),
available
at
http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/C.18.8%20SPP%2
0FINAL.pdf [hereinafter STRUCTURE, PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES] (proposing to
―[s]trengthen the coordinating and collaborative role of the GEF Secretariat vis-àvis the Convention Secretariats‖ to ―help . . . clarify the autonomous role of the
GEF and the GEF Secretariat‖). See also GEF Instrument, supra note 109, para. 34,
at 1293 (providing that amendments to the GEF Instrument can only be made
with the consensus of the GEF‘s supreme governing body, the GEF Assembly, and
that requests for amendments should be channeled to the Assembly through the
GEF Council).
199 See STRUCTURE, PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES, supra note 198, para. 36
(suggesting that the Secretariat should ―play a pivotal coordinating role in the
programmatic dialogue with the countries‖ and ―have an important coordination
and policy oversight function in developing GEF programmatic approaches and
in proposing commitments on behalf of the GEF‖).
200 See id. paras. 56, 63(h) (stating that although ―all GEF staff are [World]
Bank staff,‖ greater clarification is necessary with respect to the ―role of the CEO
in relation to appointment and dismissal of staff‖).
201 See id. at annex C1–7 (revising the text of the proposal to confine the
Secretariat‘s authority and clarify that its powers are kept in check by the
Implementing Agencies).
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would be responsible for what, at the instruction of the GEF
Council.202 But the matrix proved a short-lived détente.
In June 2009 the GEF Secretariat, under a new CEO, renewed
the bid for wide-sweeping institutional and governance changes.203
The CEO is sought authority for the GEF Secretariat to issue GEF
grants directly to GEF recipients, thus allowing a direct
relationship between the GEF and recipients independent of any
intermediaries.204 She also proposed, inter alia, that the GEF
Secretariat be solely responsible for mobilizing resources for the
GEF (a responsibility currently shared with the World Bank as
Trustee) and that the Secretariat be exempted from certain World
Bank employment policies.205 Like her predecessor CEO, she also
sought independent legal personality and legal capacity for the
GEF.206 These proposals have been tabled for further review.207 In
202 See GEF COUNCIL, JOINT SUMMARY OF THE CHAIRS, paras. 19–22, (May 15–17,
2002),
available
at
http://207.190.239.143/COUNCIL/GEF_C19
/Joint%20Summary%20of%20the%20Chairs%20-%20FINAL.pdf (recognizing the
importance of coordination between the Secretariat and Implementing Agencies
as well as the need for greater power and independence for the Secretariat); GEF
COUNCIL, CLARIFYING THE ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE GEF ENTITIES,
GEF/C.19/8,
paras.
5–10
(May
15–17,
2002),
available
at
http://207.190.239.143/COUNCIL/GEF_C19/C.19.8%20Roles%20and%20Respon
sibilities.pdf (clarifying the roles and responsibilities of each GEF entity including
the Secretariat).
203 See GEF COUNCIL, DRAFT GEF POLICY, INSTITUTIONAL, AND GOVERNANCE
REFORMS, GEF/R.5/15, paras. 125–27, (June 25–26, 2009,), available at
http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/GEF.R.5.15.pdf
[hereinafter GEF Fifth Replenishment Reform] (advocating for a clarification and
strengthening of the Secretariat's legal capacity in order to increase the overall
effectiveness and efficiency of the GEF).
204 See id. para. 88 (listing suggested reforms such as ―[c]onferring onto the
GEF Secretariat the primary role for resource mobilization‖).
205 See id. app. 1, paras. 12–14 (acknowledging that World Bank Staff Manual
rules ―apply to all staff members alike‖ and that variance is permitted only for
―compelling business‖ reasons).
206 The GEF Secretariat argues that the GEF already has independent legal
personality and capacity, a view opposed by the World Bank. Whatever the
merits of this view, the fact remains that the CEO of the GEF Secretariat, and all
GEF Secretariat Staff, along with the CEOs and staffs of all other Quasi Entity
Funds, serve on contracts of employment with the World Bank on the
understanding that the Bank, as the trustee of such funds, is the sole entity with
legal capacity to employ them.
207 See GEF Fifth Replenishment Reform, supra note 203, at i (proposing
reforms in five principal areas: (1) accountability to conventions, (2)
responsiveness to recipient countries, (3) delivery of measurable results to the
international community, (4) the increase and nature of resources for the GEF, and
(5) institutional and governance reforms).
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due course, however, both the donors and the Bank will have to
address them, most likely in the context of determining what role,
if any, the GEF Secretariat will have in the Green Climate Fund.208
These fifteen years of cat-and-mouse negotiations between the
GEF Secretariat and the World Bank cast doubt on whether the
concept of a fund within the World Bank, with a functionally
independent secretariat, is workable. The ambitions of a secretariat
inevitably expand with the amount of funding placed under its
control, and the appearance of a conflict of interest in the
secretariat serving two masters may become an unworkable
reality.
Conflicts also dogged the relationship between the World Bank
and the Education Fund in the first seven years after the fund was
established in 2003. The donors to the Education Fund209 had
extensive experience in the education sector from previous funding
efforts.210 Thus, though committed to pooling their resources in
support of a harmonized approach, they were determined to stay
actively involved in the fund.211 They initially provided for this
active involvement by creating a donor governing body (a Strategy
Committee)212 to select what countries would receive financing

208 See supra note 3 (discussing the ―crisis of legitimacy‖ that the World Bank
has suffered due to perceptions that it is ineffective and beholden to powerful
corporate interests).
209 The donors currently consist of seventeen countries and the European
Union.
See Donors, EDUCATION FOR ALL FAST TRACK INITIATIVE,
http://www.educationfasttrack.org/partners/donors-agencies (last modified
Sept. 16, 2010) (listing the major countries and organizations that have donated to
Education for All).
210 See id. (―The Fast Track Initiative encompasses all major donor countries
and agencies working in education . . . .‖). The founding donors of this fund, the
Netherlands, Norway, Belgium, and Spain, had extensive bilateral aid programs
for education prior to the fund‘s start in 2002. See UNITED NATIONS EDUCATIONAL,
SCIENTIFIC AND CULTURAL ORGANIZATION (―UNESCO‖), EFA GLOBAL MONITORING
REPORT
2010:
REACHING
THE
MARGINALIZED,
432,
available
at
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001866/186606E.pdf.
211 See Sophie Smyth & Anna Triponel, Education as a Lynchpin of Development:
Legal and Policy Considerations in the Formation of the Education For All—Fast Track
Initiative Catalytic Trust Fund, 6 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL‘Y 8, 9–10 (2005)
(describing the formation of the Education for All Fast Track Initiative ―Catalytic
Fund‖ which is administered by the World Bank as trustee and was set up to
provide short-term funding to ―donor orphans,‖ countries that have developed
strategies to reduce poverty and bolster education but that have too few donors to
make those plans a reality).
212 See id. at 10 (explaining the structure of the Strategy Committee which was
―comprised of a senior representative from each donor and a representative from
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from the Education Fund and in what amounts.213 There was a
small secretariat in the World Bank when the Education For All
Fast Track Initiative was created, which ran a knowledge-sharing
initiative on education.214 By default, this secretariat became the
Secretariat of the Education Fund.215 Once the secretariat became
responsible for a financing mechanism, rather than simply a
knowledge exchange, the position‘s power changed. Friction soon
arose between its CEO and the Bank as the Education Fund
ballooned in size.
The friction between the Bank and the Fund was caused by
several factors. When first established, the Fund provided money
for the education sector on terms and conditions that were
different from those that applied to IDA funding (the source of
Bank funding for the countries that are the Education Fund‘s target
beneficiaries, all of which qualify for IDA funding).216 Education
Fund grants were made without the kind of specificity regarding
deliverables, measurable outcomes, and policy reforms that
equivalent IDA financing would require.217 This disparity in terms
and conditions ended in 2007 when, pursuant to a bank-wide
policy change regarding the terms and conditions applicable to
bank-supervised grant funding, World Bank policies and

the [World] Bank‘s senior management, who serves as the Committee‘s
chairperson‖).
213 The fund was created pursuant to an initiative to improve worldwide
literacy, the Education For All initiative (―EFA‖), which was founded by a group
of 155 countries and 150 organizations at the World Conference on Education,
held by the UNESCO in Thailand in 1990. See Smyth & Triponel, supra note 211,
at 8 (stating that goals of the EFA were to greatly reduce worldwide illiteracy by
2000, and, ultimately, to make basic education available to all).
214 See id. at 8–9 (explaining that EFA-FTI is a partnership formed in
collaboration with the UNESCO, the World Bank, and donor and recipient
countries and ―supported by a small secretariat, housed in the World Bank, which
performs a knowledge sharing and coordination role‖).
215 See id. at 10 (detailing the two-tiered governance structure of the Catalytic
Fund and its progress reporting system which required team leaders to provide
updates on recipient countries directly to the Secretariat of the EFA-FTI).
216 See EDUCATION FOR ALL FAST TRACK INITIATIVE, FRAMEWORK 7 (2004),
available
at
http://www.educationfasttrack.org/media/library
/FrameworkNOV04.pdf (providing a chart illustrating the process by which the
EFA-FTI functions).
217 See Smyth & Triponel, supra note 211, at 10 (detailing the flexible
monitoring and supervision of countries receiving funding pursuant to the
Education for All—Fast Track Initiative ―Catalytic Fund‖).
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procedures governing grants to IDA countries were applied to all
Education Fund grants supervised by the Bank.218
A further cause of conflict between the Education Fund and the
Bank arose from the fact that when the Education Fund was
created, the externally financed funds of the World Bank were not
fully integrated into the Bank‘s regional portfolio management.219
This meant that Bank staff involved in the education sector did not
get the same credit for work on Education Fund grants as they got
for work on Bank-funded activities. This disparity created
perverse incentives for the World Bank departments and staff that
the Education Fund was counting on to deliver its assistance.220 It
gave rise to a conflict between the Fund‘s interests and the interests
of Bank staff whose time would get diverted to working on
monitoring and supervising Education Fund grants instead of
being spent on career-building core World Bank work.221 In the
face of such perverse incentives, a Quasi-Entity Fund cannot
operate as an effective control on the risk of agency slack that
arises due to the World Bank serving as trustee. In principalagency terms, the collective principal‘s (the donors‘) objectives and
the Bank staff‘s (the agent‘s incentives) were out of alignment—a
situation virtually guaranteed to lead to stalemate.222
The Education Fund‘s record is replete with evidence of a
stalemate in the first seven years of its existence. The Bank‘s
involvement in the Fund was marked by ambivalence. There were
218 See Smyth, supra note 38 (detailing the terms and conditions applicable to
grants issued by the World Bank).
219 See id. at 529–32 (discussing the problems arising from the lack of
administrative coordination between external funds and the World Bank).
220 See Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 26 (noting
the importance of agents having preferences that are closely aligned with those of
the principal).
221 See Sarfaty supra note 22, at 667–68 (exploring how incentive programs
within the World Bank have impacted its organizational culture). For the same
reasons, Bank staff have been reluctant to work on loans for technical assistance
because such loans are relatively small and perceived by Bank staff as
unimportant to Bank management, and, therefore, unlikely to advance a staff
member‘s career. See also Rich, supra note 72, at 26 (stating that despite
Wolfensohn‘s aspirations of changing staff incentives, World Bank staff culture
still remains tied to money pushing).
222 See e.g. Rich, supra note 72, at 26 (commenting on how former President of
the World Bank, James Wolfensohn attempted to change the culture of the World
Bank instead of rewarding staff for ―pushing‖ money); see also Milner, supra note
4, at 110 (explaining that tensions between donor governments and their publics
make it so that their ―preferences . . . are likely to diverge‖).
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long delays before the Bank agreed to a basic framework and
guidelines for country education plans (which countries must
comply with in order to be eligible for a grant from the Fund).223
Following agreement on a framework, long delays ensued before
the Bank convened the initial meeting necessary to initiate the
Education Fund.224 Further delays in securing an agreement from
the Bank on the terms of the Fund‘s expansion ensued after the
Fund was launched.225
The Bank‘s ambivalence about the Fund also played out in
disputes between the Bank and the donors over the responsibilities
of the Secretariat and reporting channels for the Secretariat head.
The Bank sought to confine the Secretariat to ministerial functions
and to have Bank staff serve as the fund‘s technical experts—
responsible for, inter alia, formulating normative criteria for eligible
But the head of the Secretariat saw the
country plans.226
Secretariat‘s role as a substantive one and appealed to (and
obtained) some donor support for that vision. This support came
at a cost, however, because in its relatively short existence the Fund
has had four different heads of the Secretariat.227 Final agreement
on the reporting lines between the head of the Secretariat, the
donors, and the Bank‘s Vice Presidency for Human Development
(of which the Bank‘s Education Sector Units are a part) languished
223 See
KATIE MALOUF, OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, RESOURCING GLOBAL
EDUCATION: HOW REFORM OF THE FAST TRACK INITIATIVE SHOULD LEAD TO A GLOBAL
(January
19,
2010),
available
at
FUND
FOR
EDUCATION
13–17
http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/resourcing-globaleducation.pdf (discussing bureaucratic delays within the Bank).
224 See id. (detailing the involvement of the World Bank, and how a lack of
autonomy for the FTI in this regard led to initial and continuing confusion and
delays).
225 See id. at 14–16 (arguing that further bureaucratic delays resulted from the
fact that the World Bank‘s Board of Executive Directors set the grant and
disbursement rules instead of the FTI governing bodies).
226 See Note on Bank‘s Multiple Roles in the FTI Partnership; EFA-FTI Draft
Charter (dated September 21, 2006) (on file with author) (discussing proposed
responsibilities of the Secretariat, and raising issues of Secretariat accountability
and Secretariat‘s reporting obligations to the World Bank).
227 See generally EDUCATION FOR ALL FAST TRACK INITIATIVE, 2009 ANNUAL
REPORT (2009), available at http://www.educationfasttrack.org/media/library
/Annual-report-2009/annual-report-2009.pdf (pointing out how, in December
2009, Robert Prouty was selected as the new head of the FTI Secretariat);
EDUCATION FOR ALL FAST TRACK INITIATIVE 2008 ANNUAL REPORT (2008), available at
http://www.educationfasttrack.org/media/library/Annual_Report_2008_EFA_F
TI.pdf (noting that the secretariat is lead by Desmond Bermingham and Robert
Prouty).
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and was unresolved for two years, between 2007 and 2009.228
These kinds of conflicts between the World Bank and the
secretariats of Quasi-Entity Funds diminish the value of the QuasiEntity Fund as a collective financing vehicle. The interests of a
fund‘s donors and beneficiaries are not well served by the time,
effort, and other resources such conflicts consume.
The Quasi-Entity Fund model might appear on its face to be a
useful first step to get a new effort off the ground, but history
suggests otherwise. These funds do not convert seamlessly into
independent, autonomous efforts in due course. Instead, their
functionally independent secretariats and the World Bank seem to
be on a collision course from the funds‘ inception. This history
indicates that a preferred approach would be to create these funds
as autonomous entities from the outset, free to advance their
donors‘ goals as their paramount objective.229 Even as an
autonomous entity, however, the design of the Quasi-Entity Fund
would need to be improved to allow for greater accountability
before it could serve as an optimal mechanism.
3.1.2. Lacunae in Accountability
The Quasi-Entity Fund model gives rise to several weaknesses
in accountability. As detailed by Ruth Grant and Robert Keohane
in their seminal work, Accountability and Abuses of Power in World
Politics, 230 accountability requires a state of affairs in which some

228 At that time, the parties ultimately agreed that the CEO would report
jointly to the Bank‘s Vice President for Human Development (consistent with the
terms of his contract of employment with the Bank) and to the executive body of
the Education For All Fast Track Initiative Partnership as a whole. See 2009
Annual Report, supra note 227.
229 See discussion infra Part 4 (arguing for greater Quasi Entity Fund
autonomy).
230 For a relevant source analyzing institutional design, see Joshua Cohen &
Charles F. Sabel, Global Democracy?, 37 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 763, 774–75 (2005)
(relying on Ruth W. Grant and Robert G. Keohane, Accountability and Abuses of
Power in World Politics, 99 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 29, 29 (2005). See generally Sumon
Dantiki, Note, Power Through Process: An Administrative Law Framework for United
Nations Legislative Resolutions, 40 GEO. J. INT‘L L. 655, 677 (2009) (pointing out the
problematic transfer of power from states to less accountable international
institutions through delegated legislative authority); Esty, supra note 3, at 1537–41
(discussing the problems of divided responsibility, informality, institutional
weakness, and the participation of private actors); Veerle, Heyvaert, Levelling
Down, Levelling Up, and Governing Across: Three Responses to Hybridization in
International Law, 20 EUR. J. INT‘L L. 647 (2009) (arguing for the establishment of
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actors have the right to (a) hold other actors to a set of standards,
(b) judge whether those actors have fulfilled their responsibilities
in light of these standards, and (c) impose sanctions if they
determine that these responsibilities have not been met.231
Accountability arises as a concern in the Quasi-Entity Fund for
the following reason: the Quasi-Entity Fund creates a different
relationship between the donors to a fund and the World Bank as
trustee, than exists under a World Bank Trust Fund. The QuasiEntity Fund shifts the locus of responsibility for the use of a fund‘s
resources.
While a World Bank Trust Fund gives that
responsibility to the World Bank, under a Quasi-Entity Fund, the
donors retain that responsibility themselves.
This shift in
responsibility, therefore, requires the creation of a new framework
of accountability which should address two key aspects of how the
fund will work: (i) who will assume responsibility for monitoring
the use of the fund‘s resources, and how; and (ii) the responsibility
of the donor governments, acting as a donor governing body, to
their citizens (whose taxes supply the resources that governments
contribute to these funds) for the decisions they will make as a
donor governing body and the policies and procedures they will
follow in making those decisions.
To put this shift in principal-agent terms, under the QuasiEntity Fund, the citizens of the donor governments become a
collective principal, and the donor governing body, charged with
responsibility for allocating the fund‘s resources, assumes the role

individual state responsibility for technical and financial assistance so there can be
greater accountability from the parties from whom it is necessary).
231 See Grant & Keohane, supra note 3, at 29–30 (discussing accountability
systems and problems experienced with them on the global level). Grant and
Keohane provide this definition of accountability in the context of assessing
whether the democratic deficit that accompanies international institutions (and
impugns their legitimacy as instruments of global governance) can be
compensated for by accountability mechanisms. Id. at 30–33 (crafting a concept of
accountability at the global level by distinguishing between two different models
of accountability: a participation model, according to which the performance of
the power wielders is evaluated by those who are affected by their actions, and a
delegation model, under which the performance of the power wielders is
evaluated by those who entrust them with power). I adopt the delegation model
as the most appropriate for the purposes of analyzing fiscal accountability in a
collective financing vehicle for development (while recognizing that a
participation model may be more apt for other purposes (e.g., for evaluating the
development effectiveness of a given initiative)).
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of those citizens‘ agent.232 The donor governing body, therefore, is
directly accountable to the donor countries‘ citizens for its actions.
These responsibilities exist alongside (not instead of) the
responsibilities the Bank as Trustee owes to the donors, though the
responsibilities to the donors are more limited than under a World
Bank Trust Fund.
Grant and Keohane maintain, further, that accountability in a
relationship between power-wielders and those holding them
accountable exists when there is a general recognition on the part
of all interested parties ―of (i) the operative standards for
accountability and (ii) the authority of the parties to conduct the
relationship (one to exercise particular powers and the other to
hold them to account).‖233 As applied to the Quasi-Entity Fund
model, this means that the donors, secretariat and World Bank
must not only follow clear standards, but they must also recognize
and own their respective responsibilities.
The accountability failure in the Quasi-Entity Fund arises from
the fact that neither donors nor the World Bank have faced up to
the implications of the changes wrought in the World Bank Trust
Fund by the Quasi-Entity Fund, nor to the resulting need that the
Quasi-Entity Fund model generates to clarify operative standards
for their responsibilities or their respective lines of responsibility.
Instead, as the history of the GEF Trust Fund and the Education
Fund show, the Bank and donors routinely fail to provide a
meaningful accountability framework when they create a QuasiEntity Fund.
This failure arises in part because the accountability gaps in
this model are not immediately apparent. Quasi-Entity Funds are
routinely labeled ―World Bank Trust Funds‖,234 a label that masks
the difference in the nature of responsibilities that donors and the
World Bank assume under the Quasi-Entity Fund model, as
compared with a World Bank Trust Fund, and the need for a new
accountability framework that the difference brings about. As put
by one jurisprudence scholar, ―the identity of terms seems

232 See generally Lyne et al, supra note 54, at 44 (explaining the inter-workings
of collective principals).
233 See Grant & Keohane, supra note 3, at 29–30.
234 The designation of these funds as World Bank Trust Funds is pervasive.
See generally WB TRUST FUNDS 2007 REPORT, supra note 122 (referring to various
Quasi Entity Funds as World Bank Trust Funds in the World Bank‘s Annual
Report).
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irresistibly to suggest an identity between the ideas expressed by
them.‖235 But the resulting failure in accountability has actual and
potential negative outcomes. These outcomes include gaps in the
oversight of the funds‘ resources resulting from misaligned
responsibilities among the fund‘s organs; liability and reputational
risk for donors and the Bank; the application of ad hoc rather than
optimal fiduciary practices; and unnecessarily high transaction
costs. Issues that have arisen with the GEF Trust Fund show both
these flaws and these outcomes.
The GEF provides several examples of conceptual confusion.
From the beginning, the terms of the GEF Instrument show
misunderstanding. In disregard of the limited role the Bank as
Trustee was accorded in the GEF—which amounts to no more than
that of a financial functionary—236the GEF Instrument makes the
World Bank as Trustee the entity responsible for ensuring that the
GEF Trust Fund‘s resources are being used in accordance with the
terms of the GEF Instrument and the decisions of the GEF Council.237
Making the World Bank as Trustee responsible for overseeing the
Implementing Agencies‘ use of GEF Trust Fund resources reflects a
misalignment of responsibilities because the Bank as Trustee lacks
the authority, substantive knowledge, and resources to exercise
such oversight.
The Bank as Trustee lacks the authority to police the
Implementing Agencies‘ use of GEF Trust Fund resources. The
GEF Instrument mandates that it commit and disburse funds to the
Implementing Agencies pursuant to the decisions of the GEF

235 See Dan Sarooshi, Conferrals by States of Powers on International
Organizations: The Case of Agency, in THE BRITISH YEAR BOOK OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 291, 297–98, n.7 (Oxford 2004).
If the expression of widely different ideas by one and the same term resulted only
in the necessity for . . . clumsy paraphrases, or obviously inaccurate paraphrases,
no great harm would be done; but, unfortunately, the identity of terms seems
irresistibly to suggest an identity between the ideas expressed by them.
Id. (quoting T. Holland, ELEMENTS OF JURISPRUDENCE 83 (1906), quoted in W.
Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 23
YALE L. J. 16, 33–34 (1914)).
236 See Smyth, supra note 43, at 32–33 (describing in detail the Bank‘s
functions in relation to the GEF Trust Fund).
237 See GEF Instrument, supra note 109, Annex B, para. 4(d) (providing, that
the Trustee shall be responsible for the ―monitoring of the application of
budgetary and project funds . . . so as to ensure that the resources of the [GEF
Trust Fund] are being used in accordance with the [GEF] Instrument and the
decisions taken by the Council‖).
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Council without giving it any authority to withhold funds if the
Implementing Agencies cannot account to the Bank for their use of
GEF Trust Fund resources already received.238 The Bank also lacks
the substantive knowledge to police UNDP and UNEPs‘ use of
resources. When the GEF Trust Fund donors set up the GEF Trust
Fund, they agreed with the Bank, UNEP, and UNDP that each
Implementing Agency would apply its own operational policies
when making grants of GEF Trust Fund resources to other
recipients.239 The Bank as Trustee, unfamiliar with the specifics of
UNEP and UNDPs‘ operational policies, would be in no position to
monitor whether they were being observed.240
In short, it was misguided for the GEF Instrument to make the
Bank as Trustee responsible for overseeing these agencies‘ use of
GEF resources. In the case of UNEP and UNDP, the parties
resolved this mis-alignment by means of a side-agreement,
whereby they agreed that the Bank as Trustee would not oversee
UNEP and UNDPs‘ application of their respective operational
policies but would simply require UNEP and UNDP to furnish it
with regular audited financial statements.241
But this sideagreement did not resolve the broader accountability gap that the
Quasi-Fund model poses with respect to oversight and the
238 See GEF Instrument, supra note 109, Annex B, para. 3 (holding that the
Fund shall be administered according to provisions of the Instrument and the
Trustee by-laws and rules, as well as any Council decisions made under the
Instrument).
239 See generally Smyth, supra note 43, at 62 (clarifying that while each agency
would apply its own policies, the World Bank was allowed by the Council to stop
sending funds to agencies if they did not meet their reporting requirements after a
grace period of thirty days).
240 The idea of World Bank staff monitoring and supervising UNDP and
UNEPs‘ execution of their projects is also inconsistent with the co-equal statures
of the World Bank and the UN, which, along with the UN‘s organs and
Specialized Agencies, co-exist in the international sphere without either bowing to
the other. See About Us, UNITED NATIONS, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE
/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/0,,contentMDK:20040610~menuPK:41691~pagePK
:43912~piPK:44037,00.html (last updated June 30, 2003) (stating the Bank‘s formal
relationship with the United Nations ―is defined by a 1947 agreement which
recognizes the Bank as an independent Specialized Agency of the UN as well as a
member and observer in many UN bodies‖).
241 See generally GEF COUNCIL, EXPANDED OPPORTUNITIES FOR EXECUTING
AGENCIES, GEF/C.12/10, para. 15 (Oct. 14-16, 1998), available at
http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/GEF.C.12.10.pdf
[hereinafter GEF Expanded Opportunities] (listing those entities which would be
able to take advantage of the newly expanded opportunities to access GEF
financing).
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standards the component bodies of a Quasi-Entity Fund should
follow.
These broader questions resurfaced in the GEF in connection
with a provision in the GEF Instrument not used in the early years
of the GEF Trust Fund‘s existence.242 This provision allows the
GEF Council to allocate GEF Trust Fund resources to a wide range
of intermediaries, including multilateral development banks, other
specialized agencies and programs of the U.N., other international
organizations,
bilateral
development
agencies,
national
institutions, NGOs, private sector entities and academic
institutions, in addition to the three Implementing Agencies.243
Beginning in the late 1990s, the GEF Council began to allocate GEF
Trust Fund resources to some regional development banks and
several U.N. agencies and programs.244 This expanded pool of
intermediaries forced the GEF Council to confront the questions
left open in the GEF Instrument—namely what standards the
Council should apply in selecting additional entities, how the
Council should determine whether an entity met those standards,
what sort of oversight should be exercised over new
intermediaries, and what would be the appropriate body to
exercise oversight.
The Council adopted a set of criteria devised by the Secretariat
for the selection of new intermediaries,245 which focused on an
entity‘s technical expertise to contribute to the GEF‘s mission.246 It
242 See Smyth, supra note 43, at 57 (discussing how in the early years of the
GEF's existence, the GEF Council only allocated resources to the Implementing
Agencies; in time, the complaints of development banks and other entities about
being shut out were heard, and the allocation procedures subsequently changed).
243 See GEF Instrument, supra note 109, para. 28 ("The Secretariat and the
Implementing Agencies under the guidance of the Council shall cooperate with
other international organizations to promote achievement of the purposes of the
GEF.‖)
244 See generally GEF COUNCIL, CRITERIA FOR THE EXPANSION OF OPPORTUNITIES
FOR EXECUTING AGENCIES, GEF/C.17/13, para. 3–5 (May 9-11, 2001), available at
http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/C.17.13.pdf
(detailing the GEF Council‘s decision to include four development banks and
three United Nations agencies among the entities to which it would allocate GEF
resources directly).
245 See id. (listing three criteria by which the GEF Council would judge the
suitability of an entity including strategic match, capacity, and complementarity).
The Council adopted these criteria some time after making some one-off rulings
affirming the eligibility of certain specific entities to serve as intermediaries. Id.
246 See id. (focusing on the three criteria such that the entity would be able to
work to fulfill the needs of the GEF (strategic match) at the necessary levels
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also assigned the Secretariat the lead role in deciding, in
consultation with the Implementing Agencies, 247 whether an entity
met those criteria. But the Council‘s ruling left gaps. Deciding on
standards of technical expertise is only part of the task; a donor
governing body of a Quasi-Entity Fund must also clarify what
fiduciary standards a recipient or intermediary must meet. The
criteria the Council approved omitted any criteria concerning an
entity‘s financial management capacity.
The omission concerning the entity‘s financial management
capacity raised the question of whether the GEF Council would
consider potential new intermediaries to have sufficient financial
management capacity as long as they could furnish financial
reports to the Bank as Trustee, as agreed for UNDP and UNEP.248
It also raised the question of whether the Bank‘s role as Trustee to
ensure that GEF Trust Fund resources are used in accordance with
the terms of the GEF Instrument and the decisions of the GEF
Council would be discharged by the Bank‘s simply securing
financial reports from these new intermediaries.
The Bank as Trustee pressed the GEF Council for clarity
regarding its responsibilities as Trustee. In response, the Council
ruled that securing financial reports from the new intermediaries
would fulfill the Bank‘s oversight responsibilities as Trustee.249 At
the Bank‘s urging, the Council also ruled that the GEF Instrument
should not be read as precluding the Bank as Trustee from
withholding the commitment or disbursement of funds to any
intermediary that failed to provide the Bank with the required

(capacity) while also being able to fully commit to the program
(complementarity)).
247 See id. (describing how, after the Council's initial review and acceptance of
an entity, the Secretariat would "complete the necessary legal and procedural
arrangements" and further review the agency before it was invited to become an
intermediary for the GEF).
248 See supra note 241 and accompanying text (detailing how the World Bank
as Trustee of the GEF Trust Fund agreed with UNEP and UNDP that UNEP and
UNDP would furnish the World Bank annually with audited financial reports, the
receipt of which would satisfy the Bank's obligation to ensure that GEF Trust
Fund resources were being used in accordance with the terms of the Instrument
and the GEF Council's decisions).
249 See GEF COUNCIL, TRUSTEE REPORT, GEF/C.23/Inf.3, para. 13 (Apr. 19,
2004), available at http://207.190.239.143/COUNCIL/GEF_C23/C.23.Inf.3_Trustee
_Report_FINAL.pdf [hereinafter GEF Trustee Report] (―[A]n appropriate manner
for the Trustee to discharge [its] responsibility would be for it to require, and
accept from, the Implementing Agencies an annual audited financial report . . . .‖).
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financial reports.250 This ruling gave the Bank as Trustee the police
powers necessary to fulfill the auditor-like role it had agreed to
assume.251
Although the Council‘s ruling resolved the open questions
concerning the scope of the Bank‘s responsibility in its capacity as
Trustee of the GEF Trust Fund, the dilution of fiduciary oversight
to the mere securing of financial reports is not a reassuring
paradigm for the accountability of the Quasi-Entity Fund model.
When intermediaries are large institutions, such as U.N. agencies
with standard financial and other controls,252 the limited measure
of securing financial reports may provide adequate fiduciary
oversight. However, the risk calculation changes in a broad
universe of diverse intermediaries with diverse fiduciary policies,
which may or may not conform to standards similar to those
applied by the World Bank and U.N. entities.
In the case of the GEF Trust Fund, the donors became alert to
inadequate fiduciary accountability belatedly when the number of
intermediaries expanded rapidly in the early 2000s.253 At that time,
they asked the World Bank as Trustee to develop a set of policy
proposals to strengthen the fiscal accountability of all GEF
intermediaries.254 The Bank as Trustee duly presented a set of

250 See id. para. 15 (authorizing the Bank as Trustee to ―suspend commitment
and disbursement‖ whenever a recipient is out of compliance with its financial
reporting obligations for thirty days or more after issuance of written notice by
the Trustee).
251 Id.
252 See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Financial Regulations and Rules of the
United Nations, U.N. Doc. ST/SGB/2003/7 (May 9, 2003) (containing amended
directives for the financial management of the U.N.).
253 Until 1998 the GEF Council only allocated funds directly to the three
Implementing Agencies: the World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP. By 2003, however,
it had decided to also was also allocate funds to seven executing agencies
pursuant to a series of decisions designed to give e give expanded access to GEF
resources. See GEF Expanded Opportunities, supra note 241, at 2–5 (discussing the
roles of the World Bank, UNDP, and UNEP as Implementing Agencies and their
efforts to expand opportunities for executing agencies); GEF COUNCIL, REVIEW OF
EXPERIENCE WITH EXECUTING AGENCIES UNDER EXPANDED OPPORTUNITIES,
GEF/C.22/12, para. 20 (Oct. 24, 2003), available at http://www.thegef.org/gef
/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/C.22.12_Executing_Agencies_FINAL.pdf
(stating that the policy of expanded opportunities has clarified the role of the
executing agencies and has provided the agencies with greater access to GEF
resources both directly and indirectly through the Implementing Agencies).
254 See GLOBAL ENV‘T FACILITY, SUMMARY OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FOURTH
REPLENISHMENT OF THE GEF TRUST FUND Annex A, para. 22 (Oct. 9, 2006), available
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minimum fiduciary standards which the Council asked every
This step
intermediary to implement within a year.255
strengthened the fiduciary accountability of the GEF Trust Fund.
The Council‘s demand that the Bank as Trustee develop such
standards, however, again manifests conceptual confusion
regarding the roles and responsibilities—and, therefore, the
accountability—of the Quasi-Entity Fund model. In principle,
there is nothing wrong with the GEF Council asking the World
Bank to develop a set of minimum fiduciary standards for GEF
intermediaries.
As an institution that has developed a
comprehensive set of fiduciary safeguards for its own
operations,256 the Bank is well placed, in the abstract, to perform
this standard-setting function. In the context of the Bank‘s role as
Trustee of the GEF Trust Fund, however, things are more
complicated. As the primary intermediary of GEF Trust Fund
resources, and as an entity that opposed expanding the pool of
GEF intermediaries,257 the Bank‘s ability to appear objective in
devising fiduciary standards for other GEF intermediaries is
tainted.
The Bank‘s inability to assume an untainted role as standardsetter is unfortunate given that it has the necessary expertise. If, in
the future, the donor community decides to create a separate legal
entity—a sixth member of the World Bank Group, to serve as an
international development fund administrator for donors‘
collective financing efforts—such an entity would be well-placed to
also serve as an advisor on fiduciary standards for intermediaries
at
http://207.190.239.143/GEF-3-4Replenishment/Reple_Documents
/SummaryofNegotiations_Revised_October2006.pdf [hereinafter GEF FOURTH
REPLENISHMENT] (―The use of GEF resources should be subject to the highest
international fiduciary standards.‖). The Council asked that the proposals set
minimum financial standards consistent with international best practices. Id.
255 See GLOBAL ENV‘T FACILITY, RECOMMENDED MINIMUM FIDUCIARY STANDARDS
FOR GEF IMPLEMENTING AND EXECUTING AGENCIES para. 12 (2007), available at
http://www.thegef.org/gef/sites/thegef.org/files/documents/Recommended_
Minimum_Fiduciary_Standard.pdf [hereinafter GEF FIDUCIARY STANDARDS] (―The
Council requests each agency to present a report to the GEF Secretariat on its
compliance with the fiduciary standards and, as necessary, plans to remedy any
shortfall.‖).
256 See generally WB TRUST FUNDS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, at
31–40 (detailing a risk-based approach to trust fund management).
257 See Smyth, supra note 43, at 63 (detailing how the World Bank initially
opposed regional banks and other entities gaining direct access to GEF resources,
as distinct from having access exclusively through sub-grants from the
Implementing Agencies).
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and direct recipients.258 This advisory role is precluded when the
Bank assumes the multiple roles it currently holds under the
Quasi-Entity Fund model.
The Bank as Trustee was also the wrong entity to set standards
for GEF intermediaries because of the risk it took by assuming that
its standard-setting role would expand to include a role overseeing
whether those standards were being met. This overseer role is
inconsistent with the limited financial functionary role the Bank
has as Trustee of the GEF. Although setting minimum fiduciary
standards for intermediaries does not necessarily entail assuming
oversight responsibilities over intermediaries‘ compliance with
those standards, it is a slippery slope. This was especially true in
the context of the GEF Trust Fund, where the Bank as Trustee had
to forcibly wean donors from depending on the Bank to perform
an oversight function it was not equipped to fulfill.
To create a situation where the donors of a Quasi-Entity Fund
would rely on the Bank as Trustee to exercise fiduciary oversight
over the fund‘s intermediaries and/or recipients, while at the same
time excluding the Bank from having any input in selecting those
intermediaries and/or recipients, would not serve the interests of
development‘s stakeholders. For example, given the lack of input
the Bank as Trustee of the GEF Trust Fund has in selecting GEF
intermediaries, if the Bank assumed responsibility for such
intermediaries‘ use of trust fund resources it would effectively be
taking on unmanageable amounts of responsibility and risk.
Instead, the donor governing body (the GEF Council) is the
appropriate body to bear the risk of selecting a fraudulent or
incompetent entity because it holds the authority to choose
intermediaries or recipients.259 This arrangement properly aligns
control with responsibility.
258 An expanded role for the World Bank as a standard-setter of financial
assessment and fiduciary monitoring practices would fit within the
characterization of the World Bank as having the potential to play a significant
role in the evolving field of global administrative law. See generally Benedict
Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, 68 L. & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 15 (2005) (discussing the transnational regulatory systems that are
emerging to tackle intergovernmental issues, such as assistance to developing
countries and banking and financial regulation, which cannot adequately be
addressed by domestic national administrative institutions).
259 See BANTEKAS supra note 18, at 156–57 (noting that an executive board—
such as the GEF Council—of an intergovernmental trust fund with a governance
mechanism owes obligations to a range of stakeholders, including the donors
themselves).

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol32/iss4/1

SMYTH.DOC

2011]

4/24/2011 9:51 AM

COLLECTIVE FINANCE CHALLENGE

1031

Ultimately, the Bank as Trustee avoided taking responsibility
for vetting the GEF‘s intermediaries or for monitoring
intermediaries‘ compliance with the policies and procedures they
had agreed to apply. Instead, the GEF Council ordered the
intermediaries to report to the Secretariat on their progress in
implementing the standards the Bank as Trustee had
recommended.260 Designating the Secretariat to vet and monitor
the intermediaries‘ compliance with the standards the Bank as
Trustee devised helped offset the appearance of a conflict of
interest in having the Bank serve as standard-setter. As an exercise
in finding the right body for the job, however,261 this result is also
suboptimal.
The Secretariat is primarily staffed with
environmental experts (rather than accounting or financial
management folks), and so lacks the right expertise to perform the
task. Meanwhile, the Bank, as the designer and proponent of the
minimum fiduciary standards, has the correct expertise, but cannot
participate due to potential conflicts in ensuring compliance with
other roles the Bank has already assumed. This is not an optimal
division of labor or use of institutional resources.
The hit-or-miss quality of the decisions that led to the ultimate
division of labor between the different components of the GEF
structure does not inspire confidence in the Quasi-Entity Fund as a
model. That same hit-or-miss quality was evident in the first
drafting of the Education Fund by the donors and Bank, and their
struggles with balancing between the Bank‘s need to observe
prudent financial management standards and the donors‘ desire
for autonomy within the constraints of the Quasi-Entity Fund
model.
The conceptual confusion about accountability is evident in the
Education Fund in connection with the donor governing body‘s
selection of recipients. The Education Fund‘s donor governing
body (the Strategy Committee) was designated to select which
countries would receive assistance262 and also to recommend to the
260 See GEF FIDUCIARY STANDARDS, supra note 255, para. 12 (requesting ―each
agency to present a report to the GEF Secretariat on its compliance with the
fiduciary standards and, as necessary, plans to remedy any shortfall‖).
261 See Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 25–26
(discussing the considerations that the principal must take into account when
―hiring‖ an agent, and noting the importance of aligning a principal‘s demands
with an agent‘s capacity).
262 Pursuant to the World Bank‘s Operating Policies governing the Bank‘s
administration of trust funds, each donor to a fund enters into a Trust Fund
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Bank as Trustee the specific recipients that should receive Fund
resources. Recommended recipients could be chosen from an
unlimited range of recipient entities.263 The Bank as Trustee,
however, retained the final say in selection.264 In principle, this
arrangement was intended to allow the Bank as Trustee to avoid
providing fiduciary oversight over an entity that would not meet
its fiduciary or social safeguards.
The Fund‘s constituent
documents, however, did not specify what standards the Strategy
Committee would apply in selecting recipients. As a result, since
the final say on recipient selection lay with the World Bank as
Trustee, the Bank‘s fiduciary and social safeguards became the
default standards.
The terms and conditions of the Education Fund provided that
the Bank‘s standards would apply to all grants from the Education
Grant except when the Strategy Committee selected a nongovernment recipient, in which case the Bank would not supervise
the recipient. The terms were entirely vague, however, regarding
which policies and procedures any such recipients would be
required to observe.265 The absence of clear and transparent
standards to guide when the Strategy Committee might make such
an allocation and/or what sort of substitute oversight procedures
would apply created a significant gap in accountability. The terms
of the Fund include an express disclaimer by the Bank of any
responsibility to account to the donors for any such recipient‘s use
of the Fund‘s resources.266 The power of this disclaimer to protect
the Bank‘s reputation if a malfeasance occurred, however, and the
wisdom of the institution relying on such a disclaimer to protect
itself are dubious.
Administration Agreement or its equivalent with the World Bank as trustee. See
World Bank OP/BP 14.40, supra note 99, at BANK PROCEDURES, para. 6.
Accordingly, each Education Fund donor has entered into a Trust Fund
Administration Agreement with the World Bank, the terms and conditions of
which create, inter alia, the fund‘s governance structure. See WORLD BANK,
AGREEMENT BETWEEN DONOR AND THE INTERNATIONAL BANK FOR RECONSTRUCTION
AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE INTERNATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ASSOCIATION
CONCERNING THE EDUCATION FOR ALL FAST TRACK INITIATIVE CATALYTIC FUND, TF
No. 051061, Annex 1, para. 2 (2007), [hereinafter Education Fund Administration
Agreement] (on file with author).
263 Education Fund Administration Agreement Annex 1, supra note 262, para.
2.
264 Id.
265 Id. paras. 2, 7.b.
266 Id. para 7.b.
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These types of accountability gaps are not present under a
World Bank Trust Fund. When a group of donors set up a World
Bank Trust Fund, they enter into legal agreements with the World
Bank which govern the administration of the fund and set out the
terms and conditions under which the World Bank will carry out
its trustee responsibilities. These agreements provide a relatively
clear accountability framework.267 They set out precisely which
policies and procedures the Bank will follow in its discharge of its
trustee responsibilities.268 Under the default rule, of the World
Bank‘s internal policies when administering a World Bank Trust
Fund, the World Bank must apply the same rules and policies to
the use of the fund‘s resources as applied to its own resources. The
full panoply of processes and procedures that the Bank has
developed for its lending activities will apply.
The Bank‘s lending polices set out a comprehensive set of
standards that apply to two different aspects of the recipient
selection process. They prescribe the requirements that an entity
must meet in order to qualify as an eligible recipient of financing—
a set of standards collectively referred to as the Bank‘s fiduciary
safeguards.269 They also prescribe the requirements a recipient must
observe while carrying out the activity being financed by the grant.

267 See SUREDA, supra note 187, at 191 (describing the principles that must be
included in trust fund administration agreements).
268 See generally World Bank OP/BP 14.40, supra note 99 (describing the
responsibilities of groups with regards to the use of trust funds). In 2006, the
Bank introduced a set of Standard Terms and Conditions for World Bank Grants,
which incorporate these policies.
See generally WORLD BANK, STANDARD
CONDITIONS FOR GRANTS MADE BY THE WORLD BANK OUT OF VARIOUS FUNDS (July
20, 2006), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTICE
/Resources/STDGC-English-06.pdf. See also Smyth, supra note 38, at 529–35
(discussing the World Bank‘s transition from its original approach to grant
agreements, which allowed for variable terms and conditions, to its current
emphasis on uniformity, and noting the Bank‘s authority to cancel or suspend
grants when necessary).
269 The fiduciary safeguards allow the World Bank to preliminarily vet a
potential recipient‘s capacity to handle grant funds. For example, they require
that the grant recipient maintain a financial management system—including
accounting, financial reporting, and auditing systems—that is satisfactory to the
Bank.
See
World
Bank
Safeguard
Policies,
WORLD
BANK,
http://go.worldbank.org/QL7ZYN48M0 (last visited Feb. 22, 2011) (describing a
series of policies to assure that the ―Bank‘s operations do not harm people and the
environment‖). What is satisfactory to the Bank will depend on what kind of
information the Bank determines it will need from a recipient in order for the
Bank to discharge its responsibilities as a trustee. The Bank also must report to
donors on the status of the fund and the use of donors‘ resources.
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These latter requirements are set down as conditions in the grant
agreement entered into between the Bank as trustee and the
recipient, and are collectively referred to as the Bank‘s social
safeguards.270 These safeguards reflect the principles the Bank
observes in order to keep its operations consistent with generally
accepted principles of sustainable development.271 In sum, the
fiduciary safeguards and the social safeguards combined are
specifically designed to create a clear framework of
accountability.272
The Bank‘s lending policies also mandate that the recipient
follow the World Bank‘s procurement policies and procedures—
provisions designed to ensure that the recipient follows a
transparent process in procuring goods and services being
financed by the grant, and that all eligible bidders get a fair
opportunity to compete.273 Further, they require the Bank to

270 The Bank‘s social safeguards apply to a project‘s environmental footprint
and other development-related issues. They require a grant recipient to comply
with the Bank‘s policies covering a host of matters such as mandated
environmental assessments and the protection of indigenous people, natural
habitats, forestry and physical and cultural resources. The Bank‘s social safeguards
consist of ten policies intended to serve as a set of minimum standards that all
Bank-supported operations must meet. See generally Alex Wilks, World Bank Social
and Environmental Policies: Abandoning Responsibility?, BRETTON WOODS PROJECT
(Sept. 2003), available at http://www.brettonwoodsproject.org/doc/env
/safeguards.PDF (revealing that the World Bank‘s efforts to ―reformat‖ its ten
safeguard policies made NGOs fear that the Bank intended to evade responsibility
for social and environmental concerns); World Bank Safeguard Policies, supra note
269 (noting social safeguards).
271 Many of these policies were introduced in the 1980s in response to
pressure from the NGO community to protect the environment and vulnerable
groups from being harmed by the World Bank‘s operations. See Kapur, supra note
73, at 65–66 (noting the strong influence of Washington-based NGOs over the
World Bank). See generally Benedict Kingsbury, Operational Policies of International
Institutions as Part of the Law-Making Process: The World Bank and Indigenous Peoples,
in THE REALITY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF IAN BROWNLIE 323
(Guy S. Goodwin-Gill & Stefan Talmon eds., 1999) (discussing the World Bank‘s
operational policies and practices and their impact on international law).
272 Fiduciary safeguards and social safeguards are part of the World Bank‘s
Operational Policies and Procedures. See WORLD BANK, THE WORLD BANK
OPERATIONS MANUAL, OP 4.00, para. 2, tbl.A1 (2005), available at
http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTOPMANUAL/Resources/EntireOpMan
ualExternal.pdf (presuming that a borrower‘s environmental and social safeguard
system is the same as the Bank‘s when it is aimed at the objectives listed in Table
A1, which describes appropriate safeguard operations).
273 See id. at OP 11.00 (outlining procurement policy).
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monitor and supervise the execution of grants from trust fund
resources.274
This framework of accountability is lost whenever a group of
donors sets up a Quasi-Entity Fund that excludes application of the
World Bank‘s fiduciary safeguards and social safeguards to the donor
governing body‘s selection of recipients. The Bank‘s internal
policies275 require that the Bank‘s fiduciary and safeguard policies
apply to all grants the Bank supervises; however, gaps exist when
donors retain the right to have non-Bank entities supervise grants
made from fund resources. In choosing to retain the right to select
non-Bank entities to implement and/or supervise, donors must
decide which substitute standards to apply both in initially vetting
recipients‘ fiduciary capacity to handle grant resources, and in
determining what kind of sustainable development policies they
want recipients to observe in carrying out the grant activities.276
As experience shows, Quasi-Entity Fund donors and the World
Bank tend not to appreciate the need to proactively determine who
will exercise oversight over the recipients‘ use of resources; what
such oversight will entail, and what standards, policies, and
procedures will guide the donor governing body‘s discharge of its
responsibilities in allocating a fund‘s resources. Accountability
demands more.277
274 See id. para. 1 (―The Articles of Agreement establish the Bank‘s fiduciary
responsibility to ensure that the proceeds of its loans are used only for specified
purposes . . . .‖). For example, the grant recipient‘s responsibility to execute the
grant holds the recipient responsible for procuring the goods and services needed
to carry out grant activities, negotiating contracts, making payments, submitting
progress and financial reports as required by the grant agreement and performing
other implementation activities. See World Bank OP/BP 14.40, supra note 99, at 3
n.7 (describing responsibilities of grant recipients). The Bank is responsible for
supervising and monitoring the recipient‘s performance of these obligations. See
id. para. 8, at 5 (―The [task team leader] is responsible for supervising and
reporting to his/her line manager . . . on progress in implementation of trustfunded activities.‖).
275 See generally World Bank OP/BP 14.40, supra note 99 (stating the
operational policies of the World Bank).
276 If fund donors decided not to give the donor governing body discretion,
but instead set rules to administer, accountability would be more easily
determined. See Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 27
(summarizing the benefits and drawbacks of ―rule-based‖ and ―discretion-based‖
delegation of authority). This would require, however, the creation of a dynamic,
flexible funding vehicle that could readily respond to changing needs.
277 Further, in a participatory model of accountability for development aid,
accountability would flow to all stakeholders. See Grant & Keohane, supra note 3,
at 38 (discussing various forms of accountability applicable to multilateral
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The World Bank itself has expressed concern about the
accountability of the Quasi-Entity Fund model. Its internal
evaluations department, the Operational Evaluation Department
(―OED‖), identified several failures in accountability in the
model.278 In a study of twenty-six initiatives, it concluded that the
roles and responsibilities of the governing officers and bodies
needed clearer articulation, and that the transparency of their
decision-making and processes needed improvement to provide
clearer accountability for their exercise of power over the
initiatives‘ resources.279 Further, OED found nine different models
of governance in use in the twenty-six initiatives, with no obvious
reason for the differences between them.280 The Bank‘s Senior
Management also raised concerns to the Bank‘s Board of Executive
Directors (the Bank‘s governing body on a day-to-day basis) about
the risks the Bank faces in administering increasingly complex
Quasi-Entity Funds.281 Despite these concerns, neither the Bank
nor the donor or recipient communities have articulated a
comprehensive vision regarding what kinds of reform of the
Quasi-Entity Fund would best serve the global community; nor
organizations, multilateral firms, and NGOs). In a delegation model, those who
delegate power hold power-wielders ―accountable through a variety of
mechanisms for judgment after the fact.‖ Id. at 32–33.
278 See OED Phase I Report, supra note 38, at 42 (noting, for instance, conflicts
of interest, whether real or perceived); WORLD BANK, ADDRESSING THE CHALLENGES
OF GLOBALIZATION: AN INDEPENDENT EVALUATION OF THE WORD BANK‘S APPROACH
TO GLOBAL PROGRAMS—PHASE 2 REPORT 85 (2004), available at http://wwwwds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2007/04/2
5/000020953_20070425114157/Rendered/PDF/396470PAPER0Ch1obalization01P
UBLIC1.pdf [hereinafter OED Phase 2 Report] (concluding that ―[w]hile pure
shareholder models of programs are being replaced by stakeholder models,
program governance are still struggling to balance legitimacy and accountability
for results with efficiency in achieving them‖).
279 See OED Phase 2 Report, supra note 278, at xxviii (concluding that the
―[l]ack of effective governance and management must be addressed if the Bank‘s
financial support is to continue‖); id. at 53–66 (noting a strong need for the World
Bank to address the lack of effective governance and management commonly
found in global programs, the kinds of programs that are funded by Quasi-Entity
Funds).
280 See id. at 53–54 (noting that ―programs have adopted their particular
governance models for reasons of history and of culture,‖ and emphasizing that
the number of diverse models makes it difficult to differentiate between partners
and participants, as well as to judge how effective each governance model is).
281 See WB TRUST FUNDS MANAGEMENT FRAMEWORK, supra note 18, para. 2.13,
at 11–12 (discussing the problems arising from complexity, such as multiple layers
of decision-making, increased financial management requirements, and the need
for greater administrative processing).
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have they articulated a vision regarding what role the World Bank
or other intergovernmental organizations should assume with
respect to them.282
Recent developments in the Education Fund indicate that
donors and the Bank are aware of the need to proactively address
the accountability lacunae that arise in the Quasi-Entity Fund
model. In November 2010, the donors of the Education Fund, in
collaboration with the full membership of the broader Education
For All Fast Track Initiative Partnership, agreed to a major
The changes, in addition to
restructuring of the Fund.283
expanding the participatory nature and inclusiveness of the Fund,
limit the range of entities to which the Fund will transfer resources
and removes the prior opacity about what policies and procedures
apply when the Fund issues a grant to an entity that will not be
supervised by the World Bank.284
Under the restructured fund, the former donor governing
body, the Steering Committee, has been abolished.285 The original
Education Fund has been merged with other related funds
financing primary education and the newly merged fund, named
the Education For All Fund, is governed by a board of directors

282 See BANTEKAS, supra note 18, at 156–58 (discussing corporate governance
duties and the lack of clarity regarding such duties in intergovernmental trust
funds).
283 See FTI Reform Agenda, EDU. FOR ALL FAST TRACK INITIATIVE (Dec. 03, 2010),
available at http://www.educationfasttrack.org/news/185/290/Key-Decisionsand-Next-Steps-Conclude-EFA-FTI-Meetings/d,Whats%20New/ (detailing the
agreed-upon changes including restructuring the Board of Directors, policy
reformation, the creation of a single trust fund, and a revision of the "Governance
of the Partnership" document).
284 See EDUCATION FOR ALL FAST TRACK INITIATIVE, COVER NOTE TO
GOVERNANCE
OF
THE
PARTNERSHIP
ii
(Nov.
2010),
available
at
http://www.educationfasttrack.org/media/Revised%20Final%20Governance%2
0Document_Jan%202011.pdf [hereinafter EFA-FTI GOVERNANCE DOCUMENT
(2010)] (reflecting the changes made to the membership and function of EFA-FTI‘s
Board of Directors).
285 See DAVID GARTNER, BROOKINGS INSTIT., TRANSFORMED GOVERNANCE AND
THE EDUCATION FOR ALL-FAST TRACK INITIATIVE 3 (May 2010), available at
http://www.brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/papers/2010/05_education_gov
ernance_gartner/05_education_governance_gartner.pdf (noting the FTI—whose
origin can be traced to the 2002 G-8 summit in Canada—has ―evolved from an
entity formally guided by an annual partnership meeting, to a steering committee
without substantial authority over funding decisions, to a unified structure of
board governance‖)
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who makes all financing decisions.286 The range of possible entities
that can supervise a grant of Fund resources has been restricted to
any multilateral or bilateral FTI Partner organization;287 a FTI
Partner organization being defined as a bilateral aid agency of a
donor country to the Education Fund or any multilateral
organization engaged in the primary education sector.288 The
entity selected to supervise a grant is responsible to the EFA FTI
Partnership for grants under its oversight.289 The lack of clarity
about what polices an entity supervising the execution of a Fund
grant should apply has been resolved in favor of allowing the
supervising entity to apply its own policies and procedures,
including those related to the procurement of goods and
services.290
The dual reporting role of the Secretariat (to the overall
Partnership and the Bank as the host organization) remains,
however.291 Further, although the re-structured fund‘s constituent
documents declare that the Board of Directors shall monitor the
use of the Fund‘s resources and ensure that they are being used in
286 See EFA-FTI GOVERNANCE DOCUMENT (2010), supra note 284, para. 4.2
(outlining the amended mandate of the FTI Board of Directors). The Board of
Directors has nineteen members and is a much broader representation of
interested stakeholders than the Strategy Committee of the former Education
Fund. Id. at para. 4.2.1. The nineteen representatives include six representatives
from donor countries, six representatives from developing countries eligible to
receive Fund resources, three representatives from Civil Society, one
representative from the private sector, and one representative from each of the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, the United
Nations Children‘s Fund and an unspecified multilateral or regional development
bank. Id. para. 4.2.2(a)–(e). Decisions are made by consensus where possible or
by a majority which must include a cross-section of the different categories of
Board representatives, where consensus cannot be achieved. Id. at para. 4.2.17.
287 See id. para. 4.1 (giving the four categories of FTI Partners, all charged
with monitoring and advising the Board of Directors).
288 See EDUCATION FOR ALL FAST TRACK INITIATIVE COUNTRY LEVEL PROCESS
GUIDE (Apr. 2010), available at http://www.educationfasttrack.org/media
/library/Secure/Board_Documents_May-2010/Final_Country_Level_Process
_Guide.pdf (providing an ―overview of the basic process of joining and working
within the EFA FTI Partnership at a country level‖).
289 See EFA-FTI GOVERNANCE DOCUMENT (2010), supra note 284, para. 3.5.6
(discussing how such organizations can be designated Coordinating Agencies,
which have the responsibility to monitor and facilitate fund disbursement).
290 See id. (noting also the Coordinating Agency's role in monitoring the
progress and implementation of a country‘s education sector plan).
291 See id. para. 4.4.6 (detailing how the FTI Secretariat is to report to the
Board of Directors regarding ―objectives and outcomes,‖ and to the host
organization regarding the work plan and budget management).
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accordance with the Board‘s decision,292 the Board, for all practical
purposes, is entirely reliant on the supervising entities to provide
oversight. In the meantime, the World Bank as ―Trustee‖ of the
Fund would appear (incorrectly) to the outside world, as the entity
responsible for that oversight role.
All of the development‘s stakeholders have a stake in
containing the risks that the accountability gaps in the Quasi-Entity
Fund model create, not least the World Bank. Unless we ascribe to
the view that the World Bank has served its purposes and should
cease to exist as an organization, there is reason to preserve its
viability as a development bank.293 This means that the Bank
should take steps to prevent the Quasi-Entity Fund model from
becoming the tail that wagged the dog, i.e., to prevent Quasi-Entity
Funds from becoming a vehicle that, by damaging the Bank‘s
reputation for sound financial management practices, impedes the
Bank‘s ability to function as a viable financial institution.294
Individual donors may have markedly different risk tolerances
than the Bank, given the Bank‘s dependence on the capital markets
to raise operating capital.
This difference seems best
accommodated in a framework that draws a clear line between the
role of the Bank as an administrator of donors‘ funds and the role
of the Bank as a lending institution whose lending rates are driven
by its cost of capital. Comprehensive change that recognizes this
difference, and the risks created by lacunae in accountability, is
overdue.
3.2. The Deficits in the National Law Entity
The National Law Entity model, as epitomized by the Global
Fund, is materially different from the Quasi-Entity Fund. The
Global Fund‘s donors broke free of the agency costs that the
donors to a Quasi-Entity Fund incur as a result of the Quasi-Entity
Fund‘s extensive dependence on the World Bank. They also
292 See id. para. 4.2.8 ("The FTI Board of Directors makes funding decisions for
the FTI Trust Funds, monitors their utilization and ensures they are being used in
line with FTI objectives and policies . . . .").
293 See Pincus & Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, supra note 3, at 18–19
(noting that the ―Fifty Years is Enough‖ sentiment reflects just one extreme view
and that while the World Bank has many critics, most of its critics advocate
reform, not abolition of the institution).
294 See generally Kapur, supra note 73, at 61–63 (noting how the World Bank‘s
dependence on global financial markets has shaped the institutional design and
governance of the World Bank itself).
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unmasked and plugged the accountability gaps hidden in the
Quasi-Entity Fund model. But neither achievement has been
absolute or cost-free. Moreover, these gains alone do not establish
the National Law Entity model as an optimal model for collective
financing efforts. Whether this model can be viewed as such
depends, as a threshold matter, upon the costs at which these gains
have been achieved.
Further, assuming—even without
conceding—that the costs are manageable, whether the National
Law Entity model‘s potential to serve as an optimal model for
collective financing also depends on whether this model‘s goals are
impeded by its lack of international legal personality.
3.2.1. Uncertain Availability
3.2.1.1. Financial Administration
The Global Fund secured the financial administration services
of the World Bank, despite the fact that it operates independently
from the Bank. Further, the Global Fund‘s Secretariat and its
Executive Director have real, not illusory, independence from any
other entity. In both of these respects, the National Law Entity
model succeeds where the Quasi-Entity Fund model fails. Both
gains are directly linked to the Global Fund‘s independent legal
status.
The World Bank agreed, reluctantly, to serve as Trustee of the
Global Fund. It was uneasy about the grassroots, locally-based
approach the Global Fund donors favored. Its concession to serve
as Trustee must be understood within the particular context in
which the Global Fund was created. The Fund was a high-profile
effort that encapsulated the developed world‘s response to an
urgent epidemic295—a response that many viewed as long
overdue.296 It is funded by the Banks‘ major shareholders acting
collectively, whom the Bank was not in a position to refuse.
When earlier versions of the Fund were under consideration,
the Bank took the position that it would not serve as trustee of a
295 See Press Release, Secretary-General, Secretary-General Proposes Global
Fund for Fight Against HIV/AIDS and Other Infectious Diseases at African
Leaders Summit, U.N. Press Release SG/SM/7779/Rev.1 (Apr. 26, 2001)
(discussing the high incidence rate of HIV/AIDS in Africa, and broadly outlining
various steps that need to be taken to curtail the spread of the epidemic).
296 See RADELET, supra note 139, at 3–7 (examining some of the most common
criticisms of foreign aid programs and how the Global Fund structure responds to
the criticisms).
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fund set up under its auspices if the purpose of that fund was to
channel funds through country-based mechanisms selected by the
donors, rather than through the Bank and other intergovernmental
organizations.297 The Bank based this position on concerns about
liability and reputational risk.298 As indicated earlier in connection
with the GEF Trust Fund,299 the Bank views a fund that channels its
resources through the Bank and U.N. entities as a known quantity,
from the point of view of the risk the Bank assumes in serving as a
trustee.
The Global Fund‘s donors were adamant, however, that the
fund would not operate through those established channels. Thus,
under pressure to help facilitate the Fund‘s creation, the Bank
opted for the second-best alternative (from the point of view of
protecting the Bank‘s interests) and conditioned its willingness to
serve as Trustee on the Fund‘s being set up with a legal personality
independent of the Bank.300 That way the Fund, not the Bank,
would bear legal responsibility for any loss, damage, or fraud that
might result in the course of the Fund‘s operations.301 The Bank
also saw the Fund‘s legal independence as a way of attenuating, if
not eliminating, any reputational damage to the Bank that might
result from something going awry in the course of the Fund‘s
operations.302
The Bank‘s agreement to serve as Trustee of the Global Fund,
therefore, cannot be viewed as indicative of a general willingness
to assume that role for financing efforts that operate independent
of it. In certain limited circumstances, notably in connection with
highly specialized, narrowly targeted health initiatives, it has
297 See GLOBAL FUND REPORT ON LEGAL STATUS OPTIONS, supra note 171, at 7
(determining that ―the Global Fund lacks a cost-effective administrative structure,
independent authorities, and sufficient liability protection‖).
298 See id. (pointing out concerns that the proposed design of the fund might
result in redundancy, increased costs, and a subversion of existing programs and
expertise).
299 See supra text accompanying notes 165, 167–68 (describing the role of Local
Fund Agents as well as the legal liability of the Global Fund).
300 See Triponel, supra note 138, at 183 (discussing the reasons why the Global
Fund was established as an independent legal entity); GLOBAL FUND FRAMEWORK
DOCUMENT, supra note 138, at 1 (discussing the purpose and scope of the Global
Fund).
301 See GLOBAL FUND REPORT ON LEGAL STATUS OPTIONS, supra note 171, at 2
(providing background information on the establishment of the Global Fund).
302 See id. (detailing the historical perspective in the formation of the Global
Fund, and why it was organized as a private entity as opposed to another form).
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agreed to serve as trustee for independent initiatives.303 However,
the criteria that determines whether the Bank will or will not
provide financial administration services are opaque. The clear
demand for collective financing for development gives rise to a
need for greater certainty regarding the availability of such
services to donors, whether from the World Bank or an alternative
institution. For the National Law Entity to be a viable model for
new collective financing efforts, donors need assurance that such
services are available.
3.2.1.2. Uncertain Commitment to the Responsibilities of
Independence
The Global Fund‘s independence from the WHO, the World
Bank, and all other pre-existing intergovernmental organizations is
real, but as the Fund‘s history shows, this independence was not
automatic.304 It resulted from the determined, relentless drive of
the Fund‘s supporters to preserve the Fund as a financing vehicle
that operates through country and regional-level channels. That
determination caused the Global Fund‘s donors early on to view
the Administrative Services Agreement between the Fund and the
WHO, and the convenience of relying on the pre-existing
institutional apparatus of the WHO to hire Fund staff, as
temporary measures.
The independence of the Global Fund‘s Secretariat serves as a
paragon of what the GEF Trust Fund‘s CEO wants to achieve.
Further, the Global Fund terminated its Administrative Services
Agreement with the WHO for the express purpose of relieving its
Secretariat of the conflict of serving the distinct agendas of the
Fund and the WHO; this strongly supports the argument that, as
the GEF‘s CEO claims, such independence is essential if a collective
financing effort is to achieve its goals. This evidence squarely
confronts donors with the implications of their design choices. The
National Law Entity offers a means of achieving real independence
303 See Why IFFIm?, IFFIM, http://www.iff-immunisation.org (last visited
Apr. 12, 2011) (―The International Finance Facility for Immunisation (IFFIm) exists
to rapidly accelerate the availability and predictability of funds for
immunization‖); What Is an AMC?, ADVANCE MARKET COMMITMENT FOR VACCINES,
http://www.vaccineamc.org/about.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011) (explaining
that ―[d]onors commit money to guarantee the price of vaccines once they have
been developed . . . .‖).
304 See Triponel, supra note 138, at 184–86 (discussing the creation of the
Global Fund as an independent legal entity).
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if donors are willing to assume the responsibilities and costs that
independence entails.
Many of the accountability gaps the Quasi-Entity Fund model
generates are resolved by the National Law Entity model. Its clear
legal independence puts donors on notice ab initio that they must
decide on standards and processes for the new entity‘s operations,
for which they will hold it accountable. In setting up the
component parts of the Global Fund, therefore, the donors
carefully delineated the responsibilities of each part at the global
and local level.305 They also delineated the standards by which
each should discharge its responsibilities.
The Country
Coordinating Mechanism, for example, selects the Principal
Recipients in accordance with criteria set by the Board of Directors,
and the Local Funding Agents are selected in accordance with preagreed competitive bidding processes.306 For the most part,
therefore, with one exception, the confusion about roles and
responsibilities evident in the Quasi-Entity Fund is absent from the
National Law Entity as exemplified by the Global Fund.
Moreover, consistent with best practices identified in principalagent theory, each component part‘s responsibilities are aligned
with its competence and relatively devoid of perverse incentives.307
The exception to the Fund‘s sound framework of fiscal
accountability concerns the role of the World Bank as Trustee.
Labeling the Bank Trustee of the Global Fund is misleading. As a
non-voting member of the Board of Directors, the Bank has no
control over who the recipients of the Fund‘s grants are, or over the
criteria applied to select them, or over the terms and conditions of
the grants made to them.308 Vis-à-vis the recipients, the Bank‘s role
305 See GLOBAL FUND FRAMEWORK DOCUMENT, supra note 138, §§ IX–X
(providing an overview on the process of monitoring programs and of different
entities‘ fiduciary responsibilities).
306 See supra text accompanying note 158 (noting that the GUIDELINES AND
REQUIREMENTS FOR COUNTRY COORDINATING MECHANISMS outline the principles the
Country Coordinating Mechanisms must advance); Who We Are, THE GLOBAL
FUND, http://www.theglobalfund.org/en/lfa/ (last visited Mar. 18, 2011) (stating
that Local Funding Agents ―are selected through a competitive bidding process‖).
307 See Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 30–31
(discussing the effect of delegation on the principal-agent theory).
308 The Fund‘s grant agreements are concluded between the Fund and the
recipient, so the Bank as Trustee is not involved in them and simply disburses
funds to the recipients‘ bank accounts in accordance with the instructions it
receives from the Secretariat. See GLOBAL FUND REPORT ON LEGAL STATUS OPTIONS,
supra note 171, at 2.
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is solely that of a disbursement or paying agent on behalf of the
Fund. Vis-à-vis the Fund‘s donors, its role resembles that of a
collection agent and custodian or investment manager. Neither of
these roles entails exercising the oversight over the Fund‘s
resources, ordinarily connoted by having the World Bank serve as
Trustee of a fund.
In fact, under the Fund‘s structure the Local Funding Agent,
Principal Recipient, Secretariat, and Board of Directors all have a
role in overseeing the use of the Fund‘s resources. In other words,
fiduciary accountability does exist, but it is not centered in, or
dependent on, the World Bank. Accountability, however, not only
demands clarity in how a principal and an agent allocate their
respective duties and responsibilities, but also clarity and
consistency in the terms they use to describe the allocations they
agree upon.309 Those terms signal to the parties, and to all
stakeholders, where accountability lies.310 This mislabeling in the
Global Fund‘s structure is an easy, yet important, fix in future
efforts seeking to rely upon the National Law Entity approach.311
3.2.1.3. High Costs
Apart from this deficit, the National Law Entity, as reflected in
the Global Fund, achieves formal fiscal accountability. Viewing
the donors‘ goal as one which creates a financing mechanism that
maximizes the likelihood that their resources will be used for the
purposes for which donors have made them available,312 the
National Law Entity model, as exemplified by the Global Fund,
309 See Grant & Keohane, supra note 3, at 39–40 (emphasizing that
accountability depends on the clarification of roles in the principal-agent
relationship, specifically noting the importance of transparency of responsibilities
in allocating accountability).
310 See id. (recognizing that the transparency of responsibilities, standards,
and sanctions within principal-agent relationships promotes stable
accountability).
311 This deficit has the potential to be especially significant from the World
Bank‘s point of view. For an institution whose reputation for financial
management competence is key, both to its ability to borrow funds on
international capital markets and to receiving continued support from its
shareholders, perpetuating this misimpression of having responsibility to provide
supervision for the resources of an entity, over which it has no control is
imprudent, if not bordering on foolhardiness.
312 See Hawkins et al., Delegation Under Anarchy, supra note 55, at 23 (arguing
that while the gains from delegation may motivate states to grant conditional
authority to international organizations, they do not determine the outcome).
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appears to achieve some success. It is an initiative designed by
donors to fund a specific issue and, by providing for donor control
and eliminating reliance on entities with competing agendas, it
achieves focused independence. That independence is achieved at
considerable financial cost. Starting afresh is an expensive
undertaking.313 The Global Fund‘s Secretariat has a staff of six
hundred people, and the creation and design of a whole new
structure complete with new component parts such as the Country
Coordinating Mechanisms, Principal Recipients, and Local
Funding Agents, in addition to new standards and processes for
them, is a major investment.
3.2.2. Adverse Effects of Non-International Legal Status
In passing the Swiss Host Act, the Swiss Government has tried
to remove any disadvantage an entity might experience under
Swiss law as a result of not having international legal personality.
The privileges and immunities the Swiss government extends to a
financing effort under Swiss law, however, do not extend beyond
Switzerland except under the laws of those countries that decide to
confer a similar status on a given entity under their own respective
laws.314 For this reason, whether the National Law Entity model is
an optimal vehicle for collective financing depends in part on
whether a financing effort‘s attainment of its goals is likely to be
impeded by not having legal personality under international law.
The record shows that having international legal personality is
not as critical as one might expect if creating the financing effort
under a jurisdiction such as Switzerland is an option. International
legal personality does not automatically bring with it legal
capacity.315 As evinced by the experiences of the GEF and the
313 See id. at 26–27 (noting the expense of instituting proper control
mechanisms for agents).
314 For example, the United States has conferred the equivalent of
International Organization status on the Global Fund under U.S. law. See Exec.
Order No. 13,395, 71 C.F.R. 3203 (Jan. 13, 2006), available at
http://www.thefederalregister.com/d.p/2006-01-19-06-554
(extending
the
application of the International Organizations Immunities Act, 22 U.S.C. § 288 and
288f–6, to the Global Fund). See also GLOBAL FUND REPORT ANNEX 6, supra note
142, at 13 (noting that the status the Swiss Government has conferred on the
Global Fund is a step short of the status it has conferred on the International
Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, which enjoy the full
equivalent of intergovernmental organization status under international law).
315 See JAN KLABBERS, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONAL LAW
47 (2d ed. 2009) (noting the different ways of describing international legal
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experience of the Global Fund‘s initial agreement with the WHO,
the most important factor affecting an effort‘s autonomy is
independent legal capacity, which the National Law Entity
provides. Although an organization might be recognized as
having legal personality under international law, it needs legal
capacity to function and make legally valid agreements, such as
employment agreements in the example above. Indeed, this has
led some commentators to view international legal personality as a
somewhat empty concept.316
At the same time, certain advantages do accrue from
international legal status that would benefit a new financing effort.
For example, international organization status can provide an
entrée into meetings and policy discussions with government and
other intergovernmental entities that are important to an
organization‘s work. Just as the right to apply for observer status
in the U.N. is limited to international organizations, 317 the right to
participate in other governmental and inter-governmental
meetings and fora, both in the developed and the developing
world, is more likely to be granted to a financing effort that has
international organization status.
International organization status may also affect an entity‘s
access to resources. International organizations may be written
directly into UNDP and other international organizations‘ funding
arrangements for particular activities instead of having to compete
on a public procurement basis.318
Further, international
organizations automatically qualify for certain kinds of funding
under various government programs, which may not be available
to an organization operating at a national level. 319 In addition,
international organization status enables an entity to enter into
personality); AMERASINGHE, supra note 187, at 77–78 (recognizing that
international personality does not automatically grant the ability to perform
functions with international consequences).
316 See KLABBERS, supra note 315, at 52–53 (contending that the notion of
―international legal personality‖ is relatively weak and difficult to apply to
concrete legal actions).
317 See ALVAREZ, supra note 187, at 154–56 (noting the objections to extending
participation rights to non-state actors).
318 See KLABBERS, supra note 315, at 125–27 (discussing the sources of income
for international organizations); AMERASINGHE, supra note 187, at 359 (discussing
the various methods of funding by international organizations).
319 See KLABBERS, supra note 315, at 128–29 (describing the obligatory funding
of donor countries to qualified organizations under the Articles of the United
Nations).
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international agreements, such as Headquarters Agreements with
host states.320 Headquarters Agreements frequently provide for
preferential treatment on taxes and other matters for the
organization, privileges and immunities for organization staff, and
ambassadorial rank for the organization‘s head.321 This higher
status translates into vastly improved access to government
officials and diplomats, enabling the organization to make its case
directly to governments.322 States do not enter into Headquarters
Agreements with national law entities that are not subjects of
International Law.323 For these reasons, an optimal collective
financing vehicle for development would have both legal capacity
and international personality.
4.

PROPOSALS FOR CHANGE

The special purpose fund phenomenon, operationalized in the
emergence of the Quasi-Entity Fund and National Law Entity
models, shows that the institutions charged with primary
responsibility for international development finance need to
change. The existing institutions date back to a polarized statecentric world when development aid cooperation was linked to
Cold War allegiances and the key donors and recipients consisted
of states. Cold War allegiances are now giving way to shared
concern about global threats and stymied progress in countries that
make up the poorest of the poor. Donors now include a range of
private sector actors, as do recipients. Many stakeholders are seen
as having a legitimate voice in the design of aid programs as well.
These funds suggest that an overhaul of the international legal
order for development is needed. As a long-term goal, an overhaul
should include re-designing those organs of the U.N. engaged in
development, as well as the structure and responsibilities of the
320 See id. at 256 (discussing the treaty-making powers of international
organizations and noting that most organizations conclude a headquarters
agreement with their host state).
321 See AMERASINGHE, supra note 187, at 337 (recognizing that many
agreements result in privileges and immunities for international organizations in
―exercising their functions in relation to the organization‖).
322 See id. at 337–38 (noting how the privileges and immunities translate into
beneficial improvements that fulfill the proposed functions of the organizations).
323 See id. at 315–17, 338–39 (noting that subjects of international law,
including states and international organizations, enter into agreements, such as
Headquarters Agreements affording entities privileges and immunities only with
entities that are similarly subjects of international law).
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World Bank to serve the needs these funds reflect. These needs
include a greater degree of participation in decision-making by
donors, recipients and other interested parties, such as NGOs. A
case could also be made for greater consolidation and a merger of
UNDP and IDA. If we were to begin from scratch today, for
example, in designing a new order for collective financing
initiatives to provide grant funds, the divisions between these
institutional bodies would make little sense.
Further, within these institutions, the need for major change is
obvious. The U.N.‘s development efforts, dispersed amongst a
range of under-funded programs, fall short.324 Donors‘ repeated
preference for donating to special purpose funds, instead of IDA—
the component of the World Bank Group these same donor
governments specifically created to serve the needs of the countries
which are the primary beneficiaries of special purpose funds, must
eventually force consideration of how IDA should change. 325 In
the short-term, pending implementation of broader reform, there
are several concrete steps that should be taken to improve the
capacity of the ad hoc models to meet immediate needs and to
reduce the adverse impact their deficits could have on the overall
aid effort.
Starting with the Quasi-Entity Fund, as currently conceived, it
is rife with uncontained conflicts of interest and destined to
disappoint stakeholders‘ hopes and expectations. In accordance
with basic principal-agent theory, the necessity of an alignment
between the principal‘s and the agent‘s incentives means that a
collective financing initiative for development should either be
subject to the control and authority of the Bank, as a traditional
World Bank Trust Fund is, or be subject to the control and
authority of a separate, autonomous entity. The Quasi-Entity Fund
model aims to serve as something in between, but, instead, results
in unabated agency costs and poor accountability.
The poor accountability in the Quasi-Entity Fund model,
stemming largely from the multiple roles the World Bank assumes,
has many negative consequences. Those consequences include a

324 See de Senarclens, supra note 1, at 10, 32–33 (discussing the U.N.‘s critical
role as a social and economic regulator while noting significant defects in the U.N.
system).
325 To the extent that the distribution of IDA‘s voting shares may credibly be
viewed as a disincentive for donors to donate additional funds to IDA, perhaps
re-evaluating that distribution would be a fruitful starting point.
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lost opportunity for all of development‘s stakeholders because the
Bank‘s multiple roles preclude it from serving as an objective
standard-setter of fiduciary and sustainable development
safeguards for new initiatives. The Bank has both the expertise
and the experience to perform a valuable function as standardsetter. If, however, the Bank is in a position where, as an
institution, it is competing for a fund‘s resources with those for
whom it is setting standards, the objectivity of those standards is
tainted.
The poor accountability in the model also means that it fails as
a useful template for financing efforts that involve a mix of public
and private donors, as the Green Climate Fund is intended to be.
A key concern of private sector donors is the avoidance of any risk
of liability for an initiative‘s acts or omissions.326 In the absence of
clarity with regards to the scope of a donor governing body‘s
responsibilities, that concern cannot be assuaged.327
Perpetuating the poor accountability of the Quasi-Entity Fund
model poses risks. At a minimum, the lack of clarity about the
responsibilities of its component parts give rise to endless turf
battles and the inefficiencies that such battles entail. At worst, the
lack of clarity has the potential to result in lax and unsupervised
application of inadequate standards, which could damage the
credibility of the overall aid effort. In between these extremes, the
model‘s poor accountability presents risks for the World Bank as
an institution and, by extension, for those countries that depend on
the Bank for loan finance.
The risk to the World Bank stems from the proclivity of donors
using this model to expect the Bank as trustee to provide a greater
degree of fiduciary oversight than it has the power to provide.
Although the Bank can expressly limit its liability by including
exculpatory clauses in its agreements with donors, such clauses
will not protect the World Bank‘s reputation if, for example, a
major fraud occurs in a fund with which it is associated. This risk
is significant because the Bank‘s reputation as a competent
financial institution (which remains intact notwithstanding
326 See Sophie Smyth, Can Business Learn to Love the Environment? The Case for
a U.S. Corporate Carbon Fund, 58 RUTGERS L. REV. 451, 474 (2006) (recognizing that
the creation of a U.S. corporate carbon fund would necessitate devising
mechanisms to shield private participants from individual liability).
327 See id. (discussing that in order to create a shield against donor or
participant liability, the scope of the World Bank‘s fiduciary duties must be
clarified).
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widespread criticism of its development effectiveness) is key to the
very essence of how the Bank operates.328 Guarding the Bank‘s
fiscal reputation is more difficult than might appear since it comes
under constant pressure from powerful member countries to meet
their needs.329
This pressure inhibits the articulation of a coherent vision for
the Bank‘s supporting role in these initiatives. One might expect
that a proposed way forward would come from the Bank‘s
leadership, but the silence of the Bank‘s leadership on this issue is
deafening. The uncomfortable reality is that confronting this issue
means confronting the murky and contentious issue of where the
interests of the Bank as an institution begin and the interests of its
more powerful members end.330 In other words, confronting this
issue means confronting the degree to which the Bank is a
328 See INFORMATION STATEMENT, supra note 2, at 1–6 (explaining how the
World Bank raises the funds it uses to make loans by issuing bonds on
international capital markets. The Bank derives most of its operating capital from
the proceeds of its bonds. Absent this capacity to borrow funds on international
capital markets, the Bank would have no access to the funds it uses to make loans
to the developing world, and therefore could not function as a development bank.
Accordingly, the World Bank cannot afford to administer externally financed
funds at the risk of jeopardizing the reputation it has in the international capital
markets as a robust financial institution); id. at 101 (noting that the ―IBRD is not
required to post collateral under‖ the derivatives agreements it has entered into
with counterparties, as long as it maintains its AAA credit rating).
329 See Pincus & Winters, Reinventing the World Bank, supra note 3, at 14–20
(discussing the Bank‘s difficulty preserving a singular focus because of the intense
pressure it comes under from member states and other entities to undertake
various mandates). The issue of whether to serve as trustee of a fund is also
subject to internal pressures as the Bank is not a monolithic institution. See
Sarfaty, supra note 22, at 667–76 (detailing, for example, differing views within the
World Bank on the issue of human rights). Every proposal for a new collective
financing effort sparks differing interests among different fiefdoms within the
institution. For example, departments poised to get funds from an effort to add to
its particular lending agenda (such as the Environment Department in the case of
the GEF Trust Fund) will be vocal advocates in favor of the Bank‘s agreeing to
administer a fund because the gain to it will be immediate; the fund offers it the
promise of additional funds, freed from the internecine struggles that attach to the
Bank‘s internal budget wars. Support for protecting the Bank‘s broader
institutional interests, however, is likely to be more diffuse. Id. The Bank‘s Trust
Fund Management Department may be keenly aware of the risks of administering
a fund for which the Bank‘s tasks as trustee are unmanageable and may clamor in
opposition. But as an arm of the Bank‘s back office, expected to service and
facilitate the front lines of the Bank‘s lending operations, the Trust Fund
Management Department‘s view is unlikely to prevail.
330 See Barnett & Finnemore, supra note 3, at 714 (discussing the difficulty in
determining whether the interests and agenda of an international organization
reflect or divert from the intentions of its founding member states).
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principal in its own right as an institution as opposed to being
merely a loyal puppy of its more powerful member countries.331
In spite of these shortcomings, however, the direction taken by
the Quasi-Entity Fund appears to be viewed, generally, as in the
interests of development. Therefore, the goal is to identify a
judicious fund design that captures the advantages of this shift
without jeopardizing the Bank‘s function as a development bank or
these funds‘ goals as a source of grant finance. No one change will
serve as a universal cure-all. Cumulative changes are needed.
In the interests of reducing the risk of agency slack in this
model, the following changes should be considered. First, the
donor community should press the World Bank to formally
disaggregate the Bank‘s functions as a financial administrator from
its other functions by creating a new legally distinct sixth member
of the World Bank Group—an International Development Fund
Administrator entity that would provide new financing efforts
with financial administration services. In addition to providing
financial administration services, a new legally distinct
International Development Fund Administrator entity could also
serve as a standard setter and provide new financing efforts with
advice on such issues as, standards for assessing financial recordkeeping capacity and procurement best practices. These efforts
would be untainted and unconstrained by the agenda of other
World Bank Group entities. Furthermore, donors should aim for a
model that allows for autonomy of the collective financing effort
and, therefore, proactively manages the conflicts of interest
inherent in the Quasi-Entity Fund model. The conflict of interest
that arises between functionally independent secretariats and the
World Bank is inevitable. Perpetuating a model that produces the
stalemates, stand-offs, and contradictory agendas, that such
conflicts of interest generate, hurts those who both give and receive
assistance to or from the initiatives that these secretariats serve.
Some competition and tension is inevitable as viewpoints and
priorities differ. But stalemates, stand offs, and paralysis are not
inevitable. They, unlike a conflict of views, result from a lack of
331 See Milner, supra note 4, at 112 (discussing how ―in a multilateral setting
the principal-agent problem becomes even more acute). See also WOODS, supra
note 17, at 179–80 (pointing out that the agendas of the IMF and the World Bank
are affected by the preferences of their most powerful members, their bureaucratic
agendas and the politics of the countries to which they provide assistance); Kapur,
supra note 73, at 65–67 (discussing the dilemma of determining the role of the
World Bank in the context of ―the continued dominance of the United States‖).
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clarity about who is in charge. Change is also needed to address
the accountability gaps in the Quasi-Entity Fund and the following
steps should be considered. First, donors and the World Bank
should delineate clearly the respective roles and responsibilities of
the component parts of a Quasi-Entity Fund to avoid gaps in
oversight or misperceptions about where responsibility lies. The
responsibilities of the component parts of a Quasi-Entity Fund
should be aligned with formal authority, technical competence,
and dedicated resources to discharge them.
Second, donors should specify whether the World Bank‘s social
and fiduciary safeguards will apply to grants financed by a fund
and if World Bank policies do not apply, what alternatives apply
and who will assume responsibility for seeing that they are
observed.
Experience also demonstrates the importance of
identifying upfront the source and substance of the standards that
a fund‘s donor governing body will apply when allocating a fund‘s
resources. The issue of what operational standards recipients
should apply is a delicate one—allowing for standards different
from the World Bank‘s social safeguards, for example, could end
up facilitating end-runs around those standards.
As these
standards exist to protect the environment and vulnerable groups,
the interests of development‘s stakeholders would not be served
by allowing collective funding initiatives to undercut those
standards.
Third, the World Bank as a trustee of a Quasi-Entity Fund
should not assume responsibility for overseeing non-World Bank
recipients‘ use of the fund‘s resources unless it is given the powers
and resources (including manpower and training as needed) to
perform that role. Further, if the World Bank does not assume that
role, donors need to find a replacement watchdog or set up
mechanisms for the donor governing body to exercise oversight.
The National Law Entity has promise. But as an approach to
collective financing, it is not clear that this model is the optimal
combination of old and new norms. Devising new practices and
institutions is a costly exercise that, to some extent, throws the
baby out with the bath water. A financing vehicle that better
integrates the knowledge base and experience of the World Bank‘s
and others‘ fiduciary and sustainable development policies would
better serve all stakeholders‘ interests. Pending the creation of
such a vehicle, however, thought could be given to improving the
National Law Entity model in the following ways.
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A way should be found to give initiatives both legal capacity
and international legal personality. If, for example, the creators of
new initiatives were to express an intention to confer international
legal personality in the initiative‘s constituent documents, in
addition to complying with the requirements necessary for an
initiative to have legal capacity under a national law regime, that
would be a start. Efforts should then be taken to encourage other
countries to recognize that status and to facilitate the process of
their doing so.332
The World Bank should clarify the criteria for determining
when and whether it, or any new member of the World Bank
Group that might be created for this purpose, will provide
financial administration services.
When the World Bank‘s role is limited to serving as a conduit
of funds, the World Bank should not adopt the label of a ―trustee‖
or any other label that connotes a fiduciary duty that the Bank does
not have the authority to discharge. The less loaded ―Financial
Administrator‖ label would be more appropriate.
A model National Law Entity form should be devised to allow
for replication and the lowering of the transaction costs involved in
creating a new entity.
5.

CONCLUSION

Success in creating credible collective development finance
efforts will be easier to achieve if the international legal order
provides the institutions, mechanisms, and norms necessary for
such efforts to operate with purposive integrity. This Article offers
the theoretical logic for improvements and some suggestions for
what those improvements should be. The core conclusion is this:
even if international development finance is hampered by
disillusionment with past aid efforts, divergent motivations, and
seesawing political preferences, the overall aid effort will be
strengthened by the creation of a baseline set of institutions,
mechanisms, and norms that facilitate collective efforts for
purposes that both donors and recipients support, with minimal
332 See KLABBERS, supra note 315, at 47 (discussing competing interpretations
of the ICJ‘s Reparation for Injuries opinion on the issue of the international legal
personality of organizations); AMERASINGHE, supra note 187, at 66–69 (providing
an overview of the dynamic between international legal personality and legal
capacity, specifically noting that there are many benefits and rationales for
according international organizations international legal personality).
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agency costs. In due course, enhanced credibility for development
finance must be earned by the delivery of results and increased
participation in framing what ideal results would be. Achieving
improved assurance that funds made available will be used for the
purposes for which they are given, however, is a necessary first
step towards achieving those broader objectives.
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